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New Chapters, Old Stories: Developmental Narratives Sustaining Apartheid(s)

Elize Soer
Series Editor: Christi Kruger

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Foreword

Contemporary writings on socio-political and economic historical trajectories often seem to theorise within binaries: modern and postmodern, apartheid and post-apartheid, colonial and postcolonial, the Global South and the Global North, developed and developing. While these concepts may offer useful points of departure, an uncritical application thereof almost inevitably results in practice that remains not only orthodox and uninspiring, but that (re)produces disempowering structures and institutions while envisioning the opposite thereof.

In *New Chapters, Old Stories: Developmental Narratives Sustaining Apartheid(s)*, Elize Soer encourages us to "think with history", imagining the temporality of political thought as much longer and more pervasive than the commonly accepted historical narratives would have us believe. With her specific focus on the notion of "sustainable development" Soer displays how one could go about thinking *with* the histories of colonialism and apartheid to link the specific ideologies, or narratives, that underpinned these structures to the present-day sustainable development industry. Despite efforts to overcome this lingering colonial legacy, many development programmes continue to imagine Euro-America as a euphuism for "civilised" while consciously and unconsciously projecting onto those communities where interventions are led, harmful stereotypes such as notions of the over-sexualised African man, the subordinate African woman, the inability of postcolonial states to regulate production, and the need for the Global North to intervene in conservation of natural and other resources. Soer carefully unpacks the idea of "global apartheids" to illustrate an entanglement of developmental and capital ideologies, and thereby thoroughly complicates the relationship between those intervening and those receiving intervention.

For those who are interested in the history of the development sector, *New Chapters, Old Stories* provides a fascinating overview of the ways in which sustainable development came to be a central part of life in many postcolonial states today, as well as a thought-provoking analysis of the structural and ideological continuities between colonialism and postcolonialism. For those working within the development sector, this monograph may serve as a cautionary tale. Like so many other socio-political aspects, Soer warns in the concluding chapter that development is never neutral. She chooses, however, to frame her writing in terms of narrative rather than ideology: it is about the stories that we tell about, and perhaps through, development and the pervasive nature thereof, despite critique.

At its core *Just Gender,* the project from which this monograph flows, seeks to question, disrupt, and

interrupt the stories that we tell ourselves and others about development and the concepts that intimately surround it. The aim of this is not to disregard all forms of development. Rather, it is to question the stories that we tell, to ask which characters we have left out of our stories entirely, and to interrogate who the writers and narrators of our stories have been.

Preface

Introduction

This text stemmed from a profound sense of *déjà vu*. As I read through recent policy documents related to "sustainable development", I noticed that they all claimed that a new era of development was being launched. This was also the case with previous documents related to "sustainable development" such as the Brundtland report of 1987. These documents, in turn, echoed the policies and discourses that the Apartheid government used to make its segregationist system seem more appealing in the late 1950s by introducing the concept of "separate development". The Apartheid government had appropriated the discourses that the British Empire had used to revive and justify its colonial mission in Africa after the Second World War. Again, Britain's policies were not entirely new, but based on the "development projects" it had launched in the 1920s.

During each stage, colonial powers insisted on the newness of their policies, although they bore striking similarities to their predecessors. Each time, these powers acknowledged that previous policies might have promoted their own interests or at least that previous policies had failed in their stated objectives, but that this time would be different. Then, paradoxically, the consequences of all the previous "development projects" were erased from the policy record, although they had been recorded elsewhere, and the problem was again portrayed as one of "underdevelopment" or "lack of development". Problems were presented as the problems of "underdeveloped" people who simply needed to be included in modernity. This simultaneously overlooked the underside of the history of modernity (Mignolo, 2011) and enabled colonial powers to blame "African culture" for the problems in countries in which they had been intervening for decades[1]. In response, this monograph aims to situate the discourse of "sustainable development" in the broader narrative of development to demonstrate that, similar to its colonial and Apartheid predecessors, it contributes to sustaining a broader exploitative structure.

From the Tomlinson Commission to the Brundtland Commission: introducing the ancestors of "sustainable development"

In 1954 the Tomlinson Commission (cited in Geldenhuys, 1981: 4) declared that (own emphasis added):

[1] European colonialism in Africa happened relatively late in comparison to imperialism in South America, as evidenced by the fact that the Berlin conference of 1884–1885 happened almost three centuries after Europeans "discovered" the Americas in 1492.

> The Commission is convinced that separate development of the European and Bantu communities should be striven for, as the only direction in which racial conflict may possibly be eliminated, and racial harmony possibly be maintained. The only obvious way out of the dilemma, lies in the *sustained development* of the Bantu Areas on a large scale.

The Tomlinson report is neither the first nor the last report to recommend "development" as a solution to the problems created by colonialism.[2] Settler colonialism in South Africa (SA) eventually culminated in the infamous Apartheid system that was formally instigated by the National Party (NP) in 1948. Apartheid ("separateness" in Afrikaans) was a system of institutionalised racial segregation that built on the segregationist policies that preceded it[3]. The Bantustans, also known as the Bantu homelands, reserves, or South African homelands, were ten territories that the Apartheid government had designated as pseudo-national homelands for the country's African population.[4] In 1950, the state appointed the Tomlinson Commission to make recommendations concerning the "socio-economic development" of these areas. Of course, the problems experienced in the Bantu areas were not regarded as corollaries of colonialism at the time but were instead attributed to the culture and supposedly inferior farming methods of the people confined to them (De Wet, 1989: 335).

Following the assumption that the "Bantu people"[5] lacked development, the Tomlinson report and a host of other documents and academic texts suggested policies for developing the people in the Bantustans. Interestingly, the recommended policies focused on the conditions within these areas without questioning or challenging the structure of Apartheid. When Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd attempted to apply a progressive gloss to the Apartheid regime by relabelling it "separate development" and refining the

[2] Providing a definitive definition of colonialism is challenging. A variety of historic interactions between different peoples have been described as colonial or neo-colonial. This poses difficulties because if the term is defined too narrowly, communities who have suffered due to what they characterise as colonialism will be excluded. Conversely, if the term is defined too broadly, "almost any form of relation featuring inequality of power between different international parties appears to be an instance of colonialism" (Butt, 2013: 1). The Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2007: 169) distinguishes between colonialism and coloniality, which refers to the continuation of colonial power structures after the official end of colonial administrations. Grosfoguel (2009: 22) similarly employs the concept of coloniality, which he defines as "the cultural, political, sexual and economic oppression/exploitation of subordinate racialized/ethnic groups by dominant racial/ethnic groups ***with or without*** the existence of colonial administrations". The definition of "colonial systems" that I use is similar to Grosfoguel's definition of coloniality since the systems can function *with* or *without* an official colonial administration. However, I discuss specific instances of colonialism throughout this study in order to demonstrate that different colonial systems functioned in the same time period and that the distinction between different types of colonialism and between colonialism and "neo- colonialism" or coloniality is not always clear or temporally exact.

[3] In this text, "Apartheid" (with a capital letter *A*) thus refers to the official system, while "apartheid" (with a lower-case *a*) refers to separateness.

[4] The Bantustans stemmed from the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts that defined various scattered areas as "native reserves" for Africans. These areas were expanded and consolidated and people were relocated. By the 1950s, the areas amounted to about 13% of the total land area of SA.

[5] The term *abantu* is a Zulu noun in plural form meaning "people". The word "Bantu" was first used in 1856 by the German linguist Wilhelm Heinrich Immanuel Bleek to describe a group of people spread across Central and Southern Africa, and who were speaking about 700 related languages. He described this group as "Bantu-speaking people". Today, "Bantu-speakers" are a third of the total population of Africa. From the 1960s, the apartheid government replaced the term "native", previously used to denote a black person of African origin, with the term "bantu". For example, the Department of Native Affairs was renamed the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. The term "bantu" is thus associated with apartheid and subjugation (South African History Online (SAHO)), 2016), and is now understood to be pejorative. I use the term throughout the monograph in its historical context, with no intention to cause offence.

structures of the system through the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, there were certainly critiques, some of which are discussed in subsequent chapters. However, very few of these filtered through to the policy recommendations for the development of the Bantu areas. In retrospect, it is evident that the NP and its affiliates used the ideology of development, and the "betterment" policies related to it, in an attempt to justify an exploitative and discriminatory system.

Thirty-three years after the Tomlinson Commission released its report, the World Commission for Environment and Development (WCED), more commonly known as the Brundtland Commission, released its report on the relationship between development and the environment: *Our common future* (WCED, 1987). Although the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) was the first well-known organisation to use the term "sustainable development" in its *World conservation strategy*, the Brundtland report popularised the term and made it the central concept around which debates concerning climate change became organised (Bruyninckx, 2006: 267).

The term has been widely criticised by scholars who claim that it leaves the unsustainable capitalist structure intact and "hence is a smokescreen concept that avoids more structural debates" (Bruyninckx, 2006: 290). However, similar to the Apartheid regime's developmental policy, the critiques against the notion of sustainable development[6] have not permeated the policy documents that claim to address environmental degradation and climate change. Other remarkable similarities between the two policy frameworks exist, both in terms of the broader developmental ideology and in terms of the policies that have been advocated. I discuss the two frameworks in relation to each other in order to critique the narrative of sustainable development and to argue that it will not produce policies that will enable us to deal with the many interrelated challenges that humanity is facing today, particularly the challenges associated with climate change.

Situating sustainable development

This monograph situates the notion of sustainable development in its historical context and reveals its colonial origins. It is important to note that "Western" development ideologies and models were not simply hegemonic discourses that were imposed on subjected people. As Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (cited in Hodge, 2007: 3) remind us, "the appropriations, deflections, and challenges emerging within the overall construct of development — and the limits to them — deserve careful attention". Nonetheless, the narrative of development was used as a framework to interpret the problems in colonies from the 1920s onwards. The ways in which problems were framed and imagined "provided the rationale for administrative solutions that promoted external intervention and control over local resources and practices" (Hodge, 2007: 12).

Likewise, the NP used ideologies of development and "betterment" to frame the problems in the Bantustans, which in turn led to policies that not

[6] Throughout the text, both "development" and "sustainable development" should be read in inverted commas. I do not use inverted commas consistently simply to facilitate readability.

only sustained a colonial system but led to widespread displacement and suffering. Specifically analogous to Britain's policies in colonies it ruled indirectly[7], the NP's policies were formed in symbiotic, though highly unequal, relationships with the people it aimed to dominate. The ways in which development discourses and policies were historically used to justify exploitative colonial systems thus inform the main argument of this monograph, namely that the discourse of sustainable development functions in a similar way today. The policy recommendations that emerge from this framework focus almost exclusively on the problems in the "Global South"[8] and these recommendations are thus aimed at "uplifting" or "developing" the "underdeveloped" world. Consequently, they shift the focus from broader systems of oppression to the specific problems that experts identify in local contexts. The developmental policies proposed by organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank focus on the alleviation of poverty instead of questioning the global systems that redistribute resources from the poor to the rich.

Global Apartheid(s)

I conceptualise these global systems as a system of Global Apartheid. As mentioned, the official Apartheid system was instigated by the NP after it had won the 1948 national election in SA. In fact, the NP used "Apartheid" as its electoral slogan and it played a huge part in the unexpected victory for radical Afrikaner nationalism[9] (Dubow, 2014: 1). Since then, the meaning of the term has escaped from its original bonds and it has been applied to various contexts and situations. However, as Dubow (2014: v) observes, "for all its familiarity, apartheid resists easy definition". Much like the system it denoted, the meaning of Apartheid is pliable and changed over time. People's experience of Apartheid also varied depending on numerous factors such as geographical location, race, gender and class (Dubow, 2014: 290). Dubow observes that, instead of asking why Apartheid was defeated, it might be more fruitful to ask why it survived for so long. Surely there were many factors that contributed to the system's longevity, but one of the most important factors was Apartheid's ability to adapt/ be adapted in form and content.

Jacques Derrida (cited in Dubow, 2014: 283) points out that once the term "apartheid" was coined, it acquired a life of its own: "its referents were no longer specific to South Africa, nor limited to the particular context in which

[7] For example, Iraq (1921–1953).

[8] I realise that the binary categories of "Global North" and "Global South", as well as "developed" and "underdeveloped", "first world" and "third world" and so on are essentialist and problematic. I use these terms as they are used in the documents that I discuss. Although they are misrepresentations, the policies that are recommended are based on these categorisations and representations and therefore they become "real". In a sense, I am applying what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak refers to as "strategic essentialism" since I discuss knowledge constructions about the Global South and "the ways in which it becomes constituted and represented by a particular set of discursive power relations that underlie the development discourse" (Banerjee, 2003: 144).

[9] The Afrikaners, an ethnic group in SA, are descendants of the Dutch, German and French settlers who came to SA in the seventeenth century. The diverse settlers became a unified group with a cultural identity based on whiteness, the Afrikaans language and belonging to one of the Dutch Reformed Churches. Afrikaner identity was constructed in opposition to English-speaking South Africans and to people classified into other racial groups. There have been various studies of Afrikaner nationalism and its contribution to Apartheid policy, for example Goldberg's (1985) *The nature of Afrikaner nationalism*, Dubow's (1992) *Afrikaner nationalism, Apartheid and the conceptualization of 'race'*, Kruger's (1991) *Gender, community and identity: women and Afrikaner nationalism in the Volksmoeder discourse of Die Boerevrou* (1919–1931), and Moodie's (1975) *The rise of Afrikanerdom: power, apartheid, and the Afrikaner civil religion.*

it operated and evolved. Apartheid became a universal metaphor". If D.F. Malan[10] had not labelled the intensification of segregationist policies "Apartheid", it is possible that SA's discriminatory policies would not have been singled out and condemned in the way that they were. On the one hand, the term provided a rallying call for Afrikaner nationalists and facilitated the NP's rise to power. On the other hand, labelling a diverse set of discriminatory policies made it easier for detractors to critique the segregationist system in SA[11]. Apartheid thus became a symbol, "a lightning-rod, even a scape-goat that took away the sins of the world" (Dubow, 2014: 278). It was condemned by countries on both sides of the iron curtain and by the so-called non-aligned countries that were emerging from colonialism[12]. The Apartheid system was rightly critiqued for being an affront to human rights and racial justice. However, the same level of condemnation was not applied to other societies marked by systemic injustices.

Using the term as a "free-floating linguistic grab-handle to characterize systematized racism and inequality" does blur historical differences and risks overlooking specificities and changes in its meaning (Dubow, 2014: 279). However, Apartheid included a multi-dimensional set of practices. It was an economic system, an elaborate form of institutionalised racism, a social engineering project and "a method of governance combining outright repression with internalized habits of deference and paternalism born of centuries of master–servant relations" (Dubow, 2014: 293). Posel (1991) warns against seeing Apartheid as the enactment of a single, prolonged "grand-plan". She challenges the notion that Apartheid was cumulative and linear and rather emphasises its uncertainties, failures, deviations and conflicts. Summarily, she argues that "the notion of a single master plan fundamentally misrepresents the political processes whereby Apartheid was built, greatly exaggerating the extent of continuity, control, and long-term planning involved" (Posel, 1991: 5). In fact, the meaning of Apartheid was controversial throughout the 1950s and by 1961 the South African Broadcasting Commission (SABC) had already switched to using the euphemism "self-development" because SA's future in the Commonwealth was being disputed (Dubow, 2014: 278; Posel, 1991: 137).

While I recognise that applying the "Apartheid" label to contexts outside of SA risks glossing over historical particularities and important distinctions, it is significant that the meaning of the term was never monolithic. Even in SA, its meaning was complex and varied over time. As noted, it was precisely its capacity for reinvention and adaptation that made it so resilient. Moreover, debates about the content of Apartheid are pertinent because it was "easier to define the abolition of the apartheid state—its constitution, its leaders, its legislation, its capacity to repress—than it was to efface the underlying system of inequality that it underwrote" (Dubow, 2014: 291). As we face a (post)apartheid world characterised by apartheid-like

[10] D.F. Malan was the Prime Minister of SA from 1948 to 1954.

[11] Dubow (2014: x) makes a similar argument and notes that "It (the term Apartheid) gave power and purpose to the apartheid state, but also rendered it vulnerable through the very act of highlighting its exceptionality".

[12] Although there were widespread critiques against Apartheid, it has to be noted that there was no shortage of sympathisers for a white minority regime that claimed to stand as a bastion of anti-communism and Christian civilisation on the "dark continent" (Dubow, 2014: 277).

inequalities, it becomes ever more critical to think about the different components of Apartheid and their continuities and discontinuities.

In concurrence with Dubow, I see Apartheid as an idea and a reality; two spheres that are certainly not mutually exclusive. Apartheid ideology propagated a vision of "separate development for communities imagined in terms of officially coded categories" (Dubow, 2014: 294). Social engineering, in turn, made these categories a reality. In some ways, Apartheid was an abstract political conception used to describe an array of oppressive policies. However, the label itself allowed for efficient critiques because it denoted that there was "a system" responsible for oppression. By labelling international structures of inequality "Global Apartheid", I therefore aim to name a diverse set of discriminatory structures in order to critique them more efficiently.

Accordingly, I chose the label for both analytical and political reasons. Firstly, it strengthens the link between the development ideologies that were prevalent during the Apartheid era and those that are used in relation to climate change policy today. As demonstrated in chapter four, the global system today functions like an apartheid system. As an empirical concept it describes the structure of global society in terms of economic control, migration patterns and "the role of aid donors and 'puppet' regimes in determining economic policy" (Dalby, 1998: 138). Although scholars today correctly note that dictatorial leaders in the Global South are not simply "puppets" of governments and institutions in the Global North, it is still sometimes assumed that this was the case in colonies that were ruled indirectly. However, not even the leaders of the Bantustans were simply puppets; they collaborated, negotiated and even resisted NP policies in various ways. As Ally and Lissoni (2012: 3) observe, the lines between resistance and collaboration in the Bantustans were blurred.

Politically, the concept of Global Apartheid is meant to be a negative judgement of the contemporary global structure. The concept carries a legacy associated with brutal exploitation and discrimination, which makes it easy to forget the Apartheid regime attempted to justify its policies in moral terms. This monograph attempts to demonstrate that contemporary policies, ranging from economic policies to border control regimes, are often just as brutal and also couched in moralistic and developmental rhetoric. From this argument it follows that fundamental changes to the global system are necessary, not only because a system of Global Apartheid is fundamentally unjust, but also because it cannot produce policies that will adequately deal with climate change as well as with a multitude of other interrelated challenges that people are facing today.

Thinking with history

The aim of identifying similarities between the NP's developmental ideologies and policies and the notion of sustainable development is not to show that history repeats itself or to argue that colonial systems have remained unchanged for more than a century. History does not repeat itself and, in spite of strong continuities, this monograph also comments on some of the changes in colonial strategies and rhetoric.[13] The aim is rather to respond

[13] As with Apartheid in SA, it is probable that the malleability of colonial systems contributed to their durability.

to the historian John Tosh's plea to "think with history". According to Tosh (2008), thinking with history entails two practices. Firstly, "it produces images of the past, against which we position ourselves by difference or resemblance" and, secondly, "it discloses the temporal flows which generate narratives of change, out of which our historical present is formed" (Tosh, 2008: 7). Thinking with history thus enables historians to see larger processes of continuity while revealing factors that are unique to the present.

Moreover, I attempt to demonstrate that development projects still blame the "lack of development" in the Global South on the traditions of the people in these countries and thus overlook the outcomes of previous developmental projects. Instead of locating the "target populations" of development projects outside of development and modernity, a historical approach recognises both the impact that previous colonial development projects had in the Global South and the important role that these societies played in constituting development and modernity in the Global North. As Grosfoguel (2009: 26) notes, many of the elements that are attributed to Western modernity were formed in complex "global relations between the west and the non-west".

Although my approach has been significantly influenced by the work of decolonial scholars such as Ramón Grosfoguel and Walter Mignolo, I am hesitant to claim that I am adopting a decolonial approach. This is, firstly, because my approach is equally informed by scholars such as Slavoj Žižek, Naomi Klein and Noam Chomsky. Though they are often referred to as critical or dissident thinkers, they are by no means decolonial. Decolonial theory and theories from the Global South more generally can be informative interpretive frameworks as well as crucial tools to challenge the status quo. Nonetheless, in this particular instance I do not want to confine my critique of sustainable development to a decolonial lens. Finally, I want to foreground the fact that including decolonial theory does not necessarily make a text decolonial. Few scholars who rely extensively on sources from the Global North explicitly state that they are using a Western approach. The fact that a Western lens is often assumed to be a universal lens has been widely and rightly critiqued by decolonial scholars (Mignolo, 2018). However, by including the work of scholars from the Global South I do not necessarily aim to make my approach decolonial. I simply believe that relying solely on the work of scholars from the Global North provides a very narrow and problematic base to argue from.

Same old story

Thus far, I have referred to developmental "notions", "ideologies" and "frameworks", all of which can be accurate classifications. However, in accordance with Emery Roe (cited in Crush, 1995: 13), I think that it can be especially useful to see development "as a form of storytelling" in which the idea of development becomes "a narrative with stage, plot, characters, coherence, morality and an outcome". Although it might be more suitable to think about multiple outcomes instead of *an* outcome and to recognise that the story of development is not always coherent, the conception is illuminating because it focuses our attention on the power of narratives. Although there has been much scholarly deliberation on narratives, I find the Cambridge

Dictionary definition both simple and valuable: a narrative is "a particular way of explaining or understanding events" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). The paradigm of development is essentially a particular way of understanding and explaining events. It tells a linear story in which humanity is ordered into an evolutionary continuum ranging from the primitive to the civilised and in which "the West" (or ideas associated with the West) presents the culmination of history and thus the model which all other societies must emulate.[14]

There are many chapters within this story, most notably sustainable development, but also "participatory development", "community-centred development" and so on. This allows for criticism against specific aspects of development, while keeping the broader framework intact. In the words of Escobar (1995: 5), "one could criticize a given approach and propose modifications or improvements accordingly, but the fact of development itself, and the need for it, could not be doubted". Twenty-five years after Escobar's critique, development is still the dominant narrative and, in spite of some of his problematic assertions,[15] Escobar's (1995: 5) observation that "Wherever one looked, one found the repetitive and omnipresent reality of development: governments designing and implementing ambitious development plans, institutions carrying out development programs in city and countryside alike, experts of all kinds studying underdevelopment and producing theories ad nauseam" is still relevant.

What does gender have to do with it?

Developmental projects are gendered in multiple ways since the narratives of development are gendered and the policy outcomes of developmental projects have heterogeneous, gendered effects.[16] Documents and reports on "women and development" also reflect and intersect with sustainable development narratives in fascinating ways. Since the First World Conference for Women in Mexico in 1974, the Women in Development (WID) approach have become dominant at international and national levels and women have been framed as agents for development. According to this cyclical argument, sustainable development is necessary for "women's empowerment" and "women's empowerment" is necessary for sustainable development.

Regarding women as agents or, rather, instruments for development is often seen as a progressive approach since it does not only focus on women's vulnerability and exploitation. For example, Sen Roy (2018: 146) notes that "most of the limited discourse on gender and climate change… is on the greater vulnerability of women and girls". She agrees that women would be more vulnerable because of "age old traditions" (Sen Roy, 2018: 146)

[14] This notion was epitomised by Francis Fukuyama's claim that the progression of history was a struggle between ideologies that ended with a victory for liberalism after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama (1992) famously dubbed the end of the Cold War "The end of history".

[15] For example, Escobar's view of the rural poor is somewhat idealised, and he often refers to them in a homogenised way. In some instances, his views were reminiscent of the "noble savage" idea associated with colonised societies. For example, he argues that "The rural poor in particular, because of their different culture, practice a certain 'ecologism,' contributing to the conservation of resources" (Escobar, 1995: 201). Not only does he imply that "the rural poor" has a homogenous and static culture, he also sees them as closer to nature, which could be problematic.

[16] There is a plethora of research on this topic, including multiple edited volumes such Routledge's *Gender and development* (Momsen, 2020).

and "cultural norms" (Sen Roy, 2018: 145) in many countries in the Global South. However, instead of just focusing on women's vulnerability, she also argues that "in many cultures some of the age old traditions with respect to lifestyle and traditions are passed through mothers to their daughters, which can be particularly useful for effective policies at the local level" (Sen Roy, 2018: 146). These two arguments, namely that women are vulnerable because of oppressive patriarchal traditions in the Global South and that women hold "special knowledge" that could be useful for development, are present in almost all of the contemporary policy documents and reports on gender, climate change and development. This conceptualisation of gender is problematic for various reasons, including the fact that it still sees gender as a women's issue.

Although many of the problems related to the framing of gender, climate change and development are discussed throughout the monograph, special attention is paid to the affinity with which women in colonies were presented in colonial development projects. The historian, Barbara Bush (2014: 271), observes that "in colonial narratives African women are silent, nameless ciphers most commonly represented as labouring 'beasts of burden'. Their oppression under male patriarchy was contrasted with the strength and freedom of emancipated European women". Conversely, as imperial Britain began to use the narrative of development to frame its colonial endeavours, colonised African women "were targeted as the key to taming potentially rebellious men and ensuring the modernisation of colonial society through Western domesticity" (Bush, 2014: 276). There is thus a strong historical precedent for the ways in which women in the Global South are presented in development narratives today and seeing women as "agents of development" is not as progressive as is often assumed. Moreover, I build on Bush's work to demonstrate that the same narratives that allowed "liberal" British women to teach African women "superior Western values" in British colonies still inform policies that present African women as oppressed "beasts of burden" who can be developed into "empowered women" and "agents of development" along the lines of enlightened white women.

Scholars have examined various gendered aspects of the Bantustans. Many of these studies focused on specific regions, for example Mager's (1992) *'The people get fenced': gender, rehabilitation and African nationalism in the Ciskei and Border Region, 1945–1955.* Other scholars such as James (1985) and Niehaus (1994) researched the impact that relocation had on changing household arrangements, although their studies were also area specific. In the historian Laura Evans's more recent study concerning the influence of gendered and generational inequalities on the experiences of farm dwellers who were "resettled" in rural townships in the Ciskei Bantustan during the 1960s–70s, she notes that "the gendered dimensions of resettlement remain little understood" (Evans, 2013: 215). Although Evans (2013: 226) notes that the process of labour migration became associated with rituals of manhood and that "migration came to constitute a central role in the construction of masculine identities", I would argue that the focus on women in studies of gender in the Bantustans has left a lacuna in the literature relating to the influence

of "resettlement" on the construction of masculinities and femininities. However, this monograph does not aim to fill this gap. Instead, I focus on the discourses surrounding gender and the "betterment" of the Bantustans as well as the ways in which these representations resemble or differ from the representations of gender in documents on sustainable development today. Although representations of gender are context specific and have changed over time, this approach also reveals important continuities, as demonstrated by the fact that narratives of women as enablers of development long predated the 1980s.

By framing the international status quo as a system of Global Apartheid, I also hope to shed light on important continuities in gendered power relations. These power relations are undoubtedly intersectional. Intersectionality[17] has become a buzzword in academia and it is perhaps a cliché to highlight its importance. I refer to the significance of intersectionality throughout the monograph, but I do not provide a thorough intersectional analysis. I simply use the term to highlight the ways in which axes of intersectionality such as race, class, gender and geography influence people's positionality in the global Apartheid system. For example, Dalby (1998: 138) notes that the analogy of Global Apartheid is especially relevant "in the field of international domestic labour and the migratory patterns of nannies and maids from the poor to the rich parts of the planet". Migrant domestic workers are thus not only a prime example of how intersectionality functions, but also clearly mirrors the migrant domestic worker system in SA. A comparative study of the domestic labour system in SA and the international domestic labour system could be illuminating. However, this study simply aims to highlight the gendered ways in which the Global Apartheid system mirrors the system of "separate development" in Apartheid SA.

This study focuses specifically on the implications this has for the narrative of development.

Chapter outline

In the first chapter, I highlight some of the colonial origins of the concept of development and emphasise the correlations between colonial development policies and sustainable development policies today. The chapter focuses on Britain's Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the reinvigoration of colonial development programmes in the 1940s. The chapter reveals how colonial powers used the narrative of development to justify and intensify colonialism and argues that the narrative of development still functions in a similar way today.

Subsequently, in the second chapter, I build on the argument made in the first chapter by analysing the ways in which the Apartheid government in SA used the narrative of development, particularly "separate development", to justify its Bantustan policies. When Dr Hendrik Verwoerd became Prime

[17] The African American lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term "intersectionality" in 1989 and used it to refer to the ways in which elements such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, age and sexuality intersect and influence an individual's position in society. The term has since become popular and various scholars have used it to examine and socially locate individuals. An intersectional approach can also be used to analyse how "both formal and informal systems of power are deployed, maintained, and reinforced through axes of race class and gender" (Berger & Guidroz, 2009:1). For a more in-depth discussion of the concept please consult Crenshaw's (2017) work, *On intersectionality: essential writings.*

Minister of SA in 1958, he aimed to make the Apartheid system seem more appealing by framing it as "separate development". The chapter focuses on the similarities between the discourses that related to "separate development" at that time and the discourses related to "sustainable development" today to support the argument that the narrative of development is being used to sustain a broader exploitative system.

The third chapter discusses some of the ways in which the discourse of sustainable development functions today. The chapter argues that, within the framework of sustainable development, the causes of climate change are sometimes misconstrued. The policy prescriptions and interventions that follow from this paradigm are equally problematic. Moreover, the chapter discusses gender in relation to sustainable development discourses to demonstrate that these discourses reproduce the colonial narratives and policies discussed in the first two chapters.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, I argue that global power relations function as a system of Global Apartheid. I also discuss "local" and "regional" forms of Apartheid to demonstrate that, in spite of the striking similarities between these systems, they function in diverse ways. These systems are heterogeneous and thus elucidate different elements of Apartheid. The chapter also discusses two predominant versions of contemporary Global Apartheid, namely the "Obama option" and the "Trump option". The chapter argues that both options echo different aspects of Apartheid in SA and are equally brutal, albeit in different ways. Consequently, if we are to deal with the problems associated with climate change, we must confront the entire paradigm of development.

Elize Soer

Chapter one

Introduction

A "thinking with history" approach emphasises the importance of locating the contemporary discourse of sustainable development in the larger narrative of development "to highlight its continuities and discontinuities" (Banerjee, 2003: 149). This chapter focuses on Britain's Colonial Development Act of 1929 and the reinvigoration of colonial development programmes in the 1940s to draw attention to the broader development narrative of which "sustainable development" forms a part. The chapter argues that colonial powers used the narrative of development to justify and even intensify colonialism. The strong continuities between older colonial development projects and contemporary "sustainable development" projects suggest that the narrative of development ultimately helps to sustain a broader unjust system.

The importance of contextualising colonial continuities

There are wide ranging debates about the origins of development. Some scholars, such as Cowen and Shenton (1996), trace the origins of the concept back to ancient Greece. In contrast, the Mexican activist Gustavo Esteva (2010) argues that the era of development began on 20 January 1949. This was the day that United States (US) President Harry S. Truman launched the Point Four Program during his inaugural address (Esteva, 2010: 1). Truman (1949) declared that:

> We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people... our imponderable resources in the technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible... The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans... Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

Wolfgang Sachs (2015) also considers Truman's speech to be the catalyst for the era of development. He argues that this was the moment that the diverse peoples of the Global South were placed on a single progressive track

and the concept of "poverty" allowed peoples to be defined, not according to what they were, but according to what they supposedly lacked and were expected to become. Consequently, the label of "poverty" allowed the reorganisation of societies into money economies to be presented as a moral crusade (Sachs, W., 2015: 9). Wolfgang Sachs (2015: 4) refers to the British Development Act of 1929, but claims that within this colonial framework the term "development" only applied "to the first duty of the double mandate: the economic exploitation of resources such as land, minerals and wood products". Accordingly, his argument is that, until 1949, only resources and not societies or people could be developed. This chapter discusses the 1929 and 1940 development acts to challenge Esteva and Sachs's argument. As we shall see, Britain's colonial development policies strongly echoed Truman's statements. Instead of demarcating the start of "the era of development", it would seem more plausible that Truman's speech was indicative of the fact that the U.S. had become the new superpower.

In response to debates about the origins of development, the historian Joseph Morgan Hodge (2016: 159) argues that, instead of searching for its illusive origin, it might be more meaningful to examine the "exchanges of ideas, models, and practices, and the interactions of people and institutions, that moved across the 'webs of significance' surrounding specific projects or programs". Likewise, Kothari (2005) insists that the history of development studies was not unilinear and that there were parallel and sometimes hidden histories of development. She recognises that the past is imbricated in the present and that the dichotomies between the "traditional" and the "modern", and the "rest" and the "West", present a continuation of colonial classifications of difference that are "often invoked to justify development interventions" (Kothari, 2005 :49). Kothari's work challenges the sharp distinction between the era of colonialism and the era of development that scholars, such as Sachs, evoke. In response to arguments that development practitioners are concerned about humanitarianism and moral responsibility and thus do not just perpetuate colonial forms of rule, Kothari notes that this assumes, firstly, that colonial practitioners were not concerned with these issues and, secondly, that development practitioners necessarily are. Her central argument is thus that "we need to be wary of histories of development that deny this colonial genealogy and attempt to create distinct and artificial boundaries between the exploitation of empire and the humanitarianism of development" (Kothari, 2005: 50).

These artificial boundaries do not only create false dichotomies, but they also erase the invention of traditions that accompanied colonial rule. Various scholars, such as Ranger (1983) and Mamdani (2012), have demonstrated that some "African traditions" were invented during colonial encounters, based on an imaginary past and were used to legitimate indirect rule. This becomes especially relevant in a context where African cultures and traditions are cited as impediments to development and modernity. In response to Hodge's observation, I discuss in this monograph the narrative of development and specific development policies at various points throughout the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The aim

of this approach is to emphasise the continuities between colonial development policies and contemporary sustainable development policies. Many of these continuities should make us sceptical of the efficacy and ethicality of sustainable development policies. The second point that I want to bring across is that development has a long history. This may seem like an obvious point, but, as we shall see, development policies are still framed as if they will be enacted on "traditional" societies in order to make them "modern" as if these societies have not been in contact with "modern" societies for centuries.

Early British colonial development (1920–1940): who developed whom?

In 1964, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) published a document entitled C*olonial development: a factual survey of the origins and history of British aid to developing countries.* The ODI used the term "colonies" to refer to official colonies, protected states, protectorates and trust territories. The important defining feature was that "they were all organised and regarded as separate and self-contained administrative units, each with its own apparatus of government and its own revenue" (ODI, 1964: 6). Colonies were also expected to be "self-sufficing" and were supposed to pay for services from their own resources. From the early 1900s, some territories were given "grants in aid" from British Government funds, which were "coupled with financial control by the British Treasury" (ODI, 1964: 6).

The term "neo-colonialism" is generally used to refer to colonial power relations that have continued after the end of official colonialism. Supposedly in contrast to former colonial powers that used direct military control, contemporary ruling elites use indirect political manipulation, cultural hegemony and economic pressure to control countries in the Global South. However, the passage from the ODI quoted above demonstrates that from around 1920, British colonies were often framed as self-governing entities while they were being financially controlled through "aid projects". In fact, many British colonies such as Iraq were officially classified as mandate territories or protectorates and Britain's involvement was only seen as colonial after the countries gained independence. On the one hand we can thus see that colonial powers did use indirect political manipulation, cultural hegemony and economic pressure to control colonies. On the other hand, present-day ruling elites from the Global North often use direct military control to intervene in the Global South. There is a plethora of research on US interventions, including Kinzer's (2006) *Overthrow: America's century of regime change from Hawaii to Iraq*, Leech's (2013) *Crude interventions: the United States, oil and the new world (dis) order*, Juhasz's (2006) *The Bush agenda: invading the world, one economy at a time,* and multiple books by Noam Chomsky (2007, 2015).

Likewise, the anthropologist and historian, Ann Laura Stoler (2006), notes that the perception that imperialism today is more benevolent than imperialism in the past is based on expectations of what connections between the past and the present are supposed to look like. The dominant features of colonial formations, governing strategies and colonial racism are generally assumed to have been far

worse in the past, but this is not always the case (Stoler, 2006: 6). This is not to say that colonial regimes have remained unchanged for over a century, but it should be noted that forms of colonial rule varied greatly within the same timeframe. This is because colonial strategies did not just depend on the colonising power, but on the ways in which colonised societies opposed and shaped imperial policy. The sociologist, Julian Go (2013: 102), remarks that "colonial policies were not shaped by national character, values, or styles but by the very spaces and scenes they aimed to manipulate and manage".[18] As we shall see, British colonial development policies in the early 1900s varied based on factors within colonies such as the extent of collaboration by local elites and whether the colony was a settler colony or not.

Notions of economic development and welfare had already become intertwined in the early 1900s. As early as 22 August 1895, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, stated (cited in Abbott, 1971: 68):

> I regard many of our Colonies as being in the conditions of underdeveloped estates and estates which can never be developed without Imperial assistance... by the judicious investment of British money, those estates which belong to the British Crown may be developed for the benefit of their population and for the benefit of the greater population which is outside.

From 1895, the British government began using the narrative of development to justify colonial rule. Since the narrative linked development to welfare, questioning development became almost tantamount to questioning welfare (Roy, 2014:32).

It is important to note that Britain's colonial development policy was not coherent or consistent, especially before 1929. Until 1929, colonies were "assisted" in response to specific needs that arose in specific colonies, for example in the case of major crop failures or projects such as railway construction (Abbott, 1971: 70). For example, a report of the East Africa Commission in 1927 stressed the importance of increasing transport facilities, particularly railways, in order to further the "economic development of both native and non-native production" (ODI, 1964: 12). Consequently, the East African Transport Loan Guarantee Bill was established so that the Imperial Government could assist in the financing of the transport facilities that would allegedly promote development in East Africa. In some colonies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, British policies before 1949 were dedicated to resource development or, as the British government framed it, "productive projects" (ODI, 1964: 10). Conversely, in the West Indies during the same period, British policies were aimed at the development of tropical medicine and were presented as "the beginning of the policy of constructive Government intervention in the problems of development and welfare" (ODI, 1964: 10).

[18] A clear example of this is the fact that, under the 1929 Colonial Development Act, only territories that were defined as "lacking responsible government" were eligible for assistance from the British Exchequer. The act excluded the old Dominions, Burma, India and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) from receiving assistance. Malta initially did not qualify for assistance, but after the "breakdown of responsible government" in 1933, it became "eligible for advances" (ODI, 1964: 8).

The variation in colonial development policies challenges Wolfgang Sachs's argument that development referred solely to the development of resources before 1949. In retrospect it became somewhat obvious that Britain's policies were aimed at acquiring resources to aid in its recovery after the First World War. However, at the time, the British Government claimed that it was contributing to colonial welfare and development. Between 1919 and 1929 various reports made recommendations on how to improve services in dependent territories. For example, the Tropical Agricultural College Committee recommended the establishment of colleges to study tropical agriculture and such colleges were subsequently constructed in Puerto Rico and Hawaii. The committee based its recommendation on the fact that the US had a near monopoly on sugar production and the Sugar School in Louisiana was unrivalled in terms of education on sugar production (ODI, 1964).

There were also debates within the British government about the form that colonial development should take and there were various individuals and pressure groups who attempted to influence opinions and policies regarding development. For example, in the early 1920s, a group of humanitarians tried to put pressure on the British government to place more emphasis on the "social and economic development of colonial peoples" because they were "distressed at the way things had gone in South Africa" (Abbott, 1971: 70).[19] Therefore, since the inception of development as a colonial strategy in the late 1800s and early 1900s, there have been debates about its content. Some emphasised the importance of increasing production and "modern" agriculture, while others advocated for "native paramountcy" in development schemes. In the early 1920s, there was an increased emphasis on the doctrine of "native paramountcy" in colonial development. This doctrine was specifically relevant to Kenya, although the principle of "trusteeship" was incorporated throughout the British Empire. In 1919, the League of Nations, the precursor of the UN, accepted the doctrine of "native paramountcy" as the primary obligation of European powers towards their mandated territories. However, the doctrine inflamed resistance in colonies and it was followed by "a storm of protest" (Abbott, 1971: 69).

It is perhaps unsurprising that colonial policies incited protests since they were often accompanied by atrocities such as dispossession and torture.[20] Nonetheless, the heightened discontent motivated members of the British parliament to rethink their colonial policies. For example, during an address to the House of Commons on 2 July 1929, the socialist politician Henry Snell[21] declared that (ODI, 1964: 15):

> The subject peoples of the British Empire are becoming increasingly aware of their position in the human family, and they are not satisfied with it. They are asking

[19] Although Abbott does not mention it, this should be seen in the context of the Second Anglo-Boer War/South African War (11 October 1899–31 May 1902). Reports of the horrid conditions in concentration camps provoked criticism in Britain. Here it is perhaps significant that reports of white people (Afrikaners) suffering in concentration camps evoked criticism, while the suffering of black South Africans went unnoticed for decades.

[20] Kenya, which was supposed to be a prime example of "native paramountcy" in colonial development, is still suffering from the repercussions of British policies. A very recent Vice News report (30 July 2020) commented on the aftermath of British displacement and massacre in the region (Vice News, 2020).

[21] Henry Snell was a British politician who held socialist views and who served under Ramsay MacDonald and Winston Churchill. He was also the leader of the Labour Party in the House of Lords in the late 1930s.

> with increasing emphasis for the protection of this House against ruthless exploitation, for the protection of their tribal land, for some education, and for some participation in the shaping of their own destinies. These things represent moral responsibility which this Parliament can neither delegate nor ignore.

Although Snell's speech was from 1929, the British had started to reformulate their colonial policy by 1924 and soon after, in 1925, the East African Commission adopted what became known as "the dual policy". The dual policy stressed the importance of developing Africa's resources for both "natives and non-natives" and, according to the East African Commission's 1925 report, there had to be a balance between "the development and advance in civilization of the African" and the promotion of the interests of "very rich territories". Apparently, this meant that the Empire had "a duty to humanity to develop the vast economic resources of a great continent" (cited in Abbott, 1971: 69). Although the Empire apparently saw this as a "reformed" approach to colonial development, it resembled its previous approach in many respects. In essence, the approach would still lead to the exploitation of African resources for the benefit of "rich territories" while attempting to gloss over colonial atrocities by employing moralist rhetoric.

In spite of these strong similarities, the 1929 Colonial Development Act was the first attempt to formalise an approach to colonial development. The Act advocated for a systemic examination of all development projects and introduced the provision of annual loans and grants that would ostensibly "prove mutually advantageous to the United Kingdom and to the colonial territories" (Abbott, 1971: 68). As noted, the Act was introduced during the aftermath of the First World War and one of its aims was to promote trade with the UK. One of the repercussions of the First World War was a major unemployment problem in Britain and, between May 1920 and May 1921 alone, unemployment had risen by 22% (Godden, 2017). James Henry Thomas, the Lord Privy Seal who introduced the Act, admitted that the Labour Government thought that it would assist him in dealing with the unemployment problem in Britain. Similarly, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, informed the House of Lords that "the principal motive for the introduction of this measure is connected with the lamentable condition of unemployment in this country, and this is an attempt to stimulate the British export trade" (cited in Abbott, 1971: 68).

The two stated aims of the Colonial Development Act of 1929 were thus to benefit the British economy and to assist in colonial development. These two aims were not seen as contradictory and the Act stipulated that it would provide loans to the governments of selected colonies "for the purpose of aiding and developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory, and thereby promoting commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom" (ODI, 1964: 14). On the one hand, the Government stressed that the British economy would benefit from the "assistance" since it would be tied to purchases of British goods. On the other hand, multiple members of parliament promoted colonial

development as a moral crusade, which they claimed would promote "the protection and advancement of the native races" (cited in Abbott, 1971: 69).

On 12 July 1929, Lord Privy Seal James Henry Thomas articulated a clear link between solving the unemployment problem in Britain and the "moral obligation" of developing the colonies. In response he suggested "a long-range policy of constructive colonial development" (ODI, 1964: 15). This "long-range policy" was articulated in the 1929 Act. The creation of the act indicates that colonial policies were not static or uniform. They varied according to the needs of empire, as demonstrated by the fact that the context after the First World War led to an increased emphasis on colonial trade with Britain. The resistance strategies of subjugated societies also shaped policies. This argument is reinforced by Henry Snell's speech which revealed that some development policies were used in order to quell dissatisfaction in colonised societies and it had become necessary for Britain to give in to certain demands for welfare in order to suppress a wider insurrection. There were also debates about the content of development and the extent to which African "trustees" should be included into a structure of indirect rule. Moreover, the fact that the narrative of development was used to justify colonialism reveals that there was no dichotomy between the two models and that they were mutually constitutive.

Colonial development in the 1940s: new superpower, old structure

When the British government released the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 it claimed that it was ushering in a new era of development. Colonial administrators felt that the colonies had received "certain benefits from the British connection" before 1940 because "loans could be raised on the London market on advantageous terms", trading companies had "stimulated production for the world market", particularly for tin, rubber, cocoa and vegetable oils, and because the British administration had ostensibly created stability and common laws (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1949: iv).[22] However, the 1940 Act emphasised the importance of social development, especially education. According to the Act, the primary aim of colonial policy was to "protect and advance the interests of the inhabitants of the colonies". It noted that "much had already been done", but that there was still "room for further active development of the natural resources of the various territories so as to provide their peoples with improved standards of life" (ODI, 1964: 21–22). It was noted again that "some colonies had made great economic progress" but that further progress could be made if the British government "assisted by improvements in the machinery of government" (ODI, 1964: 21). Summarily, the Act emphasised that British assistance would be necessary for colonies to obtain "full and balanced development" (ODI,

[22] The horrific legacies of many of these policies are still evident today. For example, cocoa production in Western Africa, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, has been scrutinised by various human rights organisations for its association with child labour, human trafficking, and slavery (Food Empowerment Project (FEP), 2020). Although Côte d'Ivoire was a French colony, the British Cameroons had an equally exploitative economic structure based on primary resource production, especially cocoa, coffee and bananas.

1964: 22).[23] As such, Britain launched another new era of development in 1940. By this time, British officials admitted that the development projects associated with the 1929 Act were actually in the interests of Britain. In 1940, as part of the justification for the new Development Act, Malcolm MacDonald, the Minister of Health who had previously worked for the Colonial Office, admitted that (cited in: ODI, 1964: 24):

> Those who are familiar with the debates of 1929 will remember that even then the primary purpose of our legislation was not to help colonial development for its own sake, but in order to stimulate that development mostly to bring additional work to idle hands in this country. It was devised as part of our scheme to solve our own unemployment problem.

This was contrasted with the 1940 Act, which would supposedly really be in the interests of the people in the colonies. Aspects of the Act that were framed as progressive, for example "native education", existed alongside the continued use of forced labour and the displacement of populations. In the context of the Second World War, European governments expanded large plantations since they feared another economic depression and wanted to intensify primary production in their colonies in order to secure raw materials and markets for European investors.

In the wake of the war, there was a proliferation of anti-colonial struggles throughout Africa. In response to these struggles, the French government introduced a policy of "development along native lines", which was also used by Britain in its indirectly ruled colonies.[24] As was already evident in the debates concerning "African paramountcy" and large-scale economic development discussed in the previous section, the discourse of development as large scale production coincided with a discourse that emphasised the need to be sensitive to "African cultural traditions". This point forms the groundwork for the argument that these two discourses were not contradictory, but actually sustained the broader narrative of development. As we shall see, these two discourses were later used by the Apartheid government and they are also present in contemporary notions of development, especially those that emphasise "culturally sensitive development".

The proliferation of anti-colonial struggles certainly influenced colonial strategies of rule, but it did not deter colonial powers from using the narrative of development to reinvigorate the colonial state. The scale of colonial development policies after 1945 was so great that many historians refer to it as the "second colonial occupation in Africa" (Hodge & Hödl, 2014: 17). The increase in development projects in Africa and Southeast Asia were intended to "alleviate US dollar

[23] The notion of "balanced development" strongly echoes popular notions of development today because the concept is based on the idea that development should be balanced with environmental protection. This becomes especially clear in chapter three where sustainable development is discussed.

[24] Similar to the British, French colonial officials ascribed to the notion that people in colonised societies represented an anterior stage of history. For example, the French statesman Albert Sarraut (cited in Hodge & Hödl, 2014: 8) commented that "It should not be forgotten that we are centuries ahead of them, long centuries during which... a magnificent heritage of science, experience and moral superiority has taken shape, which makes us eminently entitled to protect and lead the races lagging behind us". Clearly the narrative of development that is still prevalent today builds on the notion that European countries are ahead of the countries in the Global South and that they have the responsibility to "lead" and "protect" those people who are apparently too far behind to govern themselves.

shortages by stimulating colonial exports that would pay for metropolitan reconstruction" (Hodge & Hödl, 2014: 1). Today historians recognise that these development projects were in the interests of European powers and were generally accompanied by atrocities in colonised societies. However, at the time, colonial powers claimed to be acting out of selfless humanitarianism. Yet, when we hear these same claims today, we are expected to believe that the "new era of development" is based purely on altruism. Another significant consequence of the war was the establishment of the UN. According to conventional history, the UN was established to keep peace among nations. After the League of Nations had failed to prevent the Second World War, the idea that a new organisation had to be established to maintain peace took hold. The UN charter, which was signed by representatives from 50 nations on 26 June 1945 in San Francisco,[25] stated that the primary aim of the UN was to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind" (UN, 1945: 1). The UN still declares that it was established to "preserve peace and help build a better world" (UN, n.d.). This has given the organisation a certain utopian aura and many of the critiques against the UN focus on the fact that it has failed to live up to its utopian vision (Sengupta, 2017). Although utopian visions certainly played a part in the establishment of the UN, Mazower (2009) demonstrates how the creators of the organisation also aimed to protect the interests of empire. This argument is supported by the fact that Jan Smuts, a racist South African statesman whose ideas are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, played a key role in drafting the UN charter. This further strengthens the link between the segregationist system in SA and Global Apartheid[26].

A detailed discussion of the origins of the UN falls beyond the scope of this monograph. However, Mazower's argument demonstrates that "global" institutions cannot be separated from histories of empire and colonialism. This is one of the reasons that the narratives and discourses promoted by organisations such as the UN and the World Bank still resemble older colonial discourses.[27] Mazower's discussion reveals the strong influence that imperial interests had on the establishment and functioning of the UN, but it also shows how imperial visions were shaped by post-Second World War affirmations of national sovereignty and the unanticipated independence of India in 1947. According to Mazower, India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, attempted to use the UN as a forum to contest colonialism (Mazower, 2009). Nehru was a radical nationalist who linked the freedom movement in India to international struggles against colonialism (Sharma, 2012: 1292). He also emphasised the need for India to develop, and launched the controversial Bhakra Nangal project in

[25] The fact that the charter was signed in San Francisco indicates that the locus of global power had shifted from the "older empires", especially Britain, to the US.

[26] Official Apartheid was instigated in SA after Smuts's term as Prime Minister ended in 1948. In fact, Smuts's party, the United Party, lost the 1948 election to the Reunited National Party that used "Apartheid" as its slogan.

[27] The institutional structures of the UN Security Council, IMF and the World Bank also perpetuate minority rule. The UN's 193 member states have an equal vote in the General Assembly (UNGA), but similar to the Native Representatives in the Apartheid parliament, they have a limited role in overall decision making. The UNGA can endorse international legislation such as the Law of the Sea, but the ultimate authority rests with the UN Security Council.

1954, lauding dam building as a signifier of development (Subramanian, 2018). Nehru's rhetoric was thus anti-colonial and pro-development. This supports the observation that the narrative of development was not just a colonial tool but had been appropriated by a variety of actors on both sides of the coloniser/colonised divide in attempts to further their interests.[28]

It was shortly after the formation of the UN, in 1949, that Truman declared that the US was also embarking on a developmental mission. From this perspective we can see that the US did not start a new era of development, as Sachs and Esteva argue, but that the narrative of development had been intertwined with colonialism since the start of the twentieth century. Instead of signalling a shift from colonialism to development, Truman's speech was an indication that the US was the new superpower. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (cited in Hodge & Hödl, 2014: 2) observe that it was during the 1940s that the concept of development became "a framing device bringing together a range of interventionist policies and metropolitan finance with the explicit goal of raising colonial standards of living". Since Britain already used the narrative of development to justify interventionist policies with the alleged aim of raising colonial standards of living, the "new" notion of development clearly had colonial roots. However, I would argue that, during the 1940s, "development" went from being a colonial policy to being a "framing device". This argument is more fully developed in chapter three, which discusses the ways in which the discourse of sustainable development frames climate change policy today.

The past in the present

The period from 1945 to 1960 is commonly seen as the era of decolonisation in Asia and Africa. In correlation with this, the UN introduced the Proposals for Action of the First UN Development Decade (1960–70) and claimed that "The problem of the underdeveloped countries is not just growth, but development… Development is growth plus change… Change, in turn, is social and cultural as well as economic, and qualitative as well as quantitative" (cited in Esteva, 2010: 9). This led to the establishment of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) in 1963. However, by the 1990s, countries in the Global South were still "lagging behind", so the 1980s were labelled "the lost decade for development". This was when the environmental costs of development were becoming apparent, but instead of noting that environmental degradation was a consequence of decades of development policies, a new era of "sustainable development" was ushered in in 1987. Consequently, the response to the negative consequences of development in Europe and North America was more development. New development projects either did not acknowledge previous ones or claimed that this time would be different because development would be "community-oriented" or "sustainable" and yet, the prescribed policies looked eerily similar to the previous ones.

The policies and ideas associated with colonial rural development since the 1930s present an exceptionally strong precedent for rural development policies today. Significantly, when agricultural production in African

[28] Similar to Nehru, many African leaders who were demanding better circumstances in colonies appropriated the narrative (Hodge & Hödl, 2014: 2).

colonies decreased sharply in the 1930s, the colonial state blamed it on the farming methods of Africans. For example, in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) the British government ignored policies such as the Reserve Pool Act and the Market Stabilisation Act, which restricted African production and subsidised European agriculture. Instead of changing colonial policies or increasing the land allocated to the reserves, the colonial state introduced "modernisation initiatives". Schools were opened at Tsholotsho in Matabeleland and in Domboshawa in Mashonaland to teach Africans "modern farming methods". Emory D. Alvord, a former American missionary, was hired to teach Africans how to use fertilisers and "improved" seeds (Makombe, 2014: 159). As the economic historian Kushinga Makombe (2014: 160) observed, rural communities were perceived as unchanging and homogenous and, since modernity was used as a yardstick, "Africans seemed to lack everything: tools were poor, harvests unreliable, and the income level low". In response, a host of technical experts including anthropologists and agricultural economists were sent to the reserves to "control and compel the progress of the most backward subject" (Makombe, 2014: 160). We can thus see that the colonial state's rural development projects focused on improving the reserves instead of changing the colonial system that forced Africans into reserves in the first place.

The Brundtland report (WCED, 1987: 128) remarks that if farmers in developing countries are:

> Forced to continue with extensive agriculture, which is inherently unstable and leads to constant movement, then farming will tend to spread throughout remaining wildlife environments. But if they are helped and encouraged to practise more intensive agriculture, they could make productive use of relatively limited areas, with less impact on wildlands. They will need help: training, marketing support, and fertilizers, pesticides, and tools they can afford.

It is widely noted that intensive agriculture is one of the top five most polluting industries in the world and is a major contributor to climate change and deforestation (Oetee, 2019). The livestock industry has recently been scrutinised for its contribution to both greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation, yet the report briefly notes that some forests are being cleared for livestock, but that this could be easily managed through agroforestry (WCED, 1987: 114). The report thus blames environmental degradation in the South on the farming methods of local people while turning a blind eye to corporate schemes with a much larger impact.

This trend is still apparent in the latest UN Secretary General (UNSG) report on climate change, the *Report of the Secretary-General on the 2019 Climate Action Summit: The way forward in 2020*. The report (UNSG, 2019: 25) praises Germany for pledging to support 60 million people in rural areas (the report does not state which areas) through agroecological approaches in order to increase their resilience to the effects of climate change. The report (UNSG, 2019: 28) also emphasises the importance of "the transfer of technology and knowledge to developing countries". As such, the report still places the focus on helping people in the Global South adapt to climate change by providing

them with certain technologies, and especially emphasises the need to promote investment to assist people to adapt to the impacts of climate change while promoting "climate resilient economic growth" (UNSG, 2019: 19). It is therefore evident that economic growth is still the primary goal and the report does not consider any form of meaningful redistribution.

The Natural Resources Board (NRB) of the colonial state in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) published the *Report of the Native Production and Trade Commission* (NPTC) in 1944. The report distinguishes between two types of economies in Rhodesia. The one was a modern economy, supposedly governed by economic rationality, and the other was a rural economy that "languished in the grip of superstition and an anti-progressive social system" (Makombe, 2014: 164). There was thus a clear divide between the urban and the rural in colonial discourse. Firstly, this divide contributed to the idea that the people in the reserves were relics of the past, living outside the modern economy. Moreover, this separation allowed colonial officials to blame the problems in the reserves on Africans and disregard "the effects of conquest, land alienation, and segregation" (Makombe, 2014: 164). I have mentioned this, however, the interesting point here is that the primary problem in the reserves was said to be the growing population.

Colonial officials argued that a combination of "benevolent colonial rule" and "irrational" African reproductive practices would lead to an apocalyptic scenario in the reserves. In order to avoid this scenario, the NPTC recommended that rural societies had to be reorganised, lands fenced, cattle reduced, and agricultural education expanded. This sentiment is echoed almost precisely in the Brundtland Commission's report. The report notes that developing nations in the tropics are characterised by fast population growth rates and widespread poverty. Population growth is identified as a major threat to conservation efforts and, consequently, the report argues that reducing growth rates in developing countries is "imperative for sustainable development" and that "urgent steps are needed to limit extreme rates of population growth" (WCED, 1987: 18).

In its section on *Managing population growth*, the Brundtland report outlines some of the steps that had to be taken in order to reduce the influence of population growth on the environment. This clearly echoes the Malthusian theory of population growth, which argues that exponential population growth and arithmetic food supply growth would lead to catastrophe. Consequently, Malthus argues that population growth has to be controlled through preventative checks (Agarwal, 2020). Malthus's ideas have had a lingering influence and are present in many contemporary commentaries on environmental sustainability. According to Mitchell Dean (2015: 19), Malthusian ideas concerning overpopulation have become a prism through which issues related to global poverty, economic development and "concerns as different as national security and immigration" have been viewed. This is evidenced by the fact that prominent scholars, such as Jeffrey Sachs (2015), have explicitly evoked Malthus's arguments in their advocacy for sustainable development. This is problematic because, as we shall see, it plays into older colonial and

Apartheid narratives of removing the "surplus population". Malthusian ideas also played a direct role in colonisation. For example, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries emigration to the "New World" (Americas) was promoted in Britain as a means of "cleansing" the metropole of its "excessive population". There were clear class dimensions to this "cleansing" since people who had been pauperised by the development of capitalism in Britain were often exported to colonies (Zaika, 2019: 148).

Moreover, it is impossible to discuss population growth without discussing gender. The Brundtland report mentions gender once in a footnote, but it mentions women repeatedly in relation to population growth. The report frames women's rights and education as a tool to reduce population growth since education would enable women in the Global South to "choose the size of their families" (WCED, 1987: 43). The report goes on to argue that "increased access to family planning services is itself a form of social development that allows couples, and women in particular, the right to self-determination" (WCED, 1987: 51). Here again, we see a cyclical argument since the "empowerment" of women is supposed to lead to "better" family planning while increased family planning is also supposed to lead to the "empowerment" of women. It is assumed that, in contrast to women in the Global North, women in the Global South do not plan their families. The report does not even consider the possibility that women in the Global South plan to have large families. Instead, women in the Global North are taken as the norm and women in the Global South are seen as lacking.

Although improving women's access to healthcare and education are cited as a means to reduce population growth, the commission also noted that "in an initial period, however, better health care means that more babies live to reproduce and that women reproduce over longer time spans" (WCED, 1987: 88). The report thus emphasises that the cultural values of "traditional" societies also have to change since "social and cultural factors dominate all others in affecting fertility" (WCED, 1987: 89). This sounds eerily similar to the colonial discourse that blamed population growth in the reserves on "benevolent colonial rule" and "irrational" African reproductive practices. The report also explains that birth rates in the Global North declined because women were "empowered" by "economic and social development". This presents a clear continuation of the notion that women in the Global North are modern while women in the South are trapped in tradition. While it is recognised that the position of women in the North has changed over time and that they now supposedly have control over their bodies and sexuality, the position of women in the South is assumed to have remained unchanged since time immemorial. As Escobar (1995: 8) notes, "the Third World woman" is represented as leading "an essentially truncated life based on her feminine gender," and is presumed to be "ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, victimized, etc.". The policies proposed to educate women in the South on "reproductive issues" are also analogous to colonial education programmes that sent white women to educate African women on subjects related to maternity and domesticity, as discussed more fully in chapter three.

While the British colonial government launched programmes that were aimed at "modernising" African women, they often colluded with elite groups of African men and increased the patriarchal power of these men. Especially in settler states such as Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), arrangements with "chiefs" led to the establishment of crop-specific gender roles, which restructured relatively egalitarian divisions of agricultural labour into more hierarchical forms (Escobar, 1995: 174). This is not to say that all African societies had egalitarian gender structures. Just like societies in the Global North, gender hierarchies were varied, and they changed over time. The sociologist, Adele Mueller (cited in Escobar, 1995: 174), summarises the problem succinctly when she states that:

> The depiction of 'Third World Women' which results is one of poor women, living in hovels, having too many children, illiterate, and either dependent on a man for economic survival or impoverished because they have none. The important issue here is not whether this is a more or less accurate description of women, but who has the power to create it.

Moreover, Mueller notes that this discursive regime does not present the concerns, interests and dreams of the women that it claims to speak for, but instead suggests a set of strategies for managing the problems that these women represent in relation to development schemes in the South. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Brundtland Commission's discussion of population growth.

Multiple reports from the World Bank also discuss women's position in relation to population growth. As Williams (1995) observes, these reports have a distinctly neo-Malthusian undertone. Williams (1995: 161) argues that the World Bank presents African women as causes of environmental degradation. To support his argument, he cites a report from the World Bank that states, "women continue to practice low-input traditional farming techniques, which prove to be harmful in terms of soil conservation". However, the Bank explains that women continue to farm this way because of "traditional cultures" which force them to be food producers, water fetchers and fuelwood gatherers and impede them from "intensifying" their farming practices.

The Bank claims that "in Africa, the prevailing young age at marriage for women, the frequency of polygamy, an unequal work burden between the sexes, and the low educational levels of women all combine to perpetuate the low status of women" (Williams, 1995: 155). Moreover, in relation to population growth, the Bank places the blame on "traditional cultures" that "place a premium on high fertility." Although the "costs" of high fertility rates are said to "fall most heavily on women… it is men who decide to have them—which brings us back to 'traditional culture'" (Williams, 1995: 155). We can thus see that the Bank does not blame women for environmental degradation. Instead, it blames "African culture" and the decisions of African men. African women are simply victims and, as the colonial trope goes, "benighted, overburdened beasts, helplessly entangled in the tentacles of regressive Third World patriarchy" (Parpart, 1995: 248).

Colonial policy documents very rarely mentioned women. Parpart (1995:

248) notes that when they did, women in the Global South were regarded as obstacles to modernity and development "apart from the gratuitous admission that women produced future labourers and thus had a role to play in population policy". There is thus continuity in the fact that women have been linked with population policy. However, there have also been significant changes over time. Since the 1970s there has been a substantial increase in the number of documents that note women's role in development and today most documents related to development comment on either gender or women, although the words are often used as synonyms.

Parpart traces this change back to Ester Boserup's landmark 1970 study, *Women's role in economic development.* The study proves that, instead of improving the lives of women in the Global South, development schemes have generally deprived women of status and economic opportunities. Boserup argues that modernisation has relegated women to the reproductive sphere and reduced their productive functions, especially in agriculture. This clearly resonates with the ways in which colonial officials increased the power of patriarchal local elites while claiming to help African women, and then paradoxically blamed patriarchy on "African tradition". Boserup's response to the dilemma is to suggest that development planners and policy makers should take women's roles in economic development into account. Other development experts became convinced of Boserup's view and, in 1973, the US amended its Foreign Assistance Act so that it explicitly included the improvement of "the status of Third World women by integrating them into the development process" as a goal. Parpart is critical of this since it is based on liberal feminist thinking in the North that aims to "integrate women into male power structures" (Parpart, 1995: 251).

Parpart is only one of many scholars and activists who have critiqued these gendered and racialised power structures. Yet, most of these critiques would still be applicable to the UNSG report on climate change that was released in December 2019. The report aims to "empower" women so that they can participate in mitigation measures, "including in science, technology, research and development" (UNSG, 2019: 29). By "including women and girls in climate solutions" the UN aims to "make climate action more effective, contributing to increased ambition in all sectors" (UNSG, 2019: 29). Moreover, some of the UN's principle aims for 2020 are "quantifying the benefits and effectiveness of engaging women and girls in climate actions and other initiatives" and promoting and enhancing "innovative tools that demonstrate and measure the transformative power of women's and girls' leadership in modifying patterns of consumption to reduce carbon emissions" (UNSG, 2019: 29). Women can thus be included into existing power structures, but the structures are not up for negotiation.

Moreover, women and girls are again seen as tools. This brings me to a second change over time that is related to terminology, but which can be read as an indication of a broader transformation. Whereas women in colonial development policies were valued for their role in "reproducing the labour force", investments in women are now seen as investments in current and future "human resources". This is

framed as especially important because "least developed countries" reportedly have "minimal human resources" (Denton, 2002: 16). As far as I am aware, John R. Commons was the first to use the term "human resource" in his book *The distribution of wealth* in 1893 (Kaufman, 2001). However, American business organisations popularised the term in the 1970s. This coincided with the rise of neoliberal ideology.

Although some scholars, such as Rajesh Venugopal, have argued that the concept of neoliberalism has become overused to the extent that it has lost its meaning, Houghton (2019: 615) argues that the versatility of the concept enhances its importance. Although the concept is multifaceted, it is generally associated with increased privatisation and commodification. Ideologically, the term is related to market fundamentalism, the fetishisation of competition, a shift from seeing populations as citizens to seeing them as consumers, an emphasis on individualised responsibility and "a narrative of investment in human capital, both by individuals to increase their own employment prospects, and by the state to drive up national productivity" (Houghton, 2019: 616).[29] Neoliberal ideology undoubtedly had an influence in framing the way that international issues have been discussed. Other easy examples from the same UNSG document include the fact that "women's empowerment" has to be quantified and that the primary yardstick is their influence on consumption patterns. The comment on consumption patterns is implicitly aimed at women in the North. There is thus a difference in the way that women in the North and South are valued. Women in the North are valued as consumers, while women in the South are valued as contributors to human resources and thus as future consumers. In spite of this slight variation, all people seem to be valued simply as economic actors.

Parpart also discusses the clashes between feminists from the South and North during the 1975 meeting to launch the UN Decade for Women. Issues arose over the fact that "development practitioners from both the mainstream and alternative approaches have for the most part continued to frame policies and programmes on the assumption that Northern expertise holds the answers to Third World women's developmental problems" (Parpart, 1995: 253). According to Parpart, the outcome of this clash was a continued belief in modernisation, but with pledges to be sensitive to cultural differences and the interests of the Global South. However, even the earliest documents on colonial development stressed the need to pay attention to "local cultures".

[29] It is important to distinguish between neoliberalism as an ideology and neoliberalism as a regime of policies. The policies associated with neoliberalism, including the promotion of free enterprise, tariff elimination and currency deregulation, are very seldom applied in practice in the Global North. The closest incarnation of neoliberal policies would probably be the structural adjustment reforms that international lending agencies and banks imposed on African states in the 1980s, which involved the removal of tariffs, deregulating currency markets and the dismantling of parastatals. Nonetheless, the policies adopted by different states still differed from the doctrine of neoliberalism "since neoliberal doctrine, if applied consistently, implies a world that could never, in fact, exist" (Ferguson, 2009: 170). Even if neoliberalism has been inconsistently applied in praxis, it still holds ideological authority. James Ferguson also notes that the meanings associated with neoliberalism in Africa differ fundamentally from those in Western Europe and North America. In the Global North the concept is related to the creation of responsibilised prudential subjects and new technologies of government. In many parts of Africa, the concept has become associated with selling state assets to foreign firms, deindustrialisation and increased unemployment. In this sense, neoliberalism was not so "neo", but "largely a matter of old-style laissez-faire liberalism in the service of imperial capital" (Ferguson, 2009: 173).

After the introduction of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, a Select Committee was sent to Nigeria and the Cameroons to gather information about the progress of colonial development. The first principle of the Committee's recommendations was that "representative African opinion should be brought into active association with development work" (ODI, 1964: 44). Moreover, the Committee recommended that "Even at the risk of apparent inefficiency, it is essential that the work undertaken should spring from the desires of the people themselves, and that they should be partners in it at every step" (ODI, 1964: 47). In 1947, the Overseas Resources Development Act founded the Colonial Development Corporation and the Overseas Food Corporation.[30] The Act stipulated that both corporations had to consider "the interests of the inhabitants of the territory where they operated" (ODI, 1964: 46). Makombe (2014: 172) demonstrates that colonial government's commitment to "consultation" under the rubric of "community development" "was not based on the premise that rural inhabitants could make a contribution to evolving policy and practice but on the assumption that, given time, they would come to see the wisdom of official designs".

Makombe's observation seems to hold true for contemporary community development projects. I again use the latest UN report on climate change as an example. The report discusses a project that aims "to benefit rural, remote and vulnerable areas in developing countries". The project involves the "intensification and densification" of cooking energy through "mobilizing competitive energy financing" (UNSG, 2019: 27). Providing cooking energy to rural communities has been a cornerstone of the World Bank's community development projects. According to the Bank, its programmes for community-driven development (CDD) are based on "participation" and "enhanced local capacity". Moreover, the Bank notes that "experience has shown that when given clear and transparent rules, access to information, and appropriate technical and financial support, poor communities can effectively organize to identify community priorities" (World Bank, 2020). The Bank's view of community development is thus that, once communities have been sufficiently modernised, they will be able to identify their priorities. This obviously assumes that communities are unable to identify their priorities without assistance from the Bank and fits Makombe's assessment of colonial community development projects.

Moreover, indirect rule depended on the collaboration of local elites, who were often seen as "representatives" of communities. As the historian James Onley (2005: 32), remarks "once the British intervened, they could not have stayed on without local collaborators and mediators". Onley refers to these local elites as the "invisible agents of empire" and, instead of seeing them as pliant tools of colonial governments, he argues that they presented a particular form of "native agency". The histories and legacies of indirect rule are well documented[31]. However, there often seems to be an implicit assumption that these legacies are simply leftovers from the past. I

[30] The corporation was renamed as the Commonwealth Development Corporation in 1963 and currently operates as the CDC Group.

[31] See, for example, Mamdani's (1996) *Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism*

would argue that this assumption is based on the idea that local elites that collaborated with imperial powers were passive instruments of rule while local elites today influence policies and often manipulate international powers to serve their own interests. Ann Laura Stoler's remark that these assumptions are based on ideas of what the relationship between the past and the present are supposed to look like seems applicable here. Similar to today, local elites and populations have always influenced colonial strategies of rule. The implication of this is that, while it is imperative to note that people in the Global South have agency and influence policy, it does not negate their positionality in a broader unjust system, and it cannot be used to justify their exploitation.

Conclusion

This chapter has emphasised some of the correlations between colonial development policies and sustainable development policies today. The chapter has demonstrated that there were strong continuities in colonial development policies, even though Britain claimed that it was launching a "new era" of development in the 1940s. Discussing these older colonial development programmes provides the historical context for contemporary development projects, which enables us to think with history during subsequent analyses of the discourse of sustainable development. We have also seen that gendered discourses have been central to colonial development policies, especially in relation to population growth and "irrational" African reproductive practices. Although the chapter focuses on continuities, even with regard to "community centred development", it shows that there have also been significant changes over time. The most striking change identified in this chapter is the influence of neoliberal ideology with its emphasis on investment in human resources and "empowered" consumers. The core argument of the chapter is that colonial powers used the narrative of development to justify and even intensify colonialism. I therefore suggest that the narrative of development that is so dominant today ultimately works to sustain a broader unjust system. The following chapter further validates this argument by demonstrating how the South African Apartheid government used the narrative of development to justify its policies in the Bantustans.

Elize Soer

Chapter Two

Introduction

The previous chapter argues that colonial powers used the narrative of development to justify and, in some ways, intensify colonialism. The following chapter builds on this theme by analysing the ways in which the Apartheid government in SA used the narrative of development, particularly "separate development" to justify its homelands policies. When Dr Hendrik Verwoerd became Prime Minister of SA in 1958, he aimed to amend and justify Apartheid by introducing a system of "separate development" based on the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959, which created ten Bantu homelands or Bantustans. The chapter especially focuses on the similarities between the discourses that were related to separate development and the discourses related to sustainable development today to support the argument that the narrative of development is being used to sustain a broader exploitative system.

Saving the soil: soil erosion, the 'children of nature' and Smuts's trusteeship

The previous chapter demonstrates that Britain began to justify its colonial endeavours by using the narrative of development in the 1920s. After the Second World War, development became a framework in international relations and colonial powers used the narrative to preserve the colonial system in the face of increased resistance from the populations over which they ruled. Throughout Africa, analogous development institutions were established and "along with them often a common discourse and the same way of defining 'problems'" (Tapscott, 1995: 172). The Second World War led to an increase in industrialisation and tensions in SA. To the dismay of many Afrikaners, SA supported Britain in the war. Moreover, the economy diversified rapidly under wartime conditions and more Africans[32] were drawn into the urban labour market

Due to the increased demand for cheap labour, the government bent

[32] I use "African" here to refer predominantly to black South Africans who were not considered to be citizens of SA at the time. The Population Registration Act of 1950 divided people into three race groups: white, coloured (of mixed racial descent) and native (or black). Later, a fourth racial category of 'Indian' was added. Classification was based on appearance, general acceptance and social standing, but these criteria were not clearly defined in the legislation. The difficulties and the trauma of race classification are shown by the case of Sandra Laing, a girl born in 1955 to white parents, but who appeared to be "coloured". She was expelled from a white school at the age of ten, and her family fought several legal battles for her to retain white racial classification. After being ostracised from the white community, she eloped with an African man, with whom she had two children who were classified as coloured. The welfare system threatened to remove Sandra's children from her care because she had been reclassified as white while her children were coloured. She applied for, and was granted, reclassification as coloured. Sandra later reconciled with her mother. However, to date, Sandra's siblings have declined to have any contact with her because of public controversies about her race (Fabian, Hofmeyr & Matheson, 2008).

the job colour bar and temporarily relaxed the pass laws. The "influx" of black workers into white areas induced fear among the Afrikaners and created the circumstances in which a radical Afrikaner party managed to gain sufficient support to win the 1948 election (Thomson, 2001: 157). D.F. Malan's NP had used the still somewhat vaguely defined doctrine of Apartheid in its election campaign, in contrast to President Jan Smuts's wartime racial policy of "trusteeship"[33]. Although the NP had positioned itself as being opposed to Smuts's more "liberal" policies, the Apartheid regime was based on a mixture of the idea of trusteeship and J.B.M. Hertzog's segregation policies and aimed to establish separate black and white communities in SA. Moreover, "the state, as self-appointed trustee, assumed the responsibility of developing the African community" (Fischer, 1992: 462).

The notion of "trusteeship" thus predated official Apartheid. In the 1930s, Jan Smuts became concerned with soil erosion in the reserves and warned that "erosion is the biggest problem confronting the country, bigger than any politics" (cited in Fischer, 1992: 462). This concern initiated a "rescue operation" known as "betterment" in the 1930s, as exemplified by the Betterment Proclamation of 1939 that aimed to "save the soil". As the historian, William Beinart (1984: 61), notes, the welfare of the soil became a justification for intervening in peasant agriculture since "by the 1930s and 1940s, it was commonplace for both settlers and officials in southern Africa to describe African agricultural methods as careless and dangerous to the environment".

On the one hand, rural intervention was an attempt to support a migrant, instead of a settled, labour force by increasing agricultural production in the rural areas. It was also later used in an attempt to curb African resistance as protest in urban areas mounted. On the other hand, conservationist ideas shaped the ways in which agricultural schemes were devised and implemented. Conservationist ideas, which were diverse and varied over time, sometimes complemented and sometimes "conflicted with the other demands that were being made on rural areas" (Beinart, 1984: 54). The close relationship between ideas of nature and blame allocation for environmental degradation thus seems to be a general theme throughout the narrative of development. The ideas that became popular in SA in the first half of the twentieth century echoed broader colonial ideas, as exemplified by the fact that environmental degradation was blamed on "African farming methods" and that "betterment" in the reserves was used in an attempt to curb African resistance.

The ideas of nature and environmental degradation at the time did not only echo broader colonial narratives but were directly influenced by international events. In the late 1920s, environmental concerns in the US became more urgent. The notion that the "virgin lands" of the American plains had been "raped" became prevalent. This gendered imagery was related to earlier colonial discourses of fruitful "virgin lands" waiting to be ploughed and planted by masculine settlers. Land had thus become feminised. Accordingly, in the wake of the Dust Bowl that damaged the ecology of the American prairies during the

[33] Although the NP was seen as being opposed to Smuts's "liberalism", it was actually Smuts who coined the term "apartheid" in 1917 (Foster, Clark & York, 2010: 255).

early 1930s, it became easy to see the land as being in need of protection because of this earlier feminisation. Both scholarly books and colonial reports validated apocalyptic visions of environmental degradation and there was an increase in works that outlined how earlier civilisations in Egypt, Northern China and the Mediterranean had collapsed because they neglected their soil (Beinart, 1984: 68).

Officials in the Colonial Service and in the settler states, including Jan Smuts, were receptive of these ideas. Not only did Smuts become increasingly concerned with the state of the soil in the reserves, his notions of racial hierarchy were guided by his ideas of nature. Smuts proposed the idea of "Holistic Selection" as part of his broader philosophy of Holism[34]. Holistic Selection evoked a teleological process that favoured "development, efficiency and perfection", in opposition to Darwin's idea of natural selection. Smuts conformed to the general colonial idea that more "advanced" people were more independent from their immediate environments. People who were "less advanced" had less control of their environments and were left to the "mercy of nature" and were seen as "children of nature" (Foster, Clark & York, 2010: 257). Smuts's ideas of naturalised hierarchy, linked with his racial views and his perception that Africans were "children of nature" who lacked the drive for "social progress", influenced his ideas of trusteeship since Europeans were apparently entrusted to enact policies that would "conserve what is precious about Africa and Africans" (Foster *et al.*, 2010: 261). It can be argued that there was a dialectic relationship between Smuts's ideas about nature and his ideas about society since "the racial differences of society were attributed to nature and then re-extrapolated back to society to justify extreme segregation" (Foster *et al.*, 2010: 261).

Smuts's ideas of soil degradation and conservation were significant because they influenced the betterment policies that were the precursors to the Apartheid government's development policies in the reserves. Moreover, they reflected discourses that are still evident in contemporary notions of sustainable development. Firstly, his perception of Africans as "children of nature" clearly reflects the broader colonial idea of "noble savages", which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter. Secondly, he argued that it was necessary to intervene in the reserves because African farming methods and overpopulation would erode the soil. Most importantly, his ideas showed how these two seemingly contradictory discourses can function together and even reinforce each other. The overall ideology constructs Africans as closer to nature and in need of European tutelage. Africans should thus incorporate European technologies into their agricultural methods, but "development" should still happen "along native lines" to preserve African culture. In the following chapter I demonstrate that the same two notions, namely that colonised people are "closer to nature" and that "traditional" farming methods cause environmental destruction, are still present in contemporary debates concerning sustainable development.

[34] "Holism" is a term coined by Smuts in his 1926 book *Holism and evolution*. Simplistically, the theory proposes that various systems should be seen as a totality and not merely as a sum of their parts. These parts are intimately connected and cannot exist independently of the whole. Consequently, they cannot be understood without reference to the whole.

The "betterment" policies that predated the Second World War unsurprisingly failed to improve agriculture in the reserves since the structure of the reserves had remained intact. During and after the war, officials began to argue that interventions that were aimed at changing specific aspects of African agriculture were insufficient and that the whole system of African land use had to be transformed. The notion that land use had to be "rationalised" and "improved" was closely related to policies that attempted to squeeze an increasing number of African families onto decreasing areas of land in both SA and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) (Beinart, 1984: 76).

After the Second World War, discourses related to development became more prominent in SA's racialised programmes. As with earlier conservationist ideas, discourses of development in SA were closely interlinked with international discourses. SA's policies must therefore be seen as part of a broader shift of colonial powers to commit to development in Africa. This commitment generally took the form of comprehensive technical schemes that emphasised the need for more individualised plot tenure, which would supposedly lead to more investment in the land. The general post-war boom in attempts to plan and control African society was thus mirrored in South African society. This is significant because South African society already represented a microcosm of international relations in many ways. This lays the basis for the theorisation that the reverse is also true, namely that international relations in many ways present a macrocosm of the South African Apartheid system.[35]

Old ideas and "new" development: the Tomlinson Commission and post-Second World War development

The end of the Second World War coincided with economic and social crises in the reserves, which were exacerbated by droughts in the late 1940s. In response, the newly elected NP introduced a "rehabilitation strategy" to replace the earlier betterment policies of stock limitation. The historian, Anne Mager (1992: 264–265), argues that these policies had "achieved little more than the shuffling of people and cattle". However, this "shuffling around" had entailed the displacement of people and had actually led to a deterioration of many people's livelihoods and made it more difficult for them to cope with their already precarious circumstances. The new schemes were framed as "a strategy for reserve development" and entailed the imposition of social engineering measures, including "the removal of 'surplus population' from rural locations to land purchased by the Native Trust" (Mager, 1992: 264–265).

The stated aim of the schemes was to boost agricultural productivity in the reserves, but it also had the effect of securing a steady supply of migrant labour for the expanding industrial sector. It is important to remember that Britain had launched its development schemes and was claiming that it was guiding its colonies from "self-government" to "independence". The Apartheid government mimicked this strategy and launched policies

[35] This is perhaps not surprising since many of SA's white politicians were trained in Western-modelled institutions and inherited colonial policies that were shaped by the broader international context.

that would "'modernise' existing patterns of segregation through the development of ethnic national units in which black South Africans might exercise 'democratic' rights and 'national sovereignty'" (Evans, 2012: 122). In fact, when Hendrik Verwoerd addressed the House of Assembly in January 1959, he stated that he envisaged a "commonwealth relationship"[36] with the Bantustans, which would be based on the principle of "Political independence coupled with economic interdependence" (cited in Geldenhuys, 1981: 6).

As mentioned in the introduction, in 1950, the state appointed the Tomlinson Commission to make recommendations concerning the socio-economic development of the "African areas". The commission had to formulate a "comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based upon effective socio-economic planning" (cited in Houghton, 1956: 14). Under the banner of "constitutional development" the NP government introduced the Bantu Authorities Act of 1953, which instituted tribal, regional and territorial authorities in African areas. Building on already established notions of trusteeship, the state appointed itself as the trustee of the Bantu areas and "assumed the responsibility of developing the African community" (Fischer, 1992: 462).

The Tomlinson report was published in 1954 and, just as the notion of trusteeship drew on already established colonial ideas, the report bore a resemblance to earlier suggestions for the economic development of the reserves. The report advocated for the reform of agriculture and for the diversification of economic activity through the industrialisation of the reserves, which was supposed to reduce the amount of people who were dependent on agriculture for their survival. In terms of reforming agriculture, the report focused on the "development of self-sustaining small farmers on 'economic units'" (Fischer, 1992: 462). The Ninth Report of the Social and Economic Planning Council in 1946 had also emphasised the need for land reform (within the reserves) and recommended that rural areas be divided into "economic units". Similar to the Tomlinson report, it had recommended that those displaced by change should be "absorbed" into other activities. The Ninth Report presented a strong precedent for the Tomlinson report and it introduced the notion of "economic units"[37] into planning so that officials could supposedly calculate how much land and stock would be necessary to sustain a rural family (Nieuwenhuysen, 1964: 3).

The Native Economic Commission's 1932 report also informed the Tomlinson report because it was the first to stress that "the economic development of the reserves must inevitably be sought as the main solution for the native economy problem." However, this report also built on those that came before it since it stated that the solution was to "teach the Native how to use their

[36] The Commonwealth of Nations is a political association of 54 states who are nearly all former British colonies. It was created through the Balfour Declaration during the Imperial Conference of 1926 and was originally called the British Commonwealth of Nations. It was renamed to the Commonwealth of Nations in 1949, just as Britain was "modernising" its colonial mission in Africa.

[37] According to Beinart (1984: 79), this notion was also borrowed from the USA.

land more economically" and that this was necessary in order to prevent "destruction of large grazing areas, the erosion and denudation of the soil and the drying up of springs" (cited in Yawitch, 1982: 9). The Tomlinson Commission's approach to rural planning involved the forced removal of a considerable number of Africans off their land since families who did not receive economic units had to move to rural townships and industrial towns. The commission's proposals for industrialisation in and around the homelands were intended to absorb the "surplus population" generated by "rural restructuring". However, the government refused the commission's request for 3 million pounds to stimulate secondary and tertiary development because it could jeopardise industries in white areas. The central government thus did not provide the necessary funding to support the new rural townships and industrial towns.

The government defied the commission's proposals for industrialisation and opted to support irrigation schemes and other similar projects instead. It thus followed basically the same route as the earlier betterment policies. In addition to the fact that the commission's policies were not so different from earlier failed betterment policies, it analogously stressed the importance of retaining an undefined "African Character" in the Reserves. This notion has been discussed in relation to British development policies and it also had a strong precedent in the Native Economic Commission's Report in 1932 (Nieuwenhuysen, 1964: 3). The notion that there was some sort of "African Character" or culture allowed officials to claim that environmental deterioration in the reserves was a consequence of "African culture" and inadequate farming methods (De Wet, 1989: 335). As Tapscott (1995:173–174) observes, "economic underdevelopment and poverty was attributed to the backwardness of the Africans themselves and their resistance to modernizing forces. Africans were blamed for the slow pace of economic development in the bantustans". From this premise it followed that the people needed more tutelage and organisation.

Although planning committees and ad hoc committees paid lip-service to community involvement, the anthropologist, Chris de Wet, demonstrates that in the Ciskei, "community involvement" consisted of showing the people pictures of flourishing crops and good grazing lands and asking them if they wanted what was in the pictures. However, the plans drawn up by the committees did not consider that the people had anything to contribute. Moreover, the plans were usually drawn up before communities had been consulted (De Wet, 1989: 330). Even the much-lauded theme of community consultation in contemporary development programmes thus had a precursor in Apartheid development schemes and in both cases it has often been tokenistic. Today it is not only the tokenism that is problematic, but also the fact that organisations are applauded when they involve people in the programmes that are imposed on them.

How new is neo-colonialism?

In 1982, Joanne Yawitch (1982: 2–3) did a study for the South African Institute of Race Relations in which

she notes that the reasons for the environmental deterioration and "underdevelopment" of the reserves:

> ...lay outside the narrow limits of agricultural planning and of relocation understood simply as a process that involves the removal of people. They are rather to be found in the relationship between the reserves and the rest of South Africa; in the functions that these areas fulfil in relation to the South African economy as a whole.

Today this would seem like an obvious observation. However, at the time, the common perception among officials was that the problem was primarily a technical one and that it was caused by the "primitive" farming techniques of Africans. This perception was combined with accounts of the "innate laziness" of African men and their "irrational" desire to accumulate cattle (Yawitch, 1982: 10). Yawitch's observation was necessary because she was responding to this popular view. Officials did have debates about the suitability of certain development strategies such as afforestation and the "appropriate" size of an "economic unit". However, they did not question the Apartheid structure and agreed that it was necessary to intervene in the homelands to "enhance the viability of Black agriculture" (De Wet, 1989: 344).

There were also debates among scholars about whether land in the Bantustans should be communally owned or whether ownership should be based on freehold title. Some scholars even claimed that private ownership always led to better conservation practices (Tapson, 1984: 4–5). The discussion about policies in the Bantustans ignored the wider structures within which the areas were located. I would even argue that the debates actually drew attention away from the wider Apartheid structure and thus contributed to sustaining it. Studies such as the Tomlinson report obviously failed to identify the origins of the problems in the reserves because the reserves were seen as separated from the broader social, political and economic system in SA. Yawitch (1982: 27) also notes that "because of the ideological framework within which Tomlinson was working he could not see that the solution to the problem of the reserves was not a 'reserve' solution, but had ultimately to be a national political one".

It was not only Professor Tomlinson who was working within this ideological framework. The economic historian Hobart Houghton wrote an article concerning the Tomlinson report in 1956. His article is representative of the intellectual climate of the time and he conformed to the popular notion that the Bantustans had "remained underdeveloped areas where traditional primitive tribal subsistence farming" prevailed and "overstocking and bad husbandry" were degrading the soil. He also notes that productivity, which was "deplorably low by modern standards," was declining further due to "the survival of a primitive subsistence economy" (Hobart, 1956: 13; 18). Typifying the tendency to overlook the history of previous "betterment" projects, Hobart (1956: 18) characterises the people in the reserves as having "a cultural heritage which has had little contact with the modern world". Although he remarks that confining "the African peoples" to their own areas was a way of maintaining the status quo, he also insists that many Apartheid supporters had the "highest of motives" and believes that separate development

is the just way to relieve Africans of their labour burdens (Hobart, 1956: 14).

According to Hobart's reading of the report, only two options were possible. The first was that Africans were increasingly sharing the "Christian principles" and "civilisation" of the white population, which fostered "their sense of duty and responsibility" and, as they progressed along the civilizational ladder, they should be awarded with equality of opportunity. In contrast, the commission also stated that increased integration would intensify animosity and racial friction due to the circumstances in the country following the Second World War. The commission argued that the only alternative to this scenario was the establishment of separate racial communities in separate areas "where each will have the fullest opportunity of self-expression and development" (Hobart, 1956: 15–16).[38] The commission favoured the second option since it supposedly offered Africans the opportunity to "develop their own society in their own area" and would encourage "individual and social advancement" (Hobart, 1956: 16).

Although it was framed in terms of the development of Africans, it was evident that the ultimate goal of separate development was to sustain white privilege or, as Hobart (1956: 16) phrases it, "this development scheme offers the Europeans the only hope of continued existence as a separate entity". Of course the Apartheid government would not actually separate the Bantustans completely. The government made it clear that while Africans would be "free to manage their own affairs" the state would still be in control of foreign affairs and defence. Moreover, white industries were still dependent on cheap black migrant labour and at any given time more than 500 000 adult males would be away from the reserves and working in urban areas (Hobart, 1956: 19). This is not to mention the invisible labour of female black domestic workers.[39] A crucial function of the Bantustan system was thus to maintain a steady supply of *migrant* labour, while preventing black workers from settling in white areas.[40]

Another primary function of the Bantustans was the control and maintenance of those who were redundant to the industrial centres of SA. It thus legitimised the removal of "non-productive" or "surplus" Africans from white areas. General Circular No 25 of 1967 explicitly states (cited in Legassick, 1974: 27):

[38] This debate about whether Apartheid should be relatively liberal or whether there should be a structure of "separate development" is extremely significant because it provides a strong historical precedent for the two forms of Global Apartheid that I elaborate on in the final chapter. It also echoes broader and older debates about the form that racial relations in SA should take, as demonstrated by the standoff between Smuts's more "liberal" approach and Malan's more conservative "Apartheid" slogan before the 1948 election.

[39] Domestic work in SA, which was once of marginal interest to social scientists, has received much more scholarly attention in recent years. There is also a growing literature on the globalisation of paid domestic work, which investigates how "thousands of women from poor countries in the global south are living in a form of servitude, as part of a 'global care chain'" (Cock, 2011: 132). However, during Apartheid and today, domestic workers were and are often disregarded. This is because, firstly, invisibility is a central feature of racism and domestic workers in SA have been predominantly black. Secondly, their work is still often trivialised and dismissed as "women's work" (Cock, 2011: 132). Many scholars have recently discussed domestic workers in relation to intersectionality to highlight various aspects of domestic workers' positionality. These discussions have ranged from positioning domestic workers in specific countries (Uganda) in larger transnational, intersectional networks (Christian & Namaganda, 2018) to analyses of how domestic workers as informal workers organise to shed light on intersectionality in social movements (Tilly, 2020). These academic works are crucial to addressing the invisibility of domestic workers, but they usually find that domestic work has been and still is undervalued and precarious work.

[40] For more information on this topic please consult Harold Wolpe's (1972) seminal text *Capitalism and cheap labour power in South Africa: from segregation to apartheid.*

> As soon as they (Africans) become, for-some reason or another, no longer fit for work or superfluous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of origin or the territory of their national unit where they fit in ethnically if they were not born or bred in the homeland … no stone is to be left unturned to achieve the settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu.

Those who were defined as "superfluous" included: the aged, the disabled, widows and women with dependent children. This definition again overlooks the labour of domestic workers, many of whom had dependent children, but had to leave their own children in the Bantustans in order to raise white children.

The responsibilities of social welfare could therefore be displaced onto the Bantustan governments, while the labour force served the white areas. Even this system was framed in terms of white benevolence. Prime Minister Vorster argued that black workers would still be allowed to enter white areas "because they cannot provide employment for themselves … What would have become of them if one had not created these employment opportunities for them?" (cited in Legassick, 1974: 28–29). The "independence" of the Bantustans also did not prevent another round of development schemes. The state claimed that, since the "ignorance" and "tribal customs" of Africans inhibited progress, it had to interfere in the name of "economic advancement". In accordance with the general colonial ideology after the Second World War, the Apartheid government argued that they had to develop the Bantustans so that they could eventually become independent. Paradoxically, notions of sovereignty and independence were used to justify more colonialism.

In 1962, Hendrik Verwoerd, the Prime Minister who framed Apartheid as "separate development", stated that (cited in Geldenhuys, 1981: 12–13):

> … both local black and foreign opinion should be made aware of the moral content of the homelands policy. We must ensure that the outside world realizes, and that the Bantu realizes, that a new period is dawning, a period in which the White man will move away from discrimination against the Bantu as far as his own areas are concerned; that the White man is leading him through the first stage towards full development.

The importance of Verwoerd's claims does not only lie in the notion of "stages of development", which has been discussed, but also in his insistence that a "new period is dawning". This chapter has demonstrated that the "new" era was not very new at all. It drew from an already established development narrative and often replicated the same policies as previous betterment policies. Most significantly, it kept the same exploitative system of Apartheid (previously segregation) intact.[41]

In fact, the government insisted on the newness of its approach in order to maintain the status quo. In the context of the proliferation of anti-colonial movements in Africa, Verwoerd

[41] Here I do not mean to imply that there was no difference between segregation and Apartheid, but simply that the one system was built on the other. I am also not arguing that there were no reforms in SA in the 1980s. As noted in the introduction, Apartheid strategies and policies changed over time. However, the same basic structure remained in place.

attempted to "'sell' the homelands policy internationally as an exercise in decolonisation" (Geldenhuys, 1981: 24). The NP essentially divided the African population in SA into an assortment of "developing states" and then appealed to the authority of "development experts" to legitimise the perpetuation of white domination (Tapscott, 1995: 174).[42] Tapscott remarks that the problems in the Bantustans were similar to those in other African states. While the NP used this same notion to classify the Bantustans as "underdeveloped states" the similarities can be attributed to common experiences of colonialism and exploitation. European perceptions of Africans also undoubtedly played a part in this assessment. In spite of the NP's attempts to make Apartheid more internationally acceptable, the UN General Assembly (UNGA), where newly independent nations from the Global South (then the Third World) had much more sway than in the Security Council, condemned the NP's discourse of "separate development".

Interestingly, critics of the Bantustan system claimed that it was "neo-colonial". In their book, *The Homelands Policy: a neo-colonial solution to SA's future?*, Cleary and Van der Merwe (1980) analyse the political systems, economic structures and revenue supplies of the Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda. They come to the conclusion that "the homelands policy is no more than a neo-colonial solution imposed on blacks in SA by a white government determined to maintain its position of power and privilege vis-a-vis blacks" (cited in Geldenhuys, 1981: 8). Cleary and Van der Merwe use Kwame Nkrumah's definition of neo-colonialism. Accordingly, neo-colonialism entails the creation of non-viable states, which are "incapable of independent development" and have to "rely upon the former imperial power for defence and even internal security." The economic and financial systems of neo-colonial states also remain linked to their former colonial rulers (Nkrumah, 1965: 4).

This definition of neo-colonialism could also apply to Britain's mandate territories. The mandate system is retrospectively classified as colonialism and today the NP's policies with regard to the Bantustans are also seen as undoubtedly colonial. With hindsight, the NP's policies do not seem very new at all and this chapter has revealed that they were based on previous colonial policies. Today, American and European policies in Africa are often described as neo-colonial. However, even this classification is not new. This is not to say that colonial policies have remained unchanged for five hundred years, but that we should be sceptical of claims that a "new" era has arrived. Moreover, as Verwoerd's speech demonstrated, claims of newness are often used to maintain old exploitative structures.

Another new era of development

Tapscott (1995: 182) argues that "developmentalism rested heavily on discursive efforts to depoliticize the social order, to transmute the racial character of the state and to argue that social life should be governed by the

[42] Chris Tapscott observes that the "Development Studies" or "Development Administration" programs that were introduced at a number of Afrikaans universities in the 1970s and 1980s were updated versions of the "Bantu Studies" programs that preceded them. For example, the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education offered a diploma on "Bantuistics" in the 1980s under the heading of "Development Studies". The diploma promised to educate students on "the living world and living conditions of the Black population group" (Tapscott, 1995: 175).

market". In the 1980s, the development discourse in SA became characterised by a language of technocratic rationality. Although there were also precedents for this, as demonstrated by the concept of "economic units", the NP and development officials used technical language more systematically in the 1980s as part of an effort to depoliticise the problems in the Bantustans. The developmentalists' reports became permeated with scientism and "underdevelopment" was seen as a result of the poor application of economic principles. For example, Erich Leistner (cited in Geldenhuys, 1981: 36), the Director of the Africa Institute, reasoned that the poor state of the Bantustan economies could be blamed on economic heresy, namely that "political and social objectives" had apparently "outweighed economic ones".

During the course of the 1980s, there was a rapid surge in the number of "development experts". In 1988, the Programme for Development Research (PRODDER) (cited in Tapscott, 1995: 178) announced that "an enormous amount of development effort is taking place in southern Africa, possibly unsurpassed anywhere in the world. The number of development agencies is to be counted in the hundreds, available funds in the thousands of millions and development projects in the thousands". In the same year, PRODDER listed 175 development agencies that were working in SA. This proliferation was related to a broader international trend,[43] which also produced the Brundtland Commission's report in 1987.

It is important to recall that this was the timeframe in which the Soviet Union was collapsing and there was immense pressure on the NP to negotiate with the African National Congress (ANC). There was increasing unrest in SA and Western business interests were pushing the NP and the ANC to come to a negotiated settlement. In March 1982, Nelson Mandela was transferred from Robben Island to Pollsmoor prison and secret meetings between the ANC and the NP began in 1984 (SAHO, 2011). Tapscott also observes a change in the terminology that developmentalists used to refer to black South Africans. Instead of using the word "Bantu", which was explicitly racial, it became popular to refer to the "underdeveloped population" and "the rural poor". Although "underdevelopment" was still associated with blackness, the averred neutrality of development terminology was "intended to facilitate the incorporation of segments of the African population into the new ideological discourse" (Tapscott, 1995:185).

Segments of the African population were not only incorporated, but in the 1990s they also began "appropriating the language and idioms of 'development' for their own ends" (King, 2007: 14).[44] The ANC increasingly employed the notion of development in its rhetoric and development became a central theme in the discourse of the (post)apartheid government. The "new" development discourses were shaped by the geographies of Apartheid and the former Bantustans are still presented as underdeveloped

[43] As already discussed, the increased use of technocratic language also corresponded with the rise of neoliberal ideology internationally. For a more in-depth discussion of neoliberal ideology, please consult Ferguson's (2009) *The uses of neoliberalism.*

[44] As noted, this was not limited to SA or the 1990s. Many leaders from the Global South appropriated the language of development from at least 1947 to further various interests, including nationalist struggles against formal colonialism.

territories in need of specific interventions. Similar to the Apartheid government's policies in the Bantustans, the specificities of the interventions have been contested, but the overall idea that technical interventions in these areas are necessary to save them from underdevelopment remains. The geographer Brian King argues that the (post)apartheid development discourse has been characterised by a neoliberal discourse that privileges the notion of economic growth and "empowerment". Consequently, King (2007: 14) notes that "this neoliberal repackaging of the region is... transforming its cultural and ecological landscapes while producing and reproducing particular ideas of local populations that shape rural development in the contemporary era".

The discourse of development did change, and the language of neoliberalism has become more prominent in development documents. However, there are aspects of the NP's betterment and development projects that are still present in the ANC's approach to rural development. For example, the National Department of Agriculture's *Policy on Agriculture in Sustainable Development* states that "population density and overgrazing are the main causes of soil degradation in the communal areas" (National Department of Agriculture, 2002: 8). This statement could have come from any Apartheid era document concerning the development of the Bantustans. Moreover, the document claims that "Rural areas also have poor financial markets. As a result, the poor find it difficult to cope with risks of various sorts" (National Department of Agriculture, 2002: 10). Again, this presents rural areas as outside of markets in SA and ignores the fact that they have been an integral part of the country's economic system.

The fact that the authors of the document see the problems in rural areas as rural problems and ignore the broader context in which they are situated is not simply the legacy of colonialism. The document actually includes legislation from the NP's Bantustan development policies, for example the Fencing Act of 1963, the Plant Improvement Act of 1976 and the Livestock Improvement Act of 1977. These Acts were apparently incorporated because they would contribute to higher productivity in rural communities through the transfer of technology. The document notes the importance of improving rural communities' capacity to "manage both climatic and market risks" (National Department of Agriculture, 2002: 22). The perpetuation of colonial narratives is worrisome because, firstly, it has failed to produce policies that improve the livelihoods of rural communities for almost a century and there is no indication that it will produce better policies now. Moreover, teaching people to "manage" in the midst of climate change and market turbulence is a clear indication that people will be taught to cope with the status quo while the same exploitative system will be kept in place.[45]

[45] The strong continuities in structures and policies also have implications for the notion of a "new South Africa". Of course SA has changed in many respects since the 1994 election, but the inequalities generated by Apartheid have persisted. Moreover, the fact that the ANC government is reproducing many of the NP's policies and framing "rural development" in the same way is disconcerting.

Where did the water go? From the NP to Nestlé in Nigeria

Some scholars were critical of "betterment" and "development" policies during the era of official Apartheid. For example, Chris de Wet provided mild critiques and noted that the schemes had resulted in the loss of arable land for many people. Moreover, he argued that betterment and development policies were carried out in the ideological confines of Apartheid and separate development and could thus not achieve their stated aims of making agriculture in the reserves viable (De Wet, 1989: 338; 328). However, he still cited lack of equipment and credit facilities as some of the major problems confronting the reserves. From this point and from the points discussed in previous sections we can already see clear similarities between Apartheid development programmes and sustainable development programmes today. Even critical scholars, such as De Wet, theorised the reserves in terms of lack of markets and thus failed to recognise that they were an integral part of SA's markets, especially in terms of the supply and reproduction of a migrant labour force. De Wet (1985: 12) also suggested "the provision of short, intensive training courses in optimal use of scarce agricultural resources". As we shall see, this sentence could just as well have come from a contemporary document on sustainable development.

Moreover, De Wet's (1989: 339) research in Keiskammahoek in the Ciskei homeland revealed that people, presumably women, had to walk much further in order to collect wood and water than they did before betterment policies were implemented. This is interesting because almost every document related to gender and climate change notes that climate change will increase the amount of time that African girls and women will have to spend on collecting water. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009) *Resource guide on gender and climate change* states that "in many countries, climate change means that women and young girls have to walk further to collect water, especially in the dry season. Women in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, spend 40 billion hours per year collecting water" (UNDP, 2009: IV). Likewise, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2016: 14) report on *Women and Sustainable Development Goals* specifies that "for women, inadequate water supplies pose additional burdens. In a single day in 25 sub-Saharan African countries, women spend 16 million hours collecting water". The World Bank (2010: 46) similarly legitimises its programmes by arguing that "Provision of water at the household level can help reduce the time spent collecting water for domestic use—a female responsibility in most countries". There are many more examples, but I think these are sufficient to support the argument that many policies related to gender and climate change focus on the theme of African women and water collection. The general point that women in sub-Saharan Africa spend a lot of time collecting water and that the time spent will probably increase with climate change is correct. However, many of the glossy and apparently philanthropic projects related to women and sustainability in Africa have detrimental effects and contribute to sustaining broader exploitative structures.

In order to validate the argument I make in the previous paragraph, I focus on one very telling example, namely Nestlé's sustainability projects in Nigeria. Nestlé Water is the bottled water division of the Nestlé Group and is the biggest supplier of bottled water in the world.[46] The company requires cheap access to vast amounts of water in order to maintain its enormous supply and thus its profits. Nestlé Water's practices sparked various protests in the Global North. For example, 515 000 Californians protested against the company's bottling practices after the state had experienced four consecutive years of drought. One of the leaders of the protests, Nick Rodnam, (cited in Hackman, 2015) stated that "It is very disturbing and actually quite offensive that a foreign company is taking our water, bottling it and selling it back to us".

In response, the company transferred many of its plants to poorer countries in the Global South, including facilities for Nestlé Pure Life bottled water in Ogun and Abaji in Nigeria. According to the company, these two plants represent their "commitment to creating shared value with local communities" because they are sharing their "expertise in preserving water resources and ensuring the sustainability of the shared water aquifers" with the local population. In fact, the company promotes "water stewardship programs" around the world, for example Project WET (Water Education for Teachers) that assists teachers in Nigeria in educating children about hydration (Nestlé Waters, 2016). It is not only ironic that a company facing various lawsuits from environmental NGOs[47] has been teaching people in rural Nigeria how to preserve water, it is also a clear indication of the unequal power relations and condescension that shape interactions in some sustainable development schemes.

Nestlé's patronising attitude is just the tip of the iceberg. President Muhammadu Buhari welcomed the company to Nigeria under the auspice of promoting development in rural communities and promised that the government would "provide the enabling environment for private sector enterprises to thrive" (Premium Times, 2016).[48] This "enabling environment" included access to land and resources, particularly water, and tax holidays. The chairman of the company's Board of Directors, David Ifezulike, announced that the company "drove rural development" and was "proud to spread the climate of progress to Abaji" (Premium Times, 2016). We can thus see that the company justified its projects in Nigeria by appealing to the narrative of development.

However, water shortages have been a huge problem in Nigeria. More than 73 000 Nigerians have died because of a lack of water and sanitation.[49] In Lagos, 15 million out of 21 million inhabitants have limited or no access

[46] The company's revenue was $7.82 billion in 2019 (Statista, 2020).

[47] Amongst other cases, Nestlé is being sued by the Earth Island Institute and Plastic Pollution Coalition for its contribution to the plastic pollution of water sources (Plastic Pollution Coalition, 2020).

[48] This notion also has a precedent in discussions concerning the Bantustans. In 1985, Chris de Wet argued that the local government structure in the Ciskei was an obstacle to economic development. Consequently, De Wet (1985: 11–12) claimed that an agricultural policy based on "free enterprise principles" had to be complemented with "a local government structure that operates along similar lines". We can thus see that even in the Bantustans governments were encouraged to create an "enabling climate" for enterprise.

[49] By 2015, Boko Haram had been responsible for about 4 000 deaths. Effectively, water shortages had killed almost 20 times more people than Boko Haram.

to running water (SumOfUs, 2016). Nestlé is contributing to this problem since its operations deplete water resources and dry up rivers that rural communities in Abaji had access to. Women and girls in the area are largely responsible for collecting water, so in this sense the pervasive image of rural African women carrying heavy loads does hold true. Women in the area have complained that the time they spend collecting water has quadrupled since the Nestlé plant opened because the rivers close to their villages have dried up. The runoff from Nestlé's factories has also increased water pollution in the region (Mussman, 2019).

The above-mentioned problem is not unique to Nigeria. In 2013 in Lahore, Pakistan, residents complained that they had become ill after being forced to drink sludge water since Nestlé had drained their water supply and sold it as bottled water. The company has been selling Pure Life bottled water in Lahore since 1998, so the elite could afford clean bottled water (Hakim, 2018). We can thus see a situation in which Nestlé contributed greatly to a problem and then positioned itself as the solution while its philanthropic projects were mostly ineffective or unrelated to the causes of the problem. By presenting itself as contributing to development in Africa and by widely advertising its philanthropic projects, the company has been able to gain control of resources and thus contributes to the deterioration of livelihoods in the regions where it operates.

Nestlé's projects echo the NP's relations with the Bantustans since access to water was one of the primary concerns when the Bantustans were established. The Apartheid government had taken precautions to ensure that white SA would retain access to the limited water resources in the Bantustans by signing bilateral treaties with the "independent" leaders of the Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana (Geldenhuys, 1981: 49). The Apartheid government therefore contributed to water shortages in the Bantustans and then launched limited irrigation projects, which they presented as benevolent development projects.

As demonstrated by President Muhammadu Buhari's support of Nestlé, development projects are carried out with the consent and encouragement of some African leaders. Accordingly, Apartheid officials collaborated with "chiefs" who could accept proposals on behalf of their subjects. For example, in Mnisi, development planners provided a map with the signature of the chief when confronted with opposition and resistance from the population. Fischer (1992: 465) notes that planners used "elaborate development rhetoric" to keep people uninformed and to support their vague claim that restructuring would benefit the "whole tribe". By claiming that "the tribe" was a collective entity, planners were able to conceal the differentiated consequences of their schemes. For example, changes in land holding patterns often made it more difficult for women to gain access to land. Generally, community involvement was limited to elite men and when a female respondent in the Ciskei was asked whether she knew what the "betterment" schemes in the region would entail she responded that "we didn't ask because only men can ask—I don't know if the men did ask" (cited in De Wet, 1989: 342).

According to De Wet's research, the general sentiment in the community

was that the schemes were an intrusion by the white government and that they had negative social and economic consequences. Programmes also shaped local relations with chiefs because they became associated with relocation, land reallocation, stock limitation and fencing. The reserves were characterised by high levels of income inequality and, in the early 1980s, 12.7% of the families in the reserves received 46.3% of the total income. State policies therefore impoverished the majority of the rural population while enriching an elite and exacerbating power and wealth inequalities within the population (Yawitch, 1982: 94). As demonstrated by the Nestlé example, the same could be said for many contemporary development projects.

Masculinities, migration and "mothers of the nation"

There is no doubt that gender and generation strongly shaped the ways in which betterment planning affected people in communities. Women from farms were resettled in Bantustan areas, which increased their dependence on remittances from male migrants and thus augmented patriarchal power in townships. Moreover, "betterment in the Ciskei reserves was marked by changing generational masculinities" (Evans, 2012: 131). This is because young male migrant workers' status improved while older men who had lost farming land became more dependent on the wages of younger men. For other young men whose opportunities of improving their status through acquiring cattle and land were diminished, the language of African nationalism presented a way to "reconfigure patriarchal discourse" (Evans, 2012: 131). The African nationalist discourse presented black women as mothers of the nation and urged them to nurture, defend and "exhort their men to action" (Mager, 1992: 777).[50]

Gendered discourses were also used by the Apartheid government to justify male migrant labour in the mines. Officials claimed that women in "traditional societies" were responsible for agricultural labour and that African men had few responsibilities. The supposed laziness of African men was used as a justification for "teaching them the dignity of labour in the mines" (Yawitch, 1982: 6). As it became evident that betterment was not working and that yields were declining, the cited reasons were still technical shortcomings and, ironically, African farming methods. This led to the idea that there were good and bad African farmers[51], which was used to justify the appropriation of land from migrant labourers since it was said that "the 'lazy' men who left their wives to work the land while they went off to sample the toys that work in the towns of the mines bought, should not have land" (Yawitch, 1982: 9).

[50] The "mother of the nation" image was also popular in Afrikaner nationalist discourses. Afrikaner women were idealised as self-sacrificial and as the moral strength of the Afrikaner nation. Accordingly, the "Afrikaner woman" had a duty to serve her husband and children and to suffer for the well-being of the nation. Some Afrikaans scholars, such as Hettie Mans (Mans, 2011; Mans & Lauwrens, 2013), have argued that this image is still present in Afrikaans women's magazines and that it actually became more prevalent after the end of official Apartheid in 1994.

[51] The farmers who were identified as good farmers were usually the ones who were connected to the "tribal authority" and the government and thus already had access to resources. The poorest farmers were also more likely to lose land, because they were the ones who had opted to become wage labourers in the first place (Yawitch, 1982: 63).

Two contradictory gendered discourses were thus used to justify the exploitation of African men. When African men were encouraged to become migrant labourers, their supposed laziness was used as an excuse to extract their labour. In contrast, when the government wanted to reallocate land, they claimed that migrant labourers were lazy and that "real men" had stayed in the reserves to farm. This reveals that discourses changed over time and sometimes contradicted each other. Moreover, it shows that contradictory discourses were still based on the same core assumption and that they did not necessarily undermine the overall narrative.

Evan's (2013: 220) research reveals that for many women in Qwaqwa, betterment represented "an unmitigated disaster". In contrast to women from Qwaqwa who associated betterment with decreased resources and increased dependence, some women from the Ciskei saw the opportunity to move to land owned by the South African Native Trust as a viable strategy to escape from domination, patriarchy and impoverishment on white farms. Other women who had previously resided on farms moved to townships to increase their associational opportunities and limited financial gains. For some of these women, the Zionist churches in townships were sources of support and new social opportunities. The four textile factories that were established at Sada presented new sources of employment, although the wages were low and the hours long. Women also used a range of strategies to subvert the state's attempts to confine them to the homelands, for example "the adoption of 'coloured' identities to avoid influx control legislation" (Evans, 2013: 229).

We can thus see that, although the Apartheid regime's development projects were generally perceived in a negative light, the affected populations were not homogenous. There were also shifts in the basis of power, for example wages became more important in determining power relations than cattle. Many of the people Evans (2013: 216) interviewed also had ambivalent experiences since resettlement provided them with a way to escape from white owned farms and increased their earning capacity while it increased their insecurity and "economic exposure stemming from the loss of farm rations". I do not mean to condone Apartheid betterment projects by pointing out that they had heterogeneous effects. Instead, I want to reveal that they functioned similarly to many contemporary development projects. Perhaps the World Bank's stove-providing schemes do improve the livelihoods of some women. However, that does not take away from the broader argument that it contributes to an overall exploitative system. Some women were financially better off after Apartheid betterment schemes had been implemented because they could earn wages in textile factories and decrease their dependence on patriarchs on white owned farms, yet it would be ridiculous to use this to argue that Apartheid should have been maintained.

Conclusion

The chapter does not provide a detailed discussion of the Apartheid system and it is historically superficial in many respects. Although historical specificity is crucial, I have chosen to

discuss Apartheid in "broad strokes", firstly, because a detailed analysis would be too lengthy and there are many other works that do provide historically specific accounts and,[52] more significantly, I felt that the purpose of the monograph would be better served by a focus on theoretical generalisations. Consequently, this chapter examines some of the discourses and policies related to the Apartheid government's betterment and development programmes in the Bantustans. It emphasises the similarities that contemporary sustainable development discourses and policies share with those that were present during Apartheid, both in SA and at an international level. The strategies that the NP used in its attempts to sustain the exploitative Apartheid system were also shaped by the changing international context, as demonstrated by the fact that the NP used the same discourses as the British Empire when it was attempting to prolong colonial relations in Africa. The chapter presents the Apartheid government's schemes as a microcosm of global power relations and thus lays the foundation for the argument that global power relations can be framed as an apartheid system.

Moreover, changing discourses and policies have to be situated in the longer narrative of development, which is the golden thread that ran through colonial strategies from the 1920s. I discuss some of the essential elements of these strategies that inform the "thinking with history" approach that this monograph aims to adopt. These elements include: using environmental degradation as a justification for intervening in the reserves; ignoring the effects of previous betterment and development schemes and blaming the failure of agriculture in the reserves on a supposedly untouched African culture; reconfiguring gender relations, especially criticising African patriarchy while enforcing policies that bolstered patriarchy; and, perhaps most significantly, announcing new eras of development that would purportedly differ from previous exploitative eras in order to keep the same unjust structures in place. The repeated failure of these policies should also encourage us to think critically about contemporary sustainable development policies and their ability to address the challenges that climate change is already posing.

[52] For a more historically in-depth discussion of Apartheid I would recommend Dubow's (2014) *Apartheid, 1948–1994.*

Elize Soer

Chapter Three

Introduction

The following chapter discusses some of the ways in which the discourse of sustainable development functions today in order to demonstrate that it helps to perpetuate an unsustainable system. Within the framework of sustainable development, the causes of climate change are sometimes misconstrued. This is primarily done by presenting lack of development in the Global South as the problem and then prescribing policies to "uplift" or "develop" the countries that are identified as lacking. The idea of the Global North is presented as the model that other societies must emulate in order to achieve sustainable development. This ironically allows the industrialised countries of the North, who are largely responsible for anthropogenic climate change,[53] to present themselves as saviours and leaders in sustainable development. This chapter argues that the policy prescriptions and interventions that follow from this paradigm are problematic. As the section on gender and climate change demonstrates, many of the policy prescriptions are informed by colonial narratives and therefore they reproduce colonial power relations.

Development and destruction: two sides of the same coin

As mentioned in chapter one, many scholars have attempted to locate the origins of the development narrative with varying degrees of success. Cowen and Shenton (1996: viii) trace its origin back to ancient Greece where it was understood "as a natural process in which phases of renewal, expansion, contraction and decomposition followed each other sequentially according to a perpetually recurrent cycle". However, they argue that the modern meaning of the word is more indicative of a "discontinuous process in which destruction and renewal are simultaneous, as much as sequential" (Cowen & Shenton, 1996: viii). They found this view of development in the genealogy of the Saint-Simonian doctrine, which they traced in the works of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill and the Fabian socialists of the late nineteenth century. Their discussion of the origin of development is intriguing because it focuses on the fact that destruction is an inherent part of development.

In fact, Cowen and Shenton (1996: ix) note that the "belief in making development happen can only be grounded in a process of development, in that it is the process of development,

[53] The term climate change refers to variations in the climate that persist for a relatively long period of time, generally decades or more. Climate change has thus been a central part of the history of the earth and predates humans. The term anthropogenic climate change has only become popular more recently and refers to the human influence on climactic systems, especially through the emission of green-house gasses since the start of the industrial revolution in the 1760s (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2018).

and not the intention to develop, which makes destruction a necessary part of development".

This point has at least two significant implications for the ways in which the development narrative is used today. The first is that the destructive consequences of development policies are not acknowledged in any of the policy documents advocating development. The problems associated with the Global South, such as poverty and food insecurity, are framed as a lack of development instead of as an outcome of previous developmental policies. This same understanding of development severs the development of the Global North from the colonialism and destruction on which it was built, as various decolonial scholars have pointed out (Grosfoguel, 2009; Mignolo, 2011; Quijano, 2007).

The second implication of an idea that argues that constructive change is created from destruction is that it becomes all right and even necessary to sacrifice some people in the name of development and growth. Development is often described as an unequal or uneven process (Economic Commission for Africa, 2017: 3, 5; WCED, 1987: 7, 17). When development is used as a measuring stick, societies do appear to be unevenly developed, but this formulation obscures more than it reveals. Development is not simply uneven; some societies are sacrificed for the development of others. In hindsight, it is recognised that this was the case during the era of official colonial development, but reactions to climate change have highlighted continuities that persisted after the end of official colonialism.

In Naomi Klein's (2014: 169–170) impassioned and meticulously researched book on climate change, *This changes everything: capitalism vs. the climate*, she uses the concept of "sacrifice zones" to highlight the enduring and sometimes implicit idea that some places "can be poisoned, drained, or otherwise destroyed, for the supposed greater good of economic progress". According to Klein, the creation of sacrifice zones is intimately linked to notions of racial superiority, since groups of people have to be presented as expendable. In colonised societies "whole subsets of humanity (were) categorised as less than fully human, which made their poisoning in the name of progress somehow acceptable" (Klein, 2014: 310). As Klein points out, this line of reasoning is still evident in industrialised countries' refusal to respond to anthropogenic climate change even though they are disproportionately responsible for it. Large parts of the world and diverse groups of people, including people in sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and small island nations, can thus be sacrificed to droughts, floods and sea-level rise so that the Global North can maintain its level of development.

Moreover, the paradigm of sustainable development often leads to implicit and explicit calculations about how many people and places could acceptably be sacrificed in the name of development.[54] Proposals for geo-engineering projects such as Solar Radiation Management (SRM)[55] clearly

[54] Many companies and organisations, especially insurance companies, calculate the value of persons based on their economic worth and therefore the amount varies according to gender, race and degree of educational attainment. People in "less developed countries" with lower incomes are also valued less (Viscusi, 2005: 1).

[55] Geo-engineering refers to the deliberate and large-scale manipulation of the Earth's environment with the intention of offsetting some of the destructive consequences of green-house-gas-induced climate change. SRM projects are designed to increase the reflectivity of the Earth's surface or atmosphere in order to mitigate increased temperatures in some parts of the world (National Research Council, 2010: 377). Examples of SRM projects include injecting large amounts of aerosols into the stratosphere and sending a giant sunshade into orbit.

demonstrate the assumption that some lives matter more than others. Proponents of these projects, such as Bill Gates and Richard Branson, have noted that they would have "distributional consequences" (Klein, 2014: 169). Petra Tschakert (2010), a geographer at Penn State University, remarks that this jargon is "a beautiful way of saying that some countries are going to get screwed". A 2013 study found that the African Sahel could be devastated if sulphur injections were launched in the Northern Hemisphere. There could also be a sharp decrease in rainfall in Brazil and the Caribbean would see an estimated 20% increase in hurricanes. It is much easier to imagine that SRM projects would be used to benefit countries in the Global North while putting countries in the Global South at risk of more extreme weather. Klein (2014: 276) notes that:

> We can imagine it because wealthy-country governments are already doing this, albeit more passively, by allowing temperatures to increase to levels that are a danger to hundreds of millions of people, mostly in the poorest parts of the world, rather than introducing policies that interfere with short-term profits.

At first glance these two implications might seem contradictory. On the one hand, the destructive dimensions of development are no longer seen as part of the development process and, as we shall see, are now framed in terms of deficiency. On the other hand, it is discreetly accepted that sacrifices have to be made in the name of development. This point reinforces the argument that the narrative of development is not always coherent, as I point out in the introduction. However, both of these strands of thought can function together and even reinforce one another. A prominent example of this is China's much-lauded economic development.

China has been widely critiqued for multiple human rights abuses, including horrific labour conditions, the repression of free speech and the persecution of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang (Human Rights Watch, 2019; Vice News, 2019).[56] Many of these abuses have contributed to China's industrialisation and thus to its advancement on the scale of development. In some instances, China's labour legislation has been portrayed as justified because it was a sacrifice made for development. In fact, some economists have argued that SA should emulate China's policies more closely by reducing workers' "high" salaries since "the country's nexus of 'high' salaries and 'low' productivity left it poorly positioned to compete for world trade" (Simpson, forthcoming: 595).

Conversely, China's oppressive policies are often framed as if they are detached from the country's economic development. Within this framework, it is argued that China's economy has been "liberated", which is in itself a

[56] China's abuses are often framed as "against international norms" and contrasted with the supposed benevolence of Western Europe and the United States. In the most recent Human Rights Watch report, Kenneth Roth even notes that "the Trump administration is one government that has been willing to stand up to China" (Human Rights Watch, 2019). Although Roth does note that the Trump administration's separation of children from their parents at the US–Mexican border is cruel, he still seems to see the US as a leader in terms of moral standards. However, multiple US governments have committed much crueller human rights abuses than the current Chinese government (Chomsky, 2007, 2015). Similarly, Western Europe has been responsible for multiple genocides, particularly during the era of official colonialism (Davis, 2000). The Chinese government's human rights violations therefore do not stand in contrast to the "morally superior West", but support the argument that development is built on destruction.

debatable point, but its political and social structures are still remnants of the previous repressive regime. Accordingly, the oppressive side of development is positioned as a lack of development that will eventually fade away as China "catches up" with the West. Hsiu-lun Teng is only one scholar of many who holds this view. He argues that "The institutional shortcomings of China's penal and political systems are underpinned by the traditional priority of collective order and wellbeing over individual rights. In contrast to China's aggressive economic opening, political reform is more conservative" (Teng, 2009: ii).

China's political doctrine is officially labelled Harmonious Society and was "initiated in 2005 for the purpose of balancing economic growth with social justice" (Teng, 2009: ii). As the 2019 Human Rights Watch report demonstrates, there has not been a decrease in China's human rights abuses since the doctrine arose. Although the Chinese government noted that it would attempt to *balance* economic growth with social justice, it is often equivocally argued that economic growth is a prerequisite for social justice and therefore it is all right to sacrifice social justice in the name of economic growth. This is exactly what makes it a prime example of how the narrative of development functions today. The same pattern is evident in the doctrine of sustainable development. The development of the West was built on ecological destruction and climate change is directly related to the growth of capitalism. Similar to China's claims that it will balance economic growth with social justice, international institutions claim that they will balance economic growth with environmental protection. In fact, many organisations have begun to argue "that economic growth is necessary for environmental protection and therefore should take priority over it" (Doyle, 1998: 774).

As we shall see, instead of challenging economic growth and development more broadly, climate change then becomes subsumed within the development narrative and is used to advocate for even more economic growth. Firstly, there is a subtle shift of emphasis from sustaining life on earth to sustaining development and, by association, economic growth. It is thus argued that it is necessary to "sustain and expand the environmental resource base" so that economic growth can continue (WECD, 1987: 11). Based on this paradigm, there is another subtle shift from "there cannot be development without sustainability" to "there cannot be sustainability without development". As I attempt to demonstrate later in this chapter, poverty is then paradoxically identified as a cause of environmental degradation. This allows development agencies to argue that, since they are supposedly alleviating poverty, they are also helping the environment. As Wolfgang Sachs (2015: 81) argues, "a terrain of semantic ambiguity was created" when the object of concern was shifted from nature to development. This semantic ambiguity then leads to the argument that, since development is necessary to save the environment, it is all right to sacrifice some parts of the environment for development.

Wolfgang Sachs (2010: x) notes that development can mean just about anything, "from putting up skyscrapers to putting in latrines, from drilling for oil to drilling for water, from setting up software industries to setting up tree

nurseries. It is a concept of monumental emptiness, carrying a vaguely positive connotation". Consequently, he remarks that it is "conceptually an empty shell" and it thus becomes "eternally unclear and contestable just what exactly should be kept sustainable" (Sachs, W., 2015: 81). This argument is supported by the World Bank's definition of sustainable development as "development that lasts," (World Bank, 1992: 34). In spite of this remark, Sachs (2015: 28) critiques the notion of development extensively and he both implicitly assumes and explicitly argues that the development discourse is based on Western certainties such as progress, growth and market integration.

The fact that the development discourse has led to concrete policies and that mechanisms such as the Human Development Index (HDI) attempt to measure development in quantifiable ways indicates that the meaning of development is not entirely empty. It is true that a range of different policies are justified in the name of development. However, just as seemingly contradictory discourses of development can sustain a broader development narrative, different policies that seem contradictory can reinforce each other in unexpected ways. The following section builds on this notion and argues that, in contrast to its stated aims, sustainable development as a discourse within the broader development narrative actually perpetuates unsustainable development.

Sustaining unsustainable development

Hajer and Versteeg (2011: 75) conceptualise sustainable development as a discourse, which they define as "an ensemble of ideas, notions, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices". A discourse influences the ways in which problems are identified and defined and thus which policy solutions are chosen. The policies that are chosen are dependent on the concepts and words that are chosen to discuss the problem as well as the images and symbols that are used to convey messages. Some discourses can become dominant in structuring the ways in which people conceptualise the world by being solidified into institutions and organisational practices. Even if discourses are contested, they can become a part of the systemic production of knowledge and result in concrete practices (Escobar, 1995: 11).

By the time that climate change in its contemporary anthropogenic form began to make its way onto political agendas in the 1980s and 1990s, the narrative of development had already been firmly established. The UN created the Brundtland Commission in 1983 to reflect on the ways in which the environment and natural resources could be preserved while economic development continued. From the mandate of the commission we can already see that economic growth and the narrative of development would not be challenged. Whatever the findings of the commission would be, they would have to fit into the framework of development, and they would have to support economic growth. Within this broader narrative, the commission introduced the discourse of sustainable development.

In accordance with the definition of a discourse, sustainable development has

shaped the ways in which international organisations define problems related to climate change and the policies that are formulated as a response. It has thus also become solidified into institutions and organisational practices. It is important to note that, although development is an immensely powerful apparatus that is used to control and manage people and environments, it is by no means uncontested. In the words of Jonathan Crush (1995: 7), "Development, for all its power to speak and to control the terms of speaking, has never been impervious to challenge and resistance, nor, in response, to reformulation and change". However, as Escobar notes, even if discourses are contested, they can become a part of the systemic production of knowledge and result in concrete practices.

Since the Brundtland Commission introduced the concept into the policy arena, sustainable development has become the central concept around which debates about climate change have been structured. This was particularly evident during the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) in 1992. The conference led to two main documents, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. Agenda 21 is a 351-page policy-orientated document that provides a clear example of how development narratives have structured responses to climate change. The document explains that "the expansion of world trade has been unevenly spread, and only a limited number of developing countries have been capable of achieving appreciable growth in their exports" and recommends "the optimal distribution of global production in accordance with comparative advantage" (UN, 1992: 5, 4). It also aims to facilitate "the integration of all countries into the world economy and the international trading system" (UN, 1992: 6). As exemplified by the criteria of the HDI, it is widely acknowledged that development should be about more than economic growth (UNDP, 2019). Nonetheless, economic growth is assumed to be a fundamental part of development, as demonstrated by the quotes from Agenda 21.

The first and most obvious assumption of Agenda 21 is that the outcomes of economic growth are inevitably positive, even though many scholars have pointed out that this is not the case (Sachs, W., 2015: 6). Since the negative consequences of economic growth are so widely discussed I do not repeat them here, instead I focus on a more implicit argument the report makes in its discussion of economic growth. The report sees the underdevelopment of the Global South as a lack of integration into the world economy.[57] This completely erases the role that many countries in the Global South played in the development of the Global North. Firstly, it erases the entire history of colonialism and, secondly, it overlooks the fact that underdeveloped countries are already integrated into global markets. One of many prominent examples is the Democratic Republic

[57] An even more implicit assumption is that something called "the economy" exists. The political theorist Timothy Mitchell argues that, until the 1930s, the word economy was used to refer to a process and not an abstract thing. Since the 1930s, the term had been used to refer to an independent structure "whose internal parts are imagined to move in a dynamic and regular interaction, separate from the irregular interaction of the mechanism as a whole with what could now be called its exterior" (Henry, 2004: 322). Mitchell argues that the notion of "laws of the market" that accompanied the rise of "the economy" is used as a technology of rule since it places economic decisions outside of the influence of democratic dispute. I would argue that referring to the economy as an abstraction also erases responsibility when economic policies have catastrophic consequences. Blaming famines or environmental degradation on "market inefficiencies" makes it appear as if there are no actors making conscious decisions about economic policies and these actors are therefore not held accountable.

of the Congo (DRC). The DRC is the world's biggest exporter of cobalt, the key ingredient in rechargeable batteries, and its cobalt output accounted for more than 70% of the market in 2018 (Clowes & Kavanagh, 2020). The DRC also has an estimated 80% of the world's coltan reserves, which is used to make heat-resistant capacitors in laptops, cell phones and other high-end electronics (Rogers, 2008). The DRC therefore exports resources that are an essential part of the world's biggest industries, while it ranks 179th out of 189 countries on the HDI (UNDP, 2020). It is therefore easy to establish that the world's least developed countries have been integrated into markets for centuries and that, instead of leading to development, it has often led to brutal exploitation and conflicts.[58]

The UN moved from the assumption that "underdeveloped" countries need more market access to the following statement (UN, 1992: 5):

> An open, multilateral trading system makes possible a more efficient allocation and use of resources and thereby contributes to an increase in production and incomes and to lessening demands on the environment. It thus provides additional resources needed for economic growth and development and improved environmental protection. A sound environment, on the other hand, provides the ecological and other resources needed to sustain growth and underpin a continuing expansion of trade. An open, multilateral trading system, supported by the adoption of sound environmental policies, would have a positive impact on the environment and contribute to sustainable development.

According to this argument, an increase in production would somehow lead to a decrease in the "demands on the environment", which would increase economic growth and also environmental protection. This argument is then used to caution that countries should not impose "unjustified restrictions of trade" but should rather "address the root causes of environmental degradation". Furthermore, countries are urged to "Ensure that environment-related regulations or standards, including those related to health and safety standards, do not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade" (UN, 1992: 8).

In the document's fourth chapter, *Changing consumption patterns*, the authors note that the pattern of consumption and production in industrialised countries is a "grave concern" (UN, 1992: 18). In response to this concern, the proposed solution is to reduce wastage in the production process by making it more efficient. Many scholars have commented on the fact that an increase in the efficiency with which a resource is used often leads to an overall increase in the consumption of the resource. William Jevons noticed this paradox for the first time in 1865 when an increase in the efficiency of using coal to produce energy increased the overall consumption of coal instead of reducing it as expected. This paradox has since become known as the Jevons Paradox and there have been multiple examples that seem to support the overall argument that increases in efficiency generally lead

[58] The atrocities of colonial rule in the Congo have been extensively documented and it is also widely acknowledged that rubber from the Congo played a critical role in European industrialisation (Ewans, 2002).

to increases in resource consumption (Paterson & Laberge, 2018: 3).[59]

There is a plethora of critiques that prove that more efficiency will not necessarily reduce anthropogenic climate change, which will have dire consequences. Yet there are elements of the ways in which sustainable development is framed that are even more troublesome. Multiple documents on sustainable development, including the Brundtland report, Agenda 21, the 1990 UN Human Development Report and several documents from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claim that poverty is one of the biggest threats to the environment. In 1993, the IMF announced that "Poverty and the environment are linked in that the poor are more likely to resort to activities that can degrade the environment" (cited in Doyle, 1998: 776). The Brundtland report also focuses on the links between poverty and environmental degradation and stresses that "a world in which poverty is endemic will always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes" (WECD, 1987: 16). This contradicts all of the facts that clearly indicate that production and consumption patterns in industrialised countries have a much more substantial effect on the environment than the survival strategies of poor people.

The Brundtland report does note that "the average person in an industrial market economy uses more than 80 times as much energy as someone in sub-Saharan Africa" (WECD, 1987: 20). There are also other sources that indicate that a child born in the US uses on average thirteen times more resources than a child born in Brazil, thirty five times more than a child born in India and fifty three times more than a child born in China (Scheer & Moss, 2012). China, India and Brazil are fairly industrialised developing countries. The entire African continent, which is the continent with the most "least developed countries", is responsible for 2–3% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions (UN, 2006). However, since the UN, the World Bank and the IMF identified poverty as a cause of environmental degradation, they claim that "What is needed now is a new era of economic growth—growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable" (WECD, 1987: 7). This point is made repeatedly throughout the Brundtland report and, again contradicting all of the evidence, the report reiterates that "far from requiring the cessation of economic growth, it recognizes that the problems of poverty and underdevelopment cannot be solved unless we have a new era of growth" (WECD, 1987: 39).

It is problematic that the Brundtland report identifies poverty as a cause of environmental degradation. Firstly, the report was published more than three decades ago, and anthropogenic climate change has become far worse because we are still following a capitalist model, which assumes that economic growth can continue perpetually and is thus not compatible with environmental sustainability. Within this model, the lifestyles of the rich and not the poor cause environmental degradation. The narrative that poverty is a cause of climate change also structures and reflects broader power relations since the report goes on to argue that people in the North care for the

[59] Examples include, but are not limited to, changes in lighting technology from "lamp oil to tallow candles to incandescent bulbs to fluorescent bulbs" and changes in agricultural technology, especially in the production and consumption of meat and dairy products (McDonald, 2011).

environment while people in the South are too poor to care. Consequently, the report claims that "the reduction of poverty itself is a precondition for environmentally sound development" (WECD, 1987: 62). As we have seen, the report blames rising population rates in the Global South for both poverty and environmental degradation and contends that population growth made it difficult for these countries to pursue environmentally sound policies (WECD, 1987: 63). This led to a bizarre situation in which the world's worst polluters can advise the societies who have contributed the least to climate change on how to be more sustainable. As we shall see, this framework has allowed countries and companies from the Global North to intervene in the Global South in colonial ways in the name of environmental sustainability.

As Subhabrata Banerjee points out, farmers in the Global South who use slash-and-burn practices are often blamed for the destruction of forests while timber and logging companies, who are far more responsible for deforestation, are given tax incentives to be more efficient. These same companies can then intervene and create "community development projects" to improve their image and sometimes receive substantial tax cuts. In this process, resourceful and knowledgeable communities are converted into "unskilled labour" and then "this 'sustainable' process is praised by corporations and governments for creating employment opportunities for local communities" while "they fail to recognize the disempowerment and poverty created as a result of the dispossession of land and natural resources" (Banerjee, 2003: 159). The Nestlé example discussed in chapter two clearly demonstrates this situation. Furthermore, the *Vision of Sustainable Development*, as promoted by the Business Council for Sustainable Development, insisted that entrepreneurial freedom be retained by avoiding "regulatory coercion" and instead relying on voluntary initiatives (Banerjee, 2003: 161). In another sleight of hand, regulating corporations was presented as coercion while the forced removal of thousands of people was presented as an "externality" or "collateral damage".

So far, this chapter has argued that, by framing the problem as a lack of development in the Global South, instead of recognising the problems caused by the development of the Global North, the concept of sustainable development reaffirms "precisely those power structures that underlie the issues for which it claims to be a cure" (Redclift, 2003: 272). Sustainable development is generally used to rationalise the notion that developing countries can develop along the lines of the Global North without damaging the environment and the concept thus obscures the international structures in which countries and societies are located. The policy outcomes of such an approach are based on better planning techniques, more cautious use of state capital and the "rational planning of land use and ecosystem exploitation" (Adams, 1995: 88). This clearly echoes both Imperial Britain and the Apartheid government's development policies. Subsequently, I build on this argument and attempt to demonstrate that this discourse has in many ways intensified since the publication of the Brundtland report and the policies that have resulted are potentially catastrophic. The much-lauded Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February

2005, aimed to tackle climate change through the "progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections" (UN, 1998: 3). The importance of energy efficiency was emphasised again as was the "protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases" through the "sustainable management" of forests (UN, 1998: 3). With one fell swoop the world's forests were reduced to carbon sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, which is problematic in itself. However, the Kyoto Protocol introduced one of the most worrisome mechanisms in the climate change regime: carbon trading. The US proposed carbon trading as a mechanism to reduce carbon emissions in response to corporate lobbying, but it ironically never ratified the protocol. This mechanism parcelled up the atmosphere and established an arrangement in which permits to pollute could be bought and sold as international commodities.
The Protocol specified that countries that agreed to targets for emissions reductions of greenhouse gases could receive a number of emissions credits equivalent to their 1990 emission levels minus their reduction commitments. The credits are measured in units of greenhouse gases so one credit is equal to one ton of carbon dioxide. Instead of reducing their own emissions, polluters can invest in pollution reduction schemes in other regions or countries and "earn credits that can then be sold, or banked, or used to make up shortfalls in its original allowance" (Bachram, 2009: 121). Unsurprisingly, this mechanism has contributed to increases in carbon dioxide emissions because polluters do not have to reduce their emissions and can claim credits for dubious projects such as monoculture tree plantations, which count as carbon sinks. Furthermore, the amount of credits attributed to a project is calculated based on "the level of emissions that would occur in an imagined alternative future without the project" (Bachram, 2009: 122). This allowed corporate polluters to produce huge estimates of emissions reductions that could allegedly be generated by their projects although there is no way of calculating imaginary emissions reductions.

Carbon offset projects have also led to what numerous scholars termed "carbon colonialism" or "green grabbing". Fairhead, Leach and Scoones (2012: 237) define green grabbing as "the appropriation of land and resources for environmental ends". There are multiple recent examples of situations where green credentials were used to justify the appropriation of land in the Global South, including in southern Madagascar (Neimark, 2012), Cambodia (Scheidel & Work, 2018) and Mozambique (Fairhead *et al.*, 2012). This appropriation has been justified in the name of alleviating pressure on forests, biodiversity conservation, ecotourism, "securing ecosystem services" and, more relevant to the topic of carbon trading, to offset the carbon dioxide emissions of corporations in the Global North.

The Centre for Science and the Environment in India, amongst others, observed that carbon offset projects are "opening the door to a new form of colonialism" (Bachram, 2009: 125). However, using environmental degradation as a justification of colonialism is not as new as the Centre seems to believe. There are certainly elements that are new, such as novel forms of valuation and commodification, especially the market for portions of the atmosphere.

Nonetheless, "green grabbing builds on well-known histories of colonial and neocolonial resource alienation in the name of the environment" (Fairhead *et al.*, 2012: 237). The environmental historian Richard Grove has provided detailed accounts of the draconian forest and land management structures colonial powers imposed in order to curb climate change and promote sustainable resource use. Grove (1997: 3) also notes that these structures often led to conflicts over land use, which involved "the colonial state, private companies and local people". In this instance, the colonial continuities between forest management practices are clear, specifically the way in which people in colonised societies were blamed for environmental destruction and removed from their lands in order to conserve resources for use by colonial powers.

Resuscitating the noble savage

In Richard Grove's other seminal work on imperialism and the environment, *Green imperialism: colonial expansion, tropical island edens and the origins of environmentalism, 1600–1860*, he argues that conservationism in Europe emerged in tandem with colonial expansion. His research shows that (Grove, 1996: 9):

> … as colonial expansion proceeded, the environmental experiences of European and indigenous peoples living at the colonial periphery played a steadily more dominant and dynamic part in the construction of new European evaluations of nature and in the growing awareness of the destructive impact of European economic activity on the peoples and environments of the newly 'discovered' and colonised land.

This inclination was expressed more explicitly in the literary concept of the "noble savage" during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The noble savage presented an idealised "uncivilised man" who was closer to nature and had not been exposed to the corrupting influences of civilisation. It was long believed that the eighteenth-century philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau invented the term, but the anthropologist Ter Ellingson (2001) claims that this was a myth propagated by one of the nineteenth century's most notorious racists, John Crawfurd, to justify his belief in the notion of inferior races. Whatever the case may be, the noble savage was clearly a racist stereotype that had its origins in colonialism. Although it would be politically incorrect to call indigenous people[60] noble savages today, the notion still permeates discussions about climate change. It can be seen in both policy documents that refer to the special properties of so-called indigenous knowledge and in some of the critiques that have been levelled against contemporary climate change policies.

There are multiple policy documents that argue that indigenous knowledge should be incorporated into

[60] It is extremely difficult to define the concept of "indigenous peoples" and the concept has evoked many controversies. This is especially the case when the concept is applied to Africa and Asia (Shrinkhal, 2013–14: 187). The UN defines indigenous peoples as "the descendants—according to a common definition—of those who inhabited a country or a geographical region at the time when people of different cultures or ethnic origins arrived. The new arrivals later became dominant through conquest, occupation, settlement or other means" (UNPFII, n.d.). The discussion of "indigenous knowledge" later in the chapter flags some of the issues related to the concept of "indigenous". However, I use the UN definition in this section because I discuss policy documents that are based on it.

international practices and should be taken into consideration when development plans are formulated. For example, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that "Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices" (UN, 1992: 4). It is not only international organisations that emphasise the importance of incorporating indigenous knowledge. SA's Policy on Agriculture in Sustainable Development also vows to "Promote scientific understanding of the sustainable use, protection and management of water resources to farmers and encourage knowledge sharing and integration with indigenous knowledge systems" (National Department of Agriculture, 2002: 18). SA's policy document noticeably resembles international statements on indigenous knowledge.

Numerous scholars have critiqued the notion that there is a clear divide between indigenous knowledge, which is assumed to be local and context specific, and scientific knowledge, which is presumed to be universal. This simultaneously presents knowledge from the Global North as universal and ignores the complex historical connections between knowledge systems. For example, the political scientist Arun Agrawal (1995: 427) observes that "certainly, what is today known and classified as indigenous knowledge has been in intimate interaction with western knowledge since at least the fifteenth century". Moreover, what is significant for the argument I am making here is that contemporary views of indigenous knowledge "echo those in earlier attempts of anthropologists to study 'savage minds' and 'primitive cultures'" (Agrawal, 1995: 419).

Indigenous knowledge is difficult to define, but various scholars have proposed working definitions. For example, George Dei (1993: 105) defines indigenous knowledge as "the common sense knowledge and ideas of local peoples about the everyday realities of living". On the one hand, this reinforces the idea that indigenous people have local, lived realities while colonists presumably have universal knowledge. On the other hand, it highlights the difficulties of incorporating indigenous knowledge into international and national development plans. The distinction between indigenous knowledge and scientific knowledge should evidently be challenged, but even if we assume that there is a divide, all of the documents that refer to indigenous knowledge focus on the incorporation of that knowledge into supposedly universal development plans. There is thus no possibility that indigenous knowledge can challenge the overall framework, it must simply be assimilated. This is paradoxical since the supposed value of indigenous knowledge is that it is context specific. If context specific information were to be universalised then, by definition, it would lose its value.

A problematic outcome of the way that indigenous knowledge is framed is that organisations and institutions sound progressive when they claim that they are incorporating indigenous knowledge in their work. Conversely, when peasants in the Global South use knowledge generated by institutions and, especially, corporations in the Global North, they have to pay or be sued for violating patent rights. One

example of many is Pepsi's 2019 lawsuit against four farmers in India who were reportedly using the company's FC5 potatoes, which are designed to have lower moisture levels than other spuds (Livni, 2019). Not only have people from the Global South generally not been compensated for their contributions to scientific knowledge, but it is difficult to imagine that they will be compensated today if their knowledge is used by institutions in the Global North.

Scholars and activists who critique current approaches to climate change use the same noble savage trope more frequently. For example, in Wolfgang Sachs's (2015: 50) critique of the development discourse he claims that the hunting rituals of the North American Cree transformed their deer hunting into an "exchange between animals and man that was governed by friendship" and that by "understanding trees, rocks or animals as animated beings in a wider cosmos" they cooperated with nature.[61] Sachs also asks, "Didn't India's tradition, undisturbed for thousands of years, have more substantial things to offer?" (Sachs, W., 2015: 16). This is extremely problematic because it glosses over diversities within "Indian culture", ignores the complex trade relations and interactions that societies in ancient India had and assumes that traditions in India were unchanged for centuries. Moreover, it reinforces the notion that people outside of the West are somehow stuck in the past. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 88), amongst others, has vehemently critiqued the presentation of some Indian people as remnants from the past or, as he put it "the living dead in our midst".

The "noble savage" trope is also prevalent in American popular culture, especially in film. *Pocahontas* (Pentecost, 1995) is a frequently cited example of this tendency. However, there are also more recent examples, such as James Cameron's *Avatar* (2009). In the film, humans colonise a habitable moon of a gas giant in the Alpha Centauri star system, Pandora, in order to establish a mining colony, specifically to gain access to a mineral called unobtanium.[62] However, the establishment of a mining colony presents a threat to the local Na'vi tribe. The Na'vi are effectively presented as the indigenous people of the planet. A handicapped ex-Marine, Jake Sully, is sent to infiltrate the Na'vi in a genetically engineered Na'vi body to convince them to let his employer mine their land for resources. The Na'vi are portrayed as deeply spiritual and as living in harmony with nature. In the film, Jake falls in love with the Na'vi princess, Neytiri, and joins the Na'vi in their battle against the human invaders so that they can save their planet.

In spite of the futuristic setting of the film, the themes clearly resonate with present-day ideologies. As mentioned, the idyllic portrait of the Na'vi corresponds to the noble savage trope. Moreover, in the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek's (2010: 394) discussion of the film he observes that "the film's lesson is clear: the only choice the aborigines (Na'vi) have is to be saved by the humans or destroyed by them, to be either the brutal victims of imperialist

[61] This also echoes the Cartesian divide, which draws a clear distinction between mind and matter. Based on this divide, Europeans were/are associated with the mind (culture) while "indigenous people" were/are associated with matter (nature and the body). Although Sachs is critiquing the "Western" model, it is still problematic to assume that "indigenous people" function in tandem with "the cosmos" while Europeans are somehow removed from it.

[62] It is a futuristic film set in the mid-twenty-second century. It thus projects concepts from the past (such as colonialism) and prevalent contemporary concerns (such as resource depletion) onto the future.

reality, or to play their allotted role in the white man's fantasy—in both cases, they become a plaything in human hands". Žižek's observation gains even more relevance when it is seen in the context of older colonial ideas. The notion that colonised people are closer to nature but also have to be saved by a white imperialist echoes Jan Smuts's philosophies, which were in turn related to broader colonial narratives.

Avatar is not the only example of how this ideology forms part of popular culture. An even more perspicuous example is the latest rendition of *The legend of Tarzan* (Weintraub, Barron & Ludwig, 2016). Edgar Rice Burroughs originally created the character in 1912 for *All-Story Magazine* before it was edited into a series of books and films. Tarzan was the son of the aristocrat Lord Greystoke who became orphaned in Africa and was raised by apes. In the original story, Tarzan became the King of the Jungle, spoke to animals and wrestled lions, crocodiles and gorillas. The story was heavily influenced by the accelerating colonisation of Africa and was filled with racist stereotypes. Unsurprisingly, whiteness was equated with civilisation and Africans were portrayed as racially inferior savages.[63] Moreover, Burroughs was a believer in eugenics and Tarzan hung his African victims from trees with vines tied around their necks, which is eerily reminiscent of the lynchings that were common in America (Warner, 2015).

As noted, Burroughs's beliefs were shaped by his context and were not unusual for his time. However, it is harrowing that the 2016 rendition of the film still contains many of the same colonial stereotypes. The fact that there is yet another rendition of the film is questionable in itself, not least because the story has been widely criticised for its problematic portrayal of race and gender relations (Cohen, 1988; De Silva, 2004; Oklopčić, 2017). The 2016 film tells a distorted history of the Belgian Congo and its struggles for independence from colonial rule. At the start of the film, Tarzan/Lord Greystoke is living in England with his wife Jane and is portrayed as a civilised man. As part of a ruse, Tarzan is offered an invitation to go and see Belgium's "progress" in the Congo. Tarzan, George Washington Williams (an African American diplomat played by Samuel L. Jackson) and Jane (played by Margot Robbie) return to the Congo and make a detour to visit the "tribe" Jane came to know when her parents were missionaries. Jane is met with much singing and celebration, which glosses over the portentous role that missionaries often played in the colonisation process.

Tarzan and Jane's happy homecoming is ruined when the antagonist of the film, Hans Landa/Leon Rom, lays ruin to the village and kidnaps Jane. Thereafter Tarzan must save both Jane and the African people from the colonisers. An in-depth discussion of the colonial and gendered representations in Tarzan falls outside the scope of this monograph. Instead, I want to draw attention to the fact that a story with unequivocally colonial origins is still being retold. Moreover, the film manages to simultaneously portray Africans as virtuous and as in need of a white saviour. According to this history, Tarzan saved the Congolese people from colonisation and everyone lived happily ever after. This reinforces the

[63] Burroughs was born in Chicago and had never been to Africa. The story thus also contained many factual inaccuracies. For example, his jungle contained both lions and tigers in spite of the fact that lions live exclusively in the savannah and tigers do not live in Africa at all.

"white saviour" trope and conforms to the same ideological structure as *Avatar*, which supports the argument that the ideology is relatively prevalent in (American) popular culture.[64] These examples also demonstrate that colonial narratives are not confined to the realm of policy, but form part of much wider imaginations.

It is interesting that many indigenous people[65] have recently presented themselves as closer to nature to oppose corporate infringements into their lands. For example, the Standing Rock Sioux members who protested against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)[66] and created the #NoDAPL movement positioned themselves as protectors of nature and stated that "the land is sacred, a living breathing entity, for whom we must care, as she cares for us. And so, it is possible to love land and water so fiercely you will live in a tent in a North Dakota winter to protect them" (Whyte, 2017 :156). There are many other cases where indigenous people have defined themselves in this way and portrayed their societies as being in opposition to certain elements of Western modernity, especially capitalism and its resulting environmental destruction. This also clearly contradicts the Brundtland Commission's claim that "underdeveloped" people are too poor to care for the environment.

This phenomenon cannot simply be explained by arguing that indigenous people have absorbed "Western narratives" about themselves. My assumption is that this phenomenon is the result of a complex symbiotic relationship between different ideas and narratives that have developed since 1492.[67] Moreover, Naomi Klein (2014: 461) has demonstrated that collaborating with indigenous peoples' organisations during struggles against corporate abuse of the environment opens up spaces in which "new stories can be told to replace the ones that have failed us". It is essential to emphasise that these stories are not a return to an idealised pre-colonial past, but new stories that can draw from the past. Although I have critiqued the representation of colonised people as closer to nature, indigenous people's groups from around the world have, amongst other things, contributed greatly to climate change activism and it could be an encouraging trend.[68] Working with indigenous peoples' organisations differs from simply incorporating "indigenous knowledge" into existing paradigms, since the focus is instead placed on creating new paradigms through collaboration. The emphasis on new stories becomes all the more significant if development is conceptualised as a narrative.

[64] Although it is strictly speaking American popular culture, Hollywood has global ideological influence.

[65] In this instance "indigenous peoples" refer to people who self-identify as indigenous and form part of organisations that explicitly fight for the rights of indigenous peoples.

[66] The Dakota Access Pipeline is a 1 171.37 kilometre oil pipeline in the US that stretches from the shale oil fields in northwest North Dakota to Illinois. The Standing Rock Sioux have been protesting against a small portion of the pipeline that runs underneath the Missouri River. Members of the Standing Rock Sioux who live in the reservation downstream are worried that leaks will contaminate their drinking water and sacred lands (Kennedy, 2020).

[67] 1492 was the year that the Italian explorer and coloniser Christopher Columbus "discovered" the Americas. This event paved the way for the European conquest and colonisation of the region.

[68] Perhaps this could even be likened to the ways in which gender queer activists turned a term that was originally meant as an insult into a positive statement about their gender identity and a banner under which to unite LGBTQ+ activists.

From exploited to empowered—all it takes is a bit of microfinance!

The notion that some people are closer to nature is most prevalent in documents related to gender and climate change. These documents are inevitably focused on women in the Global South. The *Resource guide on gender and climate change* (UNDP, 2009), the *Overview of linkages between gender and climate change* (UNDP, 2012), the *Gender & climate change: 3 things you should know* (World Bank, 2011) and *Gender, development, and climate change* (Oxfam, 2002) are quintessential examples of documents that discuss the links between gender and climate change. The covers of all of these documents have images of African or Indian women who are either carrying heavy loads or who are participating in "empowerment" activities that are presumably sponsored by organisations from the Global North.

The imagery used in these documents is extremely important. Before one even reads the documents, there is already a clear illustration of a hierarchy of power relations. Firstly, it is assumed that "gender and climate change" is a topic that is related to women in the Global South. Secondly, the fact that they are carrying heavy loads presents a continuation of the colonial perception that women in colonised societies were "beasts of burden", as mentioned in the introduction. Furthermore, these women have the potential to be developed into "empowered" women with the assistance of women from the Global North[69]. It might seem like a stretch to assume this information from simply looking at the covers. However, as we shall see, these assumptions are supported by information from the documents.

Feminists have extensively critiqued the notion that women are somehow closer to nature. Ecofeminists such as Ariel Salleh and Annie Rochette have also been scrutinised for perpetuating the notion that women have a special connection with the environment. However, policy documents concerning gender and climate change still perpetuate the notion that women in the Global South are closer to nature. Although some of these documents note that it is not an innate connection, but the result of socially constructed norms and roles, they still assume that these roles are homogenous and static across the Global South. This can lead to problematic assumptions. For example, Rochette (2002, 156) states that "women farmers concentrate on subsistence cropping and feeding people". Similarly, the *Resource guide on gender and climate change* assumes that "women hold most traditional knowledge about the medicinal properties of plants" (UNDP, 2009: XLIX) and that "women's traditional knowledge and practices" make them more likely to conserve biodiversity

[69] The imagery becomes even more significant when contrasted with the imagery in articles that do not have a gendered focus. For example, an article entitled *The lesson that Rio forgets,* which was published in The Economist a week before the UN World Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, was accompanied by a photograph that showed "an undifferentiated mass of dark people" (Escobar, 1995: 210). The article considered the threat that population growth in the Global South posed to development. As mentioned, population growth is intimately related to women's reproductive rights. However, it is possible to argue that, by ignoring the gendered dimensions of population growth, environmental threats in the Global South have become masculinised. This masculinisation only becomes apparent when it is contrasted with the view that women in the Global South are "environmental protectors". If governments in the Global North blame environmental destruction on poverty, and population growth and women in the Global South are protectors of the environment, then we must ask: who is supposedly responsible? The masculinisation of environmental degradation in the Global South can perhaps also be seen in the representation of poachers as dark men.

(UNDP, 2009: LXII). This then leads to the argument that women should be empowered so that they can play a greater role in resource conservation and that increasing and strengthening the role of indigenous women in development programmes will lead to a more "sustainable use of biodiversity" (UNDP, 2009: LX). Programmes based on this principle often increase women's workloads by making them responsible for conservation projects (Arora-Jonsson, 2011).

The World Bank (2011: 2) goes a step further and argues that gender equality is "smart economics". Similar to the UNDP, the Bank argues that the "empowerment of women is an important ingredient in building climate resilience" (World Bank, 2011: 2). Thereafter the Bank assumes that it is women in the Global South who need to be empowered and suggests that this could be done through the "distribution of improved cook stoves" and "advice on low-tillage agriculture" (World Bank, 2011: 2). Another one of the Bank's most popular recommendations is providing women with micro-loans since "investing in women can improve adaptation outcomes" (World Bank, 2011: 10). Women in the Global South are therefore seen as tools for development.

Seeing women as objects to invest in is problematic in itself, but the policy recommendations that follow from this framework are correspondingly worrisome. For example, the *Power to the Poor* project, which was inspired by the Lao People's Democratic Republic (PDR) Rural Electrification Project, set up a revolving loan fund that enabled female-headed households in the Lao PDR to borrow money that would reportedly help them to finance electricity connections costs. The Kuyasa Fund in Cape Town, SA, is a similar project that provides microfinance lending to "the most vulnerable groups, and women in particular" (World Bank, 2011: 14). These policies are worrisome simply because they do not offer a viable solution for the challenges that will follow from climate change.

However, Roberts and Soederberg (2012: 962) reveal that this trend is especially troubling because "investment firms, rating agencies and other corporations have helped to privatise and securitise microfinance loans in order to make a profit from the poor and disproportionately female borrowers". In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the potential to generate profits from securitised microfinance loans sold to the poor was enthusiastically promoted. For example, at a summit for the Clinton Global Initiative, Bill Clinton advised investors to "consider the poor of developing nations as viable investment alternatives to today's turbulent markets" (cited in Roberts & Soederberg, 2012: 963). Investors can therefore profit from speculating on securitised microfinance loans and present the projects related to this market as empowerment projects for impoverished women in the Global South.

As demonstrated by the Lao PDR Rural Electrification Project, many World Bank projects focused on providing loans to women so that they could afford electricity. These projects were also presented as contributing to environmental protection and their stated aim was the "protection of forests and plantations from local use" (Hoskins, 2016: 20)[70]. The World

[70] There are critiques of aspects of these projects, although the World Bank does not generally acknowledge them. Nonetheless, when the failures of these projects are discussed they are often blamed on the traditions of the people who were the targets of the projects.

Bank (2011: 14) cites improved access to information as one of the benefits of these projects since, apparently, "electrification can have greater positive impacts on women when accompanied by effective social marketing". Consequently, the Bank notes that increased access to electricity would allow women in the Global South to watch television, which would then contribute to their emancipation and empowerment.

The Bank claims that "there is also an important body of evidence demonstrating that access to television has resulted in lower acceptance of spousal abuse, lower son preference, more autonomy, and greater likelihood of sending girls to school in rural India" (World Bank, 2011: 14). Another 2011 report by the World Bank on *Energy, gender and development* reveals that the claim was not based on "an important body of evidence", but on one study conducted by Robert Jensen and Emily Oster on the influence of cable television on women's status in India. Jensen and Oster argued that access to cable television resulted in a decrease in women's tolerance of spousal abuse, which stemmed from the "imitation of role models of emancipated women in fictional TV dramas" (Köhlin, Sills, Pattanayak & Wilfong, 2011: 39). The assumption underpinning this statement is that women in the Global North are empowered and, by imitating these empowered women, women in the Global South can become empowered.

The discourse discussed in the previous paragraph forms part of a protracted colonial narrative. Bush's (2014: 278) analyses of gender and development discourses in late colonial Africa reveal that white women were "instrumental in the development of colonial discourse and practice centred on the health and welfare of African women". Firstly, the Colonial Office in Britain contended that educated white women should participate in colonial development by carrying out social policies in the colonies because they possessed special feminine qualities related to empathy. Consequently, African women "became the object of elite white women's philanthropic initiatives" (Bush, 2014: 279).

Well intentioned women from Britain felt that it was their duty to "uplift" the supposedly subjugated and inferior women in colonies. The role of women and gendered discourses in colonial development projects bore striking similarities to contemporary projects related to gender and sustainable development. From the examples cited above we can already see a continuation of the narrative that women in colonised societies could be empowered through imitating women in colonial metropoles. This narrative has also produced comparable policies. Since "superior European gender roles and behaviour were contrasted with inferior African cultural practices" the assumption was that African women had to be educated and empowered by European women. During the 1940s and 1950s this aim was achieved by educating African women in domesticity since, apparently, it was only through education that colonial officials could "deal with the problem of African women in marriage" (Bush, 2014: 273). Apparently today African women only need access to soap operas.

Although the majority of reports focus on women in the Global South, the World Bank's 2011 report mentions women in the Global North. The report

states that "billions of women make decisions every day" (World Bank, 2011: 12). Although the fact that the Bank has realised that women make decisions is perhaps a step in the right direction, it contextualises the importance of women's decisions in a very limited way. The extent of women's decision making is relevant to the degree that they are also consumers "who influence the amount of carbon emitted in the production, distribution, use and disposal of the consumer goods they choose to purchase" (World Bank, 2011: 12). Empowerment and choice are therefore equated with participation in consumer economies.

During Britain's colonial development projects, European women were seen as superior because of their domestic roles and supposedly advanced maternal skills (Bush, 2014). Contemporary development projects instead emphasise "economic empowerment" as the source of Western women's superiority. For example, the UN (2016: 13) report on *Women and Sustainable Development Goals* states that their goal is to empower women and girls through advancing programmes that lead to "economic empowerment". Two of the programmes that were supposed to advance women's economic empowerment were the *Rural Women Economic Empowerment* programme in Ethiopia and an Edutainment initiative in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania that focused on "issues such as post-harvest losses, women's land rights, women's economic empowerment" (UN, 2016: 5–7). This presents an example of how discourses related to what constitutes an "advanced" woman have changed over time, namely from domesticity and maternity to economic empowerment.

However, there is also a clear continuity of the colonial narrative that white women in the Global North present the example that women in the Global South must emulate. This narrative is also made manifest in programmes created by philanthropic Western women to "uplift" African women. Moreover, the World Bank has launched incongruous programmes based on this narrative. For example, one of its gender-based sustainable development programs focused on raising community awareness about the "adverse health and other effects of flooding, including diarrhea and malaria" (World Bank, 2011: 11). Presumably the flooded societies in rural India which it aimed to educate would already know what the adverse effects of flooding were.

In response to the notion that women are merely helpless victims, a number of new reports stress the fact that women also have agency. For example, the World Bank (2010: 12) has begun to frame women as "economic agents" while the UN emphasises that, although women are still vulnerable, they can also be "agents of change" (UN, 2020). This approach might sound new and progressive, but it actually has a strong historical precedent. Phyllis Kaberry worked on the Grassfields Project in Cameroon from 1945 to 1951 where she researched the economic position of women. Seemingly in contrast to the colonial development discourse of the time, she emphasised female agency instead of passivity. She particularly emphasised the fact that women produced most of the food in the area (Bush, 2014: 283; Kaberry, 1952).

Kaberry's work was remarkable and significant, but not as revolutionary as it might appear at first glance. British

colonial development discourses had already begun to emphasise that "the development of a balanced society" depended on well-educated and trained women (Bush, 2014: 274). The widespread "new" idea that women can be instruments for development is therefore a resuscitated colonial discourse. In fact, the World Bank's (2010: 69)[71] claim that "educated women contribute to the welfare of the next generation by reducing infant mortality, lowering fertility, and improving the nutritional status of children" echoes Britain's colonial development policies almost precisely.

I want to make it clear that I am not in opposition to programmes that provide healthcare or education for women in the Global South. Moreover, there are many organisations, including UN women, who have done extremely valuable work. While there are certainly projects that I have not mentioned that deserve acclaim, I discuss some of the more problematic aspects because I want to draw attention to the power relations that define what "empowerment" means and the discourses that are often used to justify narrow interventions in the Global South. I define these interventions as "narrow" not because of their consequences, which can be extensive and significant, but because of their ahistorical representation of gender and gender equality which often normalises spaces of vulnerability and insecurity (Roberts & Soederberg, 2012: 949). Moreover, these vulnerable spaces are often the products of colonial relations. This is especially significant in relation to climate change because it will exacerbate many existing inequalities. Moreover, conceptualising women as either vulnerable or virtuous still deflects "attention from power relations and inequalities reproduced in institutions at all levels and in discourses on climate change" (Arora-Jonsson, 2011: 746).

Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the discourse of sustainable development. Although I briefly note one possible historical origin of the narrative of development, the chapter predominantly focuses on how this discourse functions today. I argue that the discourse either erases the destructive impact of development policies or justifies them in the name of development, but usually there is a combination of the two ideologies. Moreover, I argue that the discourse of sustainable development contributes to perpetuating an unsustainable system. In relation to gender and sustainable development, I note that the ahistorical representation of gender and gender equality often normalises spaces of vulnerability and insecurity. These two themes are integrated because shifting the focus to the development of so-called undeveloped countries and societies conceals the broader systems of exploitation that often led to the vulnerability in the first place. In the following chapter, I discuss these broader systems of exploitation and argue that they function comparably to the Apartheid regime in SA.

[71] Roberts and Soederberg (2012: 950–951) also critique this discourse and wittily comment on the notion that "as women become entrepreneurs, they are able to lift both themselves and—thanks to the inherent nurturing qualities ascribed to the female gender—their children out of poverty". This resonates with the argument that gender relations in colonised societies are often presented in an ahistorical and homogenised way.

Elize Soer

Chapter Four

Introduction

Many scholars, including the sociologist Jacklyn Cock, have argued that SA presents a microcosm of global inequalities and environmental injustices. As Cock notes, "South Africa is indeed a world in one country" (Cock & Koch, 1991: preface). However, this argument can be inverted to reveal that global power structures function as a kind of Apartheid system. This inversion does not only serve an analytical purpose, but also a political one. Apartheid is associated with exploitation and evokes a strong sense of injustice. By claiming that international power structures function as an Apartheid system, I therefore aim to indicate that they are immoral and unjust. This chapter points to various similarities between contemporary international politics and the Apartheid system and argues that the strategies employed under Apartheid are mirrored in the "global system". Likewise, there are various other "local" and "regional" iterations of Apartheid[72]. Žižek (2015) suggests that "new forms of Apartheid" are emerging, for instance in US/Mexico relations, between Israel and Palestine and in Europe's preoccupation with isolating itself from Africa. Though the "newness" of these systems is debatable[73], this chapter argues that the general argument seems to be valid.

Global Apartheid: mobility, markets and minority rule

Gernot Köhler was one of the first scholars who conceptualised global interactions as a system of Global Apartheid in 1978. Köhler's more recent elaboration of the concept specifies that it serves three functions (Dalby, 1998: 137):

> First, as an empirical concept that describes the structure of the global society; second, as a normative concept implying a negative judgment on that order; and, third, as an existential category encompassing experience of the world and the lived identities constructed on the basis of this experience by participants in the global polity.

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars such as Fantu Cheru and Titus Alexander have applied the concept to their studies of North-South relations and as an overarching framework to comprehend global politics. Anthony Richmond also applies the term in his discussion of global migration patterns (Dalby, 1998: 136). This is based on the observation that the process often referred to as globalisation[74] allows

[72] I use inverted commas here because there are complex international links between apartheid systems, as we can see from the US's support for Israel's apartheid regime in Palestine (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015).

[73] For example, Israel's apartheid-like policies in Palestine have continued for decades.

[74] This is the first time that I refer to "globalisation". Although globalisation certainly provides a context for many of the phenomena that I have discussed, I choose not to address it directly because it is such a contested concept. If I were to discuss the concept in a meaningful way, I would have to include another chapter.

money, information and goods to flow across borders relatively easily, while people do not have the same freedom (Valtonen, 1994: 25).[75]

Salih Booker and William Minter defines Global Apartheid as "an institutional system of minority rule" characterised by differential access to power, wealth and basic human rights based on race and place. Accordingly, it allows double standards that assume that certain "others" should have inferior rights because of their locations, race and/or gender (Harrison, 2002: 53–54). The concept has been used to expose and analyse different aspects of international relations, including gross inequality (Köhler, 1978: 268), structural violence (Harrison, 2002: 53) and "the conventional epistemological practices of geopolitical reasoning" (Dalby, 1998: 135). The term "apartheid" also captures the use of "nativist language to structure mobility, belonging, elimination, and extermination, as well as the relevance of border controls and the hierarchical modes of excluding or incorporating racially delineated people into a polity for labor exploitation" (Besteman, 2019: 28).

These structures depend on the cultural production of gendered images and discourses. As the anthropologist Faye Harrison notes, the structural adjustment policies imposed on many countries in the Global South during the 1980s depended on notions of masculine dignity and feminine sacrifice. This is because it was assumed that, once state-funded social safety nets were eliminated, women would increase their care work to fill the need. She also observes that the theme of black hyper-sexuality is still prevalent, especially in association with fertility or health-related social problems (Harrison, 2002: 61–63). The discussion of population growth in climate change policy documents in chapters one and three substantiates this point.

I find the concept illuminating because it encompasses different elements of global relations, including political, economic, ideological and institutional aspects. It also reveals how these different elements function concurrently to produce structural violence on a global scale. Harrison (2004: 13) notes that "in response to criticism from below, there was an attempt to reform structural adjustment to give it a more 'human face'". As we have seen, projects began to note the importance of "incorporating indigenous knowledge" and the concept of "sustainable development" gained precedence as a way to make economic growth less environmentally destructive. My argument is thus that, just like "separate development" was intended to make Apartheid more internationally acceptable, "sustainable development" is being used to revamp an older exploitative system.[76]

The first discernible characteristic of Global Apartheid is extreme inequality. In Apartheid SA, a sixth of the

[75] It has to be noted that the goods that flow across borders are also highly regulated and there are a multitude of trade agreements and regulations that restrict the import of specific products from specific countries. For example, there are a series of complex trade restrictions on even the pockets of jeans and, in 2008, the US Association of Importers of Textiles and Apparel had to offer an entire lecture series to help American retailers understand the specificities of pocketing regulations (Rivoli, 2009: 152). This example demonstrates clearly that the international trading system is not characterised by "free trade" or "free markets" at all.

[76] Interestingly, when P.W. Botha, a man who embodied the Apartheid system, was interviewed by Ted Koppel for the American television programme Nightline in 1985, he claimed that "If you mean by apartheid the deprivement of fundamental rights to people, I say I'm all against it" (cited in Dubow, 2014: 274-275). This does not indicate that P.W. Botha was opposed to Apartheid, but rather that officials can claim to support human rights while simultaneously supporting a system that is unequivocally abhorrent. Moreover, Botha first questioned what the interviewer meant by the term 'Apartheid'. This also indicates that the labels we apply to systems of injustice matter.

population owned more than three-quarters of the land and resources.[77] Less than a sixth of the world's population live in North America and Europe, but these regions have control over more than three-quarters of global resources (Alexander, 1996: 9). Although financial integration makes it difficult to measure wealth, a conservative estimate suggests that the top 1% of the world's population holds 33% of the world's wealth while 75% of the people on earth hold less than 10% (Zucman, 2019: 109). Although monetary wealth is by no means an accurate measurement of living standards, I cite these figures to demonstrate that wealth has been redistributed from the Global South to the Global North. For example, between 1982 and 1990, countries in the then "Third World" paid $1, 345 billion on debt servicing to the "First World".[78] "This was 30 percent more than the total aid, private investment, new loans and trade credits, so that a net flow of $418 billion was paid to the West" (Alexander, 1996: 114). Yet when the World Bank made $500 million (not adjusted for inflation) available for a Clean Cooking Fund (CCF) to assist the Global South in "adjusting" to climate change, it was portrayed as a laudable donation (UNSG, 2019: 23).

Moreover, bilateral aid to developing countries is frequently tied to specific policy conditions. I am not even referring to the IMF and the World Bank's infamous Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). In 1989, the British government loaned $350 million to Malaysia to build the controversial Pergau dam on the condition that the Malaysian government would buy $2 billion worth of arms from British companies. The British High Court decided that the deal was illegal in 1994, but it was already too late (Alexander, 1996: 82–83). The Pergau dam incident became known as Britain's biggest aid scandal, but there have been other similar incidents. For example, the Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, linked aid to India to the sale of Typhoon fighter jets in 2011 (Provost, 2012). Dam construction projects more generally are also controversial because they usually entail massive displacement. The writer[79] Arundhati Roy (2019: 1–20) has discussed this topic extensively, especially in relation to Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru's dam building schemes in India. Moreover, dams can obstruct the flow of rivers and reduce village communities' access to water.[80]

The politics of water in Apartheid and development projects are discussed in previous chapters. The Apartheid government's relocation programmes are also notorious. Likewise, a system of Global Apartheid entails massive relocation. In 1993 alone an estimated 2

[77] It has to be noted that this is a rough estimate and that wealth inequality in SA changed over time. In the 1960s, per capita income for white South Africans was 13 times higher than for Africans, but by 1994 the differential had narrowed to 8.6 (Dubow, 2014: 299). However, the methods used to calculate wealth inequality also obviously influence the result and many forms of inequality related to power and privilege cannot be quantified.

[78] Although the phrase 'Third World' is now used to indicate a low level in a scale of development, the term came into popular usage during the Cold War and it was used to describe countries who refused to be aligned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and capitalism or the Soviet Union and communism. The phrase 'First World' referred to countries that were aligned with NATO and capitalism and the 'Second World' referred to communist countries.

[79] Although Roy is often referred to as a "novelist and activist", she has taken issue with these labels and made it clear that she does not differentiate between her activism and her writing. I therefore simply use the label "writer".

[80] Interestingly, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement) that opposed dam construction under the Narmada Valley Development Project were accused of trying to sabotage India's development and were often beaten and jailed (Roy, 2019: 1–20).

million people were displaced by World Bank projects (Alexander, 1996: 138). Similar to the Apartheid government, the World Bank justified the projects in the name of development. In spite of the West's professed commitment to private property rights, it is evident that this only counts for wealthy property owners. Rural communities, subsistence farmers and impoverished people more generally are habitually relocated in the name of development. This is indicative of a more general principle of "socialism for the rich and capitalism for the poor", again similar to the Apartheid system. [81]

Rabbit proof fences: the militarised "management" of migration

The Apartheid system in SA was based on constructed racial differences that were said to be rooted in biological variations. However, the term "ethnic" started making its appearance in SA as early as the 1930s as a euphemism for biological notions of race. In the 1960s and 1970s the idea gained more traction in conjunction with theories of political pluralism. As alluded to in the discussion of the Bantustans, the Nationalist government imposed crude ethnic, national and cultural identities on the South African population to secure political division and exploitation. For example, the term was used in section 5 of the 1950 Population Registration Act, which gave the Governor-General the power to "prescribe and define the ethnic or other groups into which coloured persons and natives shall be classified" (cited in Dubow, 1994). The term became widely used as national groups were divided into "appropriate" Bantustans, which were in themselves justified by appeals to ethnic and cultural differences.

Dubow (1994) eloquently argues that, as racial determinism received increasing critique,

> Biological notions of race were not necessarily repudiated; rather they were incorporated within a form of cultural essentialism that encouraged the articulation of human difference without explicit recourse to arguments based on biological determinism. In this context, the idea of ethnicity, combining a sense of primordial affiliation, biological descent, and cultural identity, was easily understood and internalised.

This argument is supported by the fact that F.W. de Klerk explained the constitutional impasse in 1992 by referring to "values and culture" and denying the importance of race. De Klerk made the claim during an interview with the BBC and it is thus plausible that he was attempting to persuade the international audience of the validity of the reforms under negotiation (Dubow, 1994).

Dubow also significantly distinguishes between two different senses in which "ethnicity" is conceived. The first sense is "claiming", which understands ethnicity "as a form of social identity that acquires content and meaning through a process of conscious assertion and imagining". This is present in societies where groups fighting against the oppression of a powerful majority or central state assert their ethnic identities. The second sense is

[81] This statement was popularised by Martin Luther King Jr. when he said, "We all too often have socialism for the rich and rugged free market capitalism for the poor." It has been used widely in relation to the 2008 bank bailouts and many of the Trump administration's policies. For example, since Trump was elected, General Motors has received more than $600 million in federal contracts and $500 million in tax breaks (Reich, 2019).

"naming", which refers to the tendency to conceive of ethnicity in static, primordial and essentialist terms. Crucially, one relatively powerful group employs the term in this way to define another less powerful group. This classification rests on an assumption of innate differences and, although it does not necessarily refer to racial differences, it relies on the acceptance of fixed social identities that "tend to coincide with established racial categories" (Dubow, 1994: 6). The clear artificiality of ethnic designations in SA paradoxically accounted for the essentialist terms in which ethnicity was presented. As Dubow (1994: 6) explains, "because ethnic categories have been so obviously manipulated by the state, in order to naturalise their status it has been necessary to invest them with the aura of primordial certainty." The central question related to the process of ethnic ascription is thus who has the power to define whom.

The Apartheid government's evocation of constructed ethnic and cultural differences is significant for the argument that the contemporary international system functions like an apartheid system. Today, differences between groups of people are conveyed in cultural instead of racial terms, although groups are often implicitly associated with race. As Catherine Besteman (2019: 29) demonstrates, while the notions are not formally expressed in racial terms they still rely on nativist ideologies and discourses that tie people to places, similar to the Bantustan system. Although there are still European neo-fascists who are explicitly racist and their numbers appear to be increasing, the more common manifestation seems to take the form of "racism without races" (Harrison, 2002: 50). Notions of immigrants and refugees are encoded with meanings of ethnic absolutism that perpetuate national inclusion and exclusion. An example of this is the European Union's Schengen list, which stipulates which nationals require a visa when crossing EU borders. The list was previously divided into "black" and "white" countries but was relabelled as the "positive and negative" list because the previous name was thought to have racist connotations. The list is reportedly intended to guarantee the physical security of Europe but is also commonly framed in terms of "Western identity protection" (Van Houtum, 2010: 957).

The geographer Henk van Houtum argues that the list functions as a means to keep the world's poorest out of Europe by creating colonial-like frontiers to preserve the boundaries of imperial power. He also observes that "the emphasis has now shifted towards a constitutive 'management' of exclusion of the 'Other' inhabitants of the world" (Van Houtum, 2010: 958). The shift in terminology from "border control" to "border management" can be seen as part of the neoliberal discourse of maximum efficiency. For example, on 15 December 2015, the European Commission approved measures to "manage the EU's external borders and protect the Schengen area without internal borders." Moreover, the stated intentions of the proposals are to "manage migration more effectively, improve the internal security in the EU and safeguard the principle of free movement of persons" (European Commission, 2015). Although the document states that its intention is to "safeguard the principle of free movement of persons", it is very clear that it safeguards the free movement of *some* people. The next sentence of the

document specifies that the Schengen Border Code would be amended to introduce systematic checks for all people attempting to enter the Schengen area, while facilitating the "effective return" of illegal immigrants.

To an extent, the clinical language of "management" and "efficiency" conceals the brutality of EU border control. The document remarks that there would be attempts to reduce the "irregular flows" of migrants through Turkey. Again, the language is rather clinical, but multiple non-governmental organisations, including Human Rights Watch, have reported on the violent nature of Turkish "border management". According to the Middle East's deputy director at Human Rights Watch, Lama Fakih (cited in Khan, 2018), "Syrians fleeing to the Turkish border seeking safety and asylum are being forced back with bullets and abuse". This statement is supported by various incidents at the border, such as one instance where Turkish guards shot ten Syrian refugees, including one child.

Interestingly, FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency responsible for the border control of the Schengen Area, works with "RABITs", an acronym for Rapid Border Intervention Teams. This analogy is a wordplay on the term "rabbits" and, as Van Houtum observes, it could be indicative of the dehumanisation and animalisation of border control. For me, this is also reminiscent of the Rabbit Proof Fence in Australia, which was constructed between 1901 and 1907 to keep rabbits and other pests out of Western Australian pastoral areas.[82] It could be argued that the term is not just an indication of dehumanisation, which is already worrisome, but is also associated with pests that need to be kept out.

Through the example of EU border control, we can see that a system of Global Apartheid is dependent on differential access to mobility. As Besteman (2019: 26) states, "the global north is massively investing in militarized border regimes to manage the northern movement of people from the global south". Within this system, people are classified according to their country of origin and become subjects of a political order instead of individualised human beings (Van Houtum, 2010: 961). This contradicts the individualised liberal ideology[83] usually associated with Europe. While European citizens are conceptualised as highly individualised autonomous actors, migrants from the Global South are often presented as "dark masses". The terms "immigrant" and "migrant" have also become associated with terms such as "influx", "invasion" and "crisis". The widespread use of the phrase "migrant influx"[84] is especially interesting because it so clearly echoes the Apartheid government's "influx controls", which were rigid controls intended to regulate the movement of black people into urban areas. As with

[82] The term was popularised by the 2002 film *Rabbit-Proof Fence*, which is based on the novel by Doris Pilkington Garimara. The book centres on the story of Molly, the author's mother, who was part of the Stolen Generations of Aborigine children in Australia (Simpson, 2018).

[83] Liberalism encompasses a very broad range of views and principles and there are differences between liberalism as a political philosophy and liberalism as an economic doctrine. Nonetheless, liberalism is usually associated with support for "free markets" and private property rights, equality before the law, limited and democratic government and, most fundamentally, individual liberty.

[84] I cite only three examples of this phrase being used in the media, but it is ubiquitous: (1) The Washington Post's (2018) *The right way to respond to the migrant influx;* (2) Tagaris's (2019) *Greece to increase border patrols and deportations to curb migrant influx;* (3) Pew Research Centre's (2018) article *At least a million sub-Saharan Africans moved to Europe since 2010,* which repeatedly refers to an "influx" of migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.

Apartheid influx controls, migrants from the Global South are only allowed into Europe if they bring "added value"[85] (Van Houtum, 2010: 970).

Harrison (2002: 50) notes that, although certain groups of immigrants are seen as troublesome and as a threat to European nations, their gendered and ethnically divided labour contributes to European economies. Consequently, the militarised border regimes of the Global North control the movement of people from the Global South in such a way that an exploitable labour force is readily available, while those considered undesirable and expendable are kept in camps and detention centres as far as possible from the borders of the Global North. In order to accomplish this, the EU provides funding to Turkey, Libya, Mali, Senegal, Morocco, the Ukraine and Tunisia to detain and deport migrants, who are kept in horrid conditions in detention facilities. Deportation authorities send people back to the countries where they think people ought to belong, which means that migrants are often deported to countries they left as infants. This resonates with the Apartheid regime's insistence that black South Africans "belong" to Bantustans they may never even have visited.

In both Europe and the US, migrants work in agriculture, domestic services, elder and childcare, construction, sex-work and many other industries. Documented migrants are dependent on employers who control their visas and thus cannot report wage theft and various forms of abuse, including sexual abuse. Undocumented migrants pay taxes in various forms, for example value added tax (VAT) every time they purchase products, but they cannot collect benefits. They have no job security, earn less than citizens and often work in poor and dangerous conditions (Besteman, 2019: 28–34).[86] This is clearly reminiscent of the Apartheid government's policies, which also positioned Africans as either security threats or exploitable labour. People from the Bantustans had to migrate to work in mines, in domestic service, on farms and so forth in white areas, but were not seen as citizens of SA. Similarly, migrants in Europe and the United States provide cheap labour but are not seen as citizens. As Alexander (1996: 62) notes, "immigration and import controls perform a similar function to the pass laws, influx controls, and job reservation policies in South Africa".

From native development to sustainable development: complementary contradictions that conserve discourses

Van Houtum (2010: 961) argues that "the EU shows a Janus-face, one face of development aid and humanitarian assistance and another of a security-obsessed economic and cultural comfort zone". Many

[85] The use of the term "added value" can probably also be attributed to the general increase in neoliberal discourses.

[86] In fact, wage differentials between Mexican migrant workers and US citizens in the US were 1:8 in 1986 while the wage differentials in the same year in Apartheid SA were 1:3. The average wage differential over the decades of official Apartheid was between 1:4 and 1:6. In both the Apartheid and the US/Mexico migrant wage systems, demands for exclusive protection are justified by claims that one group has more rights than another (Alexander, 1996: 48). For a more in-depth discussion of the role that illegality or "undocumentedness" plays in American societies and economies, I would recommend Aviva Chomsky's (2014) *Undocumented: how immigration became illegal.*

scholars have theorised about the gap between European discourses of rights and political freedom and the economic reality of domination and exploitation. While some scholars, such as Van Houtum, see this gap as a contradiction, Žižek (2010: 44) argues that "civil racism"[87] can "function through (in the guise of) the illusion of anti-racist multiculturalism". Similarly, Sara Ahmed's research on diversity in organisations found that references to "diversity" and "multiculturalism"[88] are often used to conceal racism. She observes that "when Black staff spoke about racism, organisations often responded by pointing to their race equality and diversity policies, as if these policies were the point" (Ahmed, 2015).

Ahmed and Žižek thus agree that postmodern forms of "tolerance" and "diversity" "extend the violence of authority precisely by concealing authority under the illusion of friendship and civility. Force is all the more forceful when it no longer appears as force" (Ahmed, 2015). Ahmed further argues that a monocultural[89] political agenda arose in the guise of a retrospective defence against multiculturalism. She uses the British Labour Party's argument that multiculturalism went "too far" as an example. Although multiculturalism was not actually realised, proponents of this argument claimed difference was celebrated "too much" and that this led to tensions and riots. A defence of "Britishness" was presented as if the "traditional British" were now a minority in Britain. Ahmed (2015) claims that the consequence of this is "defence integration, as a defence against multiculturalism". Žižek disagrees with Ahmed on this point. He argues that, instead of being monocultural, the injunction is one of cultural apartheid. He reminds us that the Apartheid regime's ideology was multiculturalist. As we have seen, the Bantustans were justified through appeals to "protect Native cultures".

Žižek's observation about Apartheid ideology and multiculturalism seems accurate. However, if we recall the discussion of the Tomlinson report in the previous chapter, we can see that both Ahmed and Žižek describe different strands of Apartheid ideology. Ahmed focuses on the first option that the Tomlinson Commission suggested, which was based on the principle of assimilation and recommended that "civilised" Africans be given "equality of opportunity"[90].

[87] The feminist scholar Sara Ahmed employs the term "civil racism" in her discussions of the ways in which multiculturalism is a fantasy that functions to conceal certain forms of racism, inequality and violence. Racism is officially prohibited and there is much talk of diversity and respect for diverse cultures. However, Ahmed (2015) begs the question: "Could the speech work to create an illusion that we do support the other's difference, which might work by not bringing such support into existence?".

[88] Multiculturalism is very simplistically defined as the ways in which a society deals with cultural diversity. It is associated with the assumption that members of different cultures can coexist peacefully, and that cultural diversity should be respected and even encouraged. Politically, multiculturalism "refers to the ways in which societies choose to formulate and implement official policies dealing with the equitable treatment of different cultures" (Longley, 2019).

[89] In contrast to multiculturalism, monoculturalism entails the support of a single social or ethnic group and it could involve a process of assimilation in which members of other cultural groups are expected to adopt the practices of the dominant group.

[90] "Equality of opportunity" is the acceptable face of equality and commands support from a range of actors that disagree about other political issues. However, when the term is used politically, there is rarely a discussion of what it entails, and important disagreements can become concealed by a seemingly uncontroversial phrase. For a succinct discussion of the topic, please consult Swift's (2014: 102-109) *Political philosophy: a beginner's guide for students and politicians.*

Žižek focuses on the second suggestion, which advocated for the establishment of separate racial communities based on ethnic identity. In the second instance, multiculturalism was used to justify "separate development".

Although the Apartheid government seemed to have followed the second option, their ultimate policy was one of "native development". There are two conflicting ideas in the concept of "native development". On the one hand, development as a concept was cultivated in Europe and produced policies associated with "European"[91] technological advancement and linear history. On the other hand, "native" was used to evoke a sense of static African cultures that differed fundamentally from "European culture". Through combining these two discourses into one term, the Apartheid government could justify interventions in the Bantustans in the name of "development" while blaming the "lack of development" in these areas on "African cultures". This duality was also apparent in the fact that "white" SA was dependent on black migrant labour. White areas could therefore not expel Africans completely, but there needed to be a justification for sending black labourers back to the Bantustans once their work had been completed. As already demonstrated, migrant labour was sometimes framed in terms of job creation for Africans to advance development while the Apartheid government claimed that Africans had to return to the reserves so that their cultures could be preserved.

Both Žižek and Ahmed consider ideologies of racism and multiculturalism within Europe and North America. However, if we consider Europe's international policies, we can begin to comprehend how these two discourses function together. Van Houtum's description of Europe's humanitarianism and ruthlessness as Janus-faced perpetuates the notion that these two aspects of European policy are separate. In light of the aforementioned example of Nestlé's projects in Nigeria and Pakistan, it becomes more evident that humanitarianism is often used as a discourse to provide a progressive gloss to brutality.

The Nestlé example is not an isolated case. Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG) is the world's leading provider of "environmentally friendly" coffee. It advertises its coffee as sustainable and sensitive to "local expertise" and it claims that "the consideration of social, environmental and economic needs is an integral part of our business model" (NKG, 2019). However, the company has been accused of multiple human rights abuses. For example, 4 000 residents of Mubende, Uganda, were forced off of their land in 2001 to make way for an NKG coffee plantation. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural and Social Rights looked into the Mubende case in 2015 and determined that the Ugandan government had to restore the rights of the expelled farmers. However, the judgement was overturned by the domestic appeals court and, at the time of writing, the farmers have not received compensation (Deutsche Welle, 2017). As demonstrated by the discussions of Britain's earlier development projects, this has been

[91] The inverted commas around "European" are used to indicate that many technologies we associate with the West today developed because of complex interactions between different societies.

a trend throughout European history since at least the start of the 1900s.[92]

In 1976, when there was no doubt about the blatant brutality of the Apartheid regime, P.W. Botha, the South African Minister of Defence, rhetorically asked "Where in the world can you find a more just society than South Africa has?" (cited in Alexander, 1996: 9). To describe Botha's statement as a brazen lie would be a gross oversimplification. The Apartheid government had just policies towards those who were seen as citizens of SA. Recall that the Bantustans were seen as sovereign entities and the problems they experienced were seen as disconnected from the broader context in SA. Similarly, migration today is seen as the consequence of political instability in the Global South and as removed from the policies of the Global North. Besteman (2019: 26) comments that the militarised border regimes of the Global North were created after the policies of the Global North had rendered many localities in the Global South unsustainable for human life. She also notes the tendency to frame the instability in regions such as the Middle East as a consequence of their global disconnections. However, the opposite is usually true: the instability is often caused by exploitative global connections.

These observations have important implications for the discourse of sustainable development. Much like "native development", sustainable development is a concept that joins two contradictory ideas. Although there are proponents of concepts like "alternative development", which is purportedly not based on economic growth, policy documents related to development still focus on economic growth and industrialisation as key elements of development. Many scholars, including Klein (2014) and Foster *et al.* (2010), have demonstrated that continued economic growth is not compatible with sustaining an environment that is conducive to human survival.

Although the definition of "sustainable" is somewhat vague, it implies that a process can continue over an extended period of time. As demonstrated by its use in policy documents related to climate change, it has become associated with the consumption of natural resources and humanity's interactions with the environment more generally. In Redclift's (2003: 34) study of the contradictions associated with the term "sustainable development", he remarks that international organisations that use the term rarely consider restructuring the relations of production and even when they do, "the real issues have been obscured and neutralized by sterile language and wrong premises". Foster *et al.* (2010: 43) also claim that the concept is based on the faulty premise that there is no contradiction between unlimited capital accumulation and the preservation of nature. Escobar (1995: 42) goes a step further in his analysis and notes that "seemingly opposed options can easily coexist within the same discursive field".

My premise is that the concept of "sustainable development" does not prevail *in spite of* its contradictions, but *because of* them. There are multiple

[92] Specifically in relation to SA, a British Act of Parliament established the Union of SA in 1909. The preamble of the Apartheid constitution was based on British law and declared that white legislators were committed to safeguarding "the integrity of the country and the freedom of its people", to respecting and promoting "the right to self-determination of all population groups", to upholding "civilised norms" and so on (cited in Alexander, 1996: 9). This was not a blatant lie. The constitution safeguarded the rights of a population group while brutally oppressing the "others".

ideologies that have functioned in a similar way. I discuss one in relation to Ahmed and Žižek's work, namely that the notion that racism has been dealt with and that we now live in a post-racist world is often used to conceal and even justify racism. A second example, which is discussed in previous chapters, is the way in which the Apartheid government used claims that a new era had begun to maintain the Apartheid system. There was thus not a simple contradiction between the government's assertions that a new era had begun and its perpetuation of Apartheid, but it was actually the big declarations of change that contributed to sustaining the status quo.

A third example can be found in contemporary post-feminist discourses. According to Angela McRobbie, post-feminist discourses contribute to sustaining patriarchy by creating the impression that feminist goals have already been achieved. By drawing on sources from popular culture, she reveals that a particular kind of feminism is often acknowledged and taken into account. This acknowledgement of "equal opportunities feminism" presents white women as empowered agents who are able to participate in the same activities as men. However, McRobbie argues that the language of empowerment and choice draws on an individualistic discourse and is deployed as a "substitute for feminism" while leaving the social order more or less intact (McRobbie, 2009: 1–14).

We can see this ideology clearly in the consumerist usurpation of certain feminist ideals. A blatant example is Dove's body-positivity campaign.[93] The campaign acknowledges that beauty ideals are unrealistic and damaging to women and thus urges women to embrace their curves. The campaign is nonetheless used in association with advertising for firming cream intended to reduce women's cellulite. The cream is presented as a way to boost women's confidence and to help them feel body-positive, and it worked—Dove's firming cream sales doubled within a month (Craik, 2017). We can thus see how Dove's incorporation of certain feminist ideals ultimately contributed to sustaining a very un-feminist status quo.

In relation to sustainable development, I use the UNSG (2019) *Report of the Secretary-General on the 2019 Climate Action Summit: the way forward in 2020* as an example. The report declares that the UN is committed to "urgent and unprecedented social and economic transformation" and that "business as usual is no longer acceptable" (UNSG, 2019: 3). This declaration is not new. The Brundtland report of 1987 similarly claimed that the status quo was no longer tenable and that a mandate for change was necessary (WECD, 1987: 5). The idea that urgent change is necessary has thus been a part of the discourse of sustainable development since its inception.

After the acknowledgement that urgent change is required, the 2019 report goes on to specify that solutions have to be economically viable (UNSG, 2019: 6). The proposed solutions include increasing energy efficiency by 3% annually and supplying people in the Global South with "climate friendly cooling solutions" (UNSG, 2019: 6). The Global South will not only be granted access to cooling, but also to "clean cooking" through the World Bank's

[93] The campaign has become part of the larger "Dove Self-Esteem Project". More information about the project is available on Dove's website: https://www.dove.com/us/en/dove-self-esteem-project.html

Clean Cooking Fund (CCF), which will use Results-Based Financing (RBF) to calculate the "climate, health, and gender benefits from clean cooking interventions" (UNSG, 2019: 23). The CCF will be used to supply "clean cooking solutions", but one of its primary aims is to develop a bond market for the "clean cooking sector" to raise capital.[94] The African Adaptation Initiative (AAI) plans to assist African countries by raising awareness of climate change in Africa and by "facilitating knowledge management", though the report does not specify which knowledge would be managed or what the "management" would entail (UNSG, 2019: 24). The big declarations of change are thus followed by policy recommendations that are likely to reinforce the status-quo.

Just like all the reports that preceded it, the new report states that it would help small-scale farmers in the Global South by "enhancing their resilience" through the provision of markets, finance, adaptation technologies and lessons on agro-ecological practices (UNSG, 2019: 25). The High-Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean Economy proposes technological solutions, including the advancement of carbon capture and storage technology (UNSG, 2019: 14). The report also notes that more progress is needed on carbon pricing (UNSG, 2019: 9) and further emphasises the importance of enhancing "the use of tools such as carbon pricing and other financial mechanisms" (UNSG, 2019: 11). In the report's chapter on *Plans for a carbon neutral world*, the Secretary General encourages countries to commit to more ambitious action by 2020 (UNSG, 2019: 12) and to deliver "climate-resilient development pathways by 2030" (UNSG, 2019: 26). This also follows the general trend of climate change negotiations thus far, namely to commit to committing in the future.

An especially worrisome aspect of the 2019 report is its emphasis on the notion of "climate-resilient development". The report repeatedly stresses the need to create "climate resilient economies" and to promote "climate resilient economic growth" (UNSG, 2019: 3, 6, 10, 17, 19).[95] Although sustainable development does emphasise the need to continue economic growth in the face of a "degrading resource base", the shift from "sustainability" to "resilience" is still significant. The shift could be indicative of an acceptance that the major contributors to climate change will do nothing substantial to mitigate its consequences. Instead, the focus is placed on protecting economies and thus profits from the consequences of climate change. At least a small group of the people who will bear the brunt of the consequences will have access to cooling systems and stoves and, let us not forget, they will also be patronisingly educated on how droughts might affect them.

Furthermore, the report specifies how this "climate resilient economic growth" might be achieved. Apparently, "market signals" will lead to more efficient "ecosystems management" so that "high-value added natural ecosystems"

[94] Similar to the derivatives market for microfinance loans, this will ultimately benefit investors in the bond market. Not even this feeble initiative to assist countries in the Global South in adapting to climate change will actually be used to benefit the "target countries" (Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Rwanda, Niger, and Ghana).

[95] The 2019 report does not provide a definition of these concepts. However, from other literature on the subject the concept seems to be based on the assumption that climate change could impede economic growth through, for example, negatively affecting agriculture. In response, institutions should find ways to ensure that economic growth can continue in spite of the challenges that climate change will bring (Ninan & Inoue, 2017).

will be protected (UNSG, 2019: 14). An archetypal paragraph of the report states (UNSG, 2019: 16):

> Implementing partners will work to scale-up financial products that incentivize blended finance and private investment into coastal natural capital for climate action, and to enlist more stakeholders to send strong political and market signals about the ongoing transition towards a more sustainable management of biodiversity and natural ecosystems for climate action.

One of the suggested market instruments is the establishment of resilience bonds, although few specifications are given about how these bonds would function (UNSG, 2019: 17).

On the one hand, the suggested policies resemble earlier colonial and Apartheid development policies, for example teaching subsistence farmers modern farming techniques. On the other hand, there is a very disconcerting emphasis on the role of financial markets, which is a theme that has become more prominent since the 1990s. This is coupled with neoliberal language and nearly everything is portrayed in economic terms, for example "high-value added natural ecosystems", "ecosystems management", "coastal natural capital", and so on.

At first glance it seems contradictory that the 2019 report acknowledges the need to change the status quo and then provides a blueprint for how the status quo should be maintained and even intensified in the face of climate change. However, this has been the trend since at least 1987. A "thinking with history" approach can be especially informative in this regard since there are resounding similarities between the Apartheid government's claims that "separate development" presented a "new era" in South African history and the claims of international organisations that sustainable development presents a new phase in the history of development. In both instances, the declarations of change contributed to maintaining the status quo.

The UN has declared 2020 to be the "Year of Action", apparently in contrast to previous years of inaction. In a sense, the language of action and urgency is non-performative. Ahmed (2015) defines non- performatives as "speech acts that do not do what they say, and that do not bring into effect what they name" and thus create the illusion that something is being done and, consequently, hide the fact that real change is not taking place. It is important to note that the claims that urgent action has been/will be taken to address climate change do not produce policies that address climate change, but this does not mean that nothing is being done. International organisations have contributed to establishing carbon markets and launching projects such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) and REDD+. Although these projects are unlikely to mitigate climate change, they do have consequences, as demonstrated by the discussion of carbon colonialism in chapter three. If we ignore the outcomes of established projects, we again risk overlooking the history of intervention in the Global South and seeing problems as the lack of development instead of seeing them as the consequences of development.

American Apartheid: imperialism and immigration imagery

Assertions of newness necessarily rely on historical erasure. Alexander (1996: 61) remarks that the distinction "between 'developed' and 'developing' countries largely follows the contours of empire". Histories of conquest and colonialism undoubtedly played a role in creating contemporary power structures. However, more contemporary interventions in the Global South are also often ignored in popular media discussions about migration. This is especially true for discussions concerning migrants from Latin America who want to enter the US.

Anti-immigration groups often refer to Latin American immigrants as invaders who want to "take what is ours" and who threaten "American culture". President Donald Trump has also several times referred to immigrants as invaders and warned Republicans that they were at risk of being "swamped" (Bump, 2019).[96] In contrast, pro-immigration views are often expressed in terms of humanitarianism or focussed on the economic contribution of migrants. For example, UnidosUS, the largest non-profit Latino/a advocacy organisation in the US, emphasises that immigrants contribute to the economy, pay taxes, help to reduce the budget deficit and actually contribute to job creation (UnidosUS, n.d.).

On both sides of the fence, no pun intended, the reasons for migration are largely ignored. As the journalist Jeremy Scahill (2018) notes, "Rarely do we get any context of why they are risking their lives and the lives of their children to flee". When the reasons are discussed, problems are usually blamed on autocratic regimes in Latin America. American-backed coups in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay, amongst other countries, are ignored. The US's so-called "dirty wars" in Latin America in the 1980s are also overlooked, although they are the primary reason for the instability in countries such as Honduras (Scahill, 2018).

This is not even to mention the economic tools the US government used to destabilise parts of Latin America. The most well-known example of this is probably President Richard Nixon's injunction to "make the economy scream" when the democratically elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende, began to implement socialist policies in 1970 (Kornbluh, 2013). Allende was overthrown in a US-backed coup in 1973 and the dictator, Augusto Pinochet, was instilled in his place. Pinochet's dictatorship entailed the brutal repression of the majority of Chile's population, but his devotion to economic liberalisation and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises gained widespread support from the US and the UK.[97]

There are many histories of American exploitation in Latin America, but they are rarely evoked during immigration debates. This is extremely important for

[96] Anti-immigrant rhetoric was an important factor in Donald Trump's election campaign, as demonstrated by his infamous insistence on extending the border wall between Mexico and the US, which was originally built by the Clinton administration in the 1990s. However, it is important to note that Trump's policies have not been more anti-immigrant than his predecessors or the proposals of many Democrats such as Nancy Patricia Pelosi. For example, during the first term of Obama's presidency, deportations were incredibly high and increased every year. More than 400 000 migrants were deported in 2012 alone (Horsley, 2016).

[97] The prevalence of the term "banana republics" to describe countries that are politically unstable and economically dependent on exports of a specific resource product is a clear indication of the type of relationship that the US has had with many countries in Latin America. In fact, the term "banana republic" was first used in relation to America's exploitation of Honduras. America was already intervening in Honduras to support the business of the United Fruit Company in the late 1800s. Today, the company has morphed into Chiquita Brands International and is regarded as a Swiss company, but many of the same principles still apply (Eschner, 2017).

various reasons. Contrary to popular belief, many Latin American immigrants are not Mexican. In 2019, immigrants came mostly from Guatemala and Honduras (Gonzalez, 2019). The US has intervened in these countries multiple times and backed a coup with severe consequences in Guatemala in 1954. This functions very similarly to the Apartheid system since the NP framed the problems in the Bantustans as if they were separated from the economic growth of white areas. Discussions of immigration should thus not be focused on whether or not immigrants should be let into the US, but on what America owes the people of Latin America after more than a century of brutal oppression and exploitation.

America's relationship with Latin America is one of the most apparent examples of contemporary apartheid. Similar to the Apartheid regime, it relies on an exploitative migrant labour system, uses a militarised border regime and pass system to regulate migrants, and relies on discourses of securitisation and cultural purity to justify its brutality. Trump's rhetoric of "swarms of migrants" clearly echoes the "swart gevaar" (black danger) rhetoric that was so prevalent during Apartheid. Another clear analogy is the US's domestic labour system. There are more than two million immigrant and black American domestic workers in the US. Only eight of the US's 50 states have passed a Domestic Workers' Bill of Rights and the first Bill of Rights was passed in New York in 2010.[98] Migrant domestic workers therefore do not have legal protection and are often victimised because of their race and/or ethnicity (Bick, 2017). The resemblance to SA's domestic labour system is clear. In both cases, white women were "empowered" to enter the labour force because of the exploitation of black women's labour.[99]

This is perhaps the clearest example of the importance of intersectionality. As mentioned in the introduction, an extensive analysis of the intersectionality of domestic work falls outside of the scope of this monograph and many other scholars are investigating the topic (Christian & Namaganda, 2018; Tilly, 2020). However, intersectional observations have implications for contemporary discourses of "women's empowerment". As demonstrated by earlier discussions of representations of women from the Global South in policy documents related to sustainable development, these discourses often assume that all women can become empowered economic actors along the lines of "liberated" Western women. The recognition that some women's "empowerment" was built on the disempowerment of others indicates that all women cannot become "empowered" within the framework of Global Apartheid. This also mirrors the logic of "development" and "underdevelopment". If we take the arguments of decolonial scholars seriously, then we must acknowledge that modernity was built on colonialism and therefore the Global South cannot develop along the lines of the Global North.[100]

Moreover, the equation of empowerment with participating in

[98] These states are: New York, California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Illinois, Nevada, Connecticut and Oregon.

[99] It is perhaps also reminiscent of the fact that white women in SA were granted franchise in 1930 while "coloured" voters were removed from the voters roll.

[100] We must also question if and why people in the Global South would want to develop in this way. For a more in-depth discussion of alternatives to development, please consult Mignolo's (2011) *The darker side of Western modernity: global futures, decolonial options.*

the labour force and having consumer choice is a very narrow definition of the concept and raises questions about what empowerment should entail. This is especially significant when thinking about policy related to climate change. Firstly, the policies that have been formulated within this paradigm have not addressed the causes of anthropogenic climate change or assisted people in dealing with the consequences of climate change in a meaningful way. Furthermore, by simply incorporating "women's voices" or "indigenous knowledge" into existing paradigms instead of rethinking the entire paradigm, we might be neglecting insights about how we should be responding to climate change.

Global Apartheid(s): borderlines, Bantustans and "black danger"

Countries classified as developing and developed are predominantly separated by economic discrimination and not necessarily by race, although race plays an important part. When Alexander was writing in the mid-1990s, he observed that "the West" had one-sided control over the movement of goods and people. While the rise of China[101] and the so-called Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) have challenged this domination in some ways, the story is much more complex than a simple East versus West paradigm concedes. One of the primary complications is that Chinese factories frequently manufacture products for Western corporations such as Nike and Adidas, who ultimately reap the profits. Nonetheless, in response to shifting power relations, Besteman (2019: 27) uses the term "the Global North" to refer to the US, Canada, Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Russia, East Asia and the Gulf States. Besteman's classification is valuable for this section because it can be used to highlight miniature Apartheid systems within the broader structure of Global Apartheid, such as the rich enclaves in the Gulf States that are dependent on migrant labour.

Between 2016 and 2019, Indian embassies in countries that are a part of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) received 77 155 labour abuse complaints from Indian migrant workers. Although the number of complaints seems high, most human rights abuses go unnoticed. Human Rights Watch attempted to investigate reports of exploitative practices during the construction of the Saadiyat Island in Abu Dhabi but was banned from entering the United Arab Emirates (AUE) in 2014. The information that Human Rights Watch could gather indicated that labour abuses were prevalent and that worker passports were confiscated if workers protested. Moreover, according to the 2015 *Human Rights Watch World Report*, many workers in the region "were subject to forced labor, slavery, or trafficking" (Ram, 2020).

Migrant labourers in the Gulf States share many similarities with migrant labourers in the South African Apartheid system. According to the Global Detention Project, the world's leading research centre on immigration and detention, labourers in the UAE "are forced to pay fees of up to a year's wages to recruiters, surrender

[101] Interestingly, the labour specialist Anita Chan (2001) compares the *hukou* system (a family registration program that acts as a domestic passport and regulates rural-to-urban migration and population distribution) in China to the Apartheid system in SA.

their passports to their sponsors, live in overcrowded and substandard housing, and work exceedingly long hours in difficult conditions" (Global Detention Project, 2016). While SA is the most unequal country in the world, the available data suggests that the Middle East is the most unequal region in the world. In 2018, it was estimated that more than 64% of the income in the region went to the top 10% of earners (Assouad, 2020). A capitalist economy characterised by inequality and migrant labour was at the heart of SA's system of white supremacy. Though many capitalists profited from racial discrimination, Apartheid in SA cannot be reduced to its economic function.[102] Consequently, Dubow (2014: 276) argues that "to lose sight of apartheid's distinctiveness as a racially based regime of power is to overlook its singular importance in world history".

Apartheid in SA certainly had distinctive features; however, the fact that it was a "racially based regime of power" is not unparalleled. In her study of domestic workers in the Arab Gulf States, Omaya Chidiac remarks that their employment was based on systemic forms of discrimination. Chidiac (2014: 12–13) argues that "the jobs migrant workers obtain in Arab Gulf States are largely dependent on the worker's social status, ethnicity/race, and gender… In turn, this contributes to job racialization and 'othering'". Similar to Apartheid SA, four of the six Arab Gulf States have a majority population comprised of "non-citizens". The governments of the Gulf States use a "spatial strategy" where an extremely narrow definition of citizenship underpins an acute reliance on temporary migrant labour. Likewise, "Apartheid's grand planners were more than alert to the fact that control of space, both in urban and in rural areas, was key to the maintenance of power" (Dubow, 2014: 295). In both cases, a sharp distinction between "citizens" and "non-citizens" contributed/s to a hierarchical labour force divided along national and ethnic lines.

The gendered and racialised hierarchy is particularly evident in the sphere of domestic work. In relation to gender, male workers tend to find employment on construction sites or plantations where they work in groups. In contrast, the social construction of care work as women's work means that female migrant workers are employed as domestic workers in much more individualised working environments, which leaves them more vulnerable to abuse. This also has gendered implications for the societies that migrant workers come from. For example, Sri Lankan women who work as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia reported that their male partners at home feel threatened by the fact that they are the primary breadwinners. This has contributed to "crises of masculinity" in Sri Lanka where "husbands may feel the need to establish a masculine breadwinner identity in the household" (Chidiac, 2014: 22).

The racialisation of employment is exemplified by the fact that race/ethnicity informs discriminatory attitudes towards migrant workers. Moreover, recruiters select labourers from particular ethnic groups for certain

[102] I say "many capitalists" here because Deborah Posel convincingly argues that "influx controls" affected industry and commerce in uneven ways. These controls made the supply of labour more unstable, but for some this was a small price to pay for the depreciating effect the controls had on labour costs since they also undermined the bargaining power of "illegal" workers. Some features of "influx control" promoted the immediate interests of individual capitalists while they might have had a negative influence on the functioning of capitalism in SA over the long run (Posel, 1991: 269).

types of employment. For example, in Doha women from Ethiopia are considered to be "cold-blooded" and dangerous and thus not suitable to be domestic workers. A representative from a recruitment agency in Doha stated that Ethiopians are "dirty" and that Filipinas are the preferred choice because they are "cleaner" (Chidiac, 2014: 33). As Chidiac (2014: 30–31) notes, "this introduces the idea of job racialization, where certain jobs become practically designated to certain ethnic/racial groups in society". In relation to domestic work, the term "Sri Lanky", which literally means Sri Lankan is widely used to refer to domestic workers even if they are from the Philippines. Because ethnicity has become so directly associated with domestic work, "the term has almost lost its meaning as a mere reference to nationality and has been incorporated as a racial slur" (Chidiac, 2014: 32). In many Arab Gulf states, the term has become almost synonymous with "servant".

The racialisation of domestic work is not only evident in the fact that certain forms of work are designated on a racial basis. Anderson (2000: 57) observes that differentiation is also applied in "an overt fear of contamination from the bodies of these 'others'". For example, workers' clothes have to be washed separately and there are separate bathrooms for workers who are considered to be the ethnic "other" or, in the cases where there is just one bathroom, workers have to scrub the whole bathroom with anti-bacterial products after they use the toilet. This clearly echoes the domestic work system in SA where black domestic workers are still often expected to use different bathrooms than the white families they work for.[103]

From the discussion above we can thus see that the development of capitalism in the Gulf States coincided with a divide between national citizens and migrant workers that are discriminated against through the racialisation of jobs and "othering". This is comparable to the Apartheid system in SA where the mutual dependence between racism and capitalism has long been a topic of discussion (Dubow, 2014: 277). In spite of these similarities with South African Apartheid, there are also stark differences. Although employment is racialised in the Gulf States, the policy of job reservation for certain races is much more informal than it was in SA. Another clear difference is the fact that the Gulf States are not built on settler colonialism.

In contrast, the apartheid system in Israel/Palestine is based on settler colonialism (Shihade, 2012: 108) and, as we shall see, it also functions as the inverse of the Gulf States system in many other ways. According to Magid Shihade, the fact that the Israeli state is a settler colonial state implies, firstly, that Israeli policies towards Palestinians have entailed dispossession and, secondly, that the formation of group identities has shaped the conflict and violence. After Israel was declared an independent state on 14 May 1948 and the US offered its de facto recognition of the Israeli Provisional Government, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 broke out. The Palestinians who managed to stay in Israel after the war continued to suffer from land expropriation. In the Galilee and the al-Naqab (the Negev),

[103] The relationship between domestic work, racial discrimination and bathroom use in the US is also a major theme in Stockett's (2009) novel *The help*, which was adapted into a film in 2011.

Palestinian houses were demolished, and Palestinians were subjected to racist laws. Palestinians in the West Bank "are still humiliated on a daily basis at checkpoints; arrested without trial, losing their lands to settlers and the Israeli Land Authority; and barred from traveling to nearby villages and towns due to systems of apartheid walls and barriers that encircle their homes" (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015: 12).

The Palestinian territories in Israel bear clear resemblances to the Apartheid Bantustans. In the mid-1970s, the South African army had almost total control over the Bantustan security forces and deployed them to fight opponents of Apartheid. The NP signed defence treaties with the leaders of the Bantustans to guarantee that the "independent" territories could not be used in any way that would pose a security threat to white SA. Likewise, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explicitly stated that "we will continue to have security control over all of the area west of the Jordan River" (cited in Shalev, 2017).[104] Similar to the Bantustans, Palestinians in the West Bank need Israeli permission to exit and enter their "homeland" and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are allowed to set up roadblocks and arrest Palestinians practically at will. They are also allowed to invade Palestinian homes in the name of "security needs". According to Netanyahu, this is because he wants "true peace, a peace for generations" (cited in Shalev, 2017).[105]

There have also been striking ideological similarities between the Israeli and South African Apartheid regimes. Both regimes claimed that their peoples faced eradication from external foes—from communism and black Africans in SA and from Islam and Arab states in Israel. The NP used the Cold War divide to frame its military operations in neighbouring states such as Angola as a fight against communism. It also claimed that liberation organisations like the ANC were "communists" and "terrorists". Likewise, the Israeli government is using the rhetoric of the so-called "War on Terror" to justify its militarism, particularly in relation to Hamas and Hezbollah. As the journalist Chris McGreal (2006: 5) argues, "both apartheid and Israel are prime examples of terrorist states blaming the victims".

In both cases there is a clear racist and ethno-centric ideology. Some Israeli officials have implicitly (and explicitly) stated that "Palestinians do not need the same space as Jews do and are quite happy to be stuck in their homes without free access to green spaces around them" (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015: 28). There are even deeper ideological connections: the Afrikaners and the Israelis claimed that they were the chosen people of God and therefore found a biblical justification for their racism and Zionist exclusivity. Moreover, similar to Zionists who claimed that Palestine was "a land without people for a people without land", Afrikaner proponents of Apartheid used the "myth of the

[104] In the 1990s, Israeli industrialists urged the government to shift from what they openly called a "colonial program" to a "neo-colonial program" by creating a "Third World-style entity" in which the majority of the population would live in desolation and there would be a wealthy minority who would be favourable to the interests of the Israeli government (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015: 109).

[105] Israel has also constructed the world's largest detention centre and a wall across the Sinai to keep African refugees from entering the state. African refugees are denied asylum and the immigrants who do manage to enter the state have no legal rights to employment or state benefits (Besteman, 2019: 32).

empty land"[106] to justify giving only 13% of the country's land to black South Africans (Marks, 2015; McGreal, 2006: 3). Dubow's (2014: 295) observation that "multiple layers of ideology and readings of history" worked to convince white South Africans that they had the inalienable right to dominate SA seems equally applicable to Israel.

Much more could be said about the relationship between the Israeli and Afrikaner regimes, especially about America's backing of both regimes.[107] Israel also exported military equipment, arms production knowledge and modules on counterinsurgency and anti-riot tactics to Apartheid SA. In 1979, SA purchased around 35% of Israel's military exports and, by 1985, SA was responsible for 20% of Israel's total industrial exports revenue. The Israeli economy was increasingly driven by its arms industry in the 1970s and 1980s: "While in 1971 Israel exported 70 million US$ worth of arms, by 1986 its arms industry accounted for 1,5 billion US$ of exports," (Alsheh, 2013: 26).[108]

The relationship between the two states also helped them to expand their nuclear capabilities. The American journalist Sasha Polakow-Suransky (2010) provides a fascinating account of the nuclear aspects of this relationship, which started in the 1960s when Israel began to import uranium from SA. Official Apartheid in SA and the formal establishment of the Israeli state both date back to 1948 and the Israeli regime is thus not a "new" or "emerging" form of Apartheid. However, the case is interesting because of a crucial difference between the two regimes: Israel is not dependent on Palestinian labour. This is also why the Israeli regime is the inverse of the Gulf State regime. Israel's lack of dependence on Palestinian labour renders Palestinians worthless to the regime and they have become disposable. This has undoubtedly shaped the forms of brutality that Palestinians have been subjected to.

The cases of "regional" or "local" Apartheid discussed above have meaningful implications for discussions of sustainable development. If we refer back to Besteman's more recent conceptualisation of the Global North, which includes Israel, East Asia and the Gulf States, we can see that the countries that have joined the list have all been associated with procedures that are reminiscent of the Apartheid system in some way. Even if all of the policies of these states or regions are not analogous to the Apartheid regime, there are certain exploitative elements in their development strategies that are dubious to say the least. This seems to indicate that the process of development is still based on exploitation.

Moreover, the strategies that these states have followed have also increased their carbon footprints. China is currently the world's biggest CO_2 emitter and the Gulf States are the biggest per capita greenhouse

[106] The government claimed that large tracts of the country had no inhabitants and that the Bantu-speaking population had moved southwards from North Africa to occupy the "empty land" (Marks, 2015). This later became known as "the myth of the empty land".

[107] For a more in-depth discussion of this topic please consult *On Palestine* (Chomsky & Pappé, 2015).

[108] Global Apartheid is extremely profitable for the arms industry. The world's biggest arms dealer, Lockheed Martin Corp. had revenues of $44.9 billion in 2019 and its runner-up, Boeing, made $26.9 billion (Ankel, 2019). Detention has also become hugely profitable. Detention centres are mostly run by private contractors and, in 2013 alone, the Corrections Corporation of America posted net profits of $301 million and the GEO Group posted net profits of $115 million (Besteman, 2019: 32).

gas emitters (Al-Sarihi, 2018; Frohlich & Blossom, 2019). The Gulf States' emissions also increased by an average of 6% annually between 1970 and 2020 in concurrence with their GDP growth. Israel explicitly follows a sustainable development programme, although one of the cornerstones of their environmental policy is switching from coal-based energy production to natural gas (Kolyohin, 2019). It is too soon to tell whether this policy will make a meaningful difference in the long run, but the various environmental problems associated with natural gas should evoke some scepticism (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2014). Moreover, even in the unlikely case that Israel's development policy would be truly sustainable, the information in this section has demonstrated that many of the policies that underpinned its development have been unethical. If development is based on oppression, then this implies that it only offers a solution for a select few and not for the people who will be most vulnerable to the consequences of climate change. The examples discussed above also demonstrate that development, particularly in its current capitalist form, cannot be sustainable.

Two roads diverged: developmentalist utopias and Apartheid dystopias

From the discussion of different Apartheid systems, we can see that these systems take different forms and, in spite of their similarities, some of their brutalities are unique. At the time of writing it seems as if there are two primary roads that Global Apartheid can take, although the two options are certainly not mutually exclusive. I discuss these two visions by analysing two different views of development, one endorsed by the former US president, Barack Obama, and the other by the current US president, Donald Trump.

President Barack Obama expressed his vision of sustainable development at the Closing Session of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals in New York City on 27 September 2015. Obama (2015) started his speech by noting that there were sceptics who claimed that "some places (are) beyond hope, that certain people and regions are condemned to an endless cycle of suffering." However, he maintained that these sceptics and cynics were wrong and that "development works". Subsequently, Obama reinforced the notion that some people and regions are stuck in the past by insisting that America could not "leave people behind."

Moreover, Obama (2015) stated that:

> We reaffirm that supporting development is not charity, but is instead one of the smartest investments we can make in our own future. After all, it is a lack of development… that helps fuel so much of the tensions and conflict and instability in our world. And I profoundly believe that many of the conflicts, the refugee crises, the military interventions over the years might have been avoided if nations had truly invested in the lives of their people.

His speech resonates with many of the discourses that have been discussed throughout this piece. Firstly, the tensions, conflicts and instability in the world are again blamed on lack of development, which discounts all of the US's previous development projects. Obama (2015) specifically

referred to Syria and claimed that the aid that America, as the "global leader in development", had provided to Syria was proof that "the world can count on the friendship and generosity of the American people". Obama ostensibly forgot to mention that his administration had launched an air-strike campaign in Syria in 2014, which would drop 26,171 bombs in 2016 alone (Benjamin, 2017). [109]

People were again framed as investments, which is symptomatic of the economisation of almost every aspect of society. This was a common theme throughout the speech and Obama later emphasised that it was important to "invest in our greatest resource—our people." He then claimed that the number one threat to development was bad governance. Although bad governance certainly plays a role in the suffering of many people around the world, it is slightly ironic that an American administration should comment on governance after they supported some of the most brutal dictatorships in history, including the Apartheid regime. Moreover, this again perpetuates the notion the countries in the Global South function completely separately from the Global North and that "development problems" are caused only by internal factors.

Obama also noted that "development is threatened by old attitudes, especially those that deny rights and opportunity to women." He then went on to repeat one of the oldest colonial tropes: "one of the best indicators of whether a country will succeed is how it treats its women" and stipulated that every nation "must invest in the education and health and skills of our women and girls." He thus assumed that nations are masculine and, if women and girls are passive objects of investment, then the investors are presumably male. Like previous colonial officials, he used the treatment of women as a barometer of civilisation and assumed that the US had empowered women while women in other societies were exploited. This became more evident when he stated that the "long tradition" of discriminating against women in some societies was not an excuse (Obama, 2015).

Obama declared that the world was undertaking the "next chapter of development". He even stipulated what this new chapter would entail. Firstly, "this next chapter" had to "unleash economic growth." Ostensibly, this would be done by investing in new technologies, data and behavioural science. The US could also help the Global South by giving people "new techniques and new seeds and new technologies... so they can boost their yields and increase their incomes." Furthermore, the South would require tools and financing so they could "embrace clean energy, adapt to climate change, and ensure that there's not a false choice between economic development and the best practices that can save our planet" (Obama, 2015).

In fact, in a speech that was supposed to address sustainable development, he barely mentioned climate change. He noted that "development is threatened by climate change", that the West would be "seeing climate change refugees" and, as indicated above, that people in the Global South would have to adapt. This new chapter therefore looks almost identical to the one outlined in the Brundtland report in 1987, which also reiterated many

[109] Syria and Iraq were the primary targets, although Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan were also hit. Overall, the US dropped on average three bombs per hour in the region for a year (Benjamin, 2017).

older colonial discourses. Sustainable development was still applied to identify the shortcomings of the Global South in comparison to the Global North. The North could yet again be presented as leaders of development who would benevolently donate technology to the South. The president of the country that has contributed the most to climate change did not take any responsibility for the problem or indicate that America would change its practices. He did not indicate how climate change could be mitigated, but simply that poorer countries would need assistance in how they would adapt.

Obama's vision of development is thus a system of Global Apartheid with a glossy liberal varnish. It appears to be a somewhat modernised version of Smuts's trusteeship where the US and Western Europe would play a supervisory role as the leaders of development. The elite minority would not give up their privilege and redistribution would only entail the transfer of resources from the poor to the rich, which is the only acceptable form of redistribution in an apartheid system. The Obama version would attempt to make this structure more palatable by donating technology and "advanced seeds" to the Global South (when it does not infringe upon corporate patent rights, of course). Masculine nations would also be encouraged to invest in women and girls, although we are reminded that the purpose is ultimately to improve the health and prosperity of their families, communities and countries (Obama, 2015).

The West will also "see" refugees. Although Obama did not elaborate on the topic during his speech, his policies indicated that these refugees would be barred from entering prosperous enclaves if they do not drown in seas with ever rising levels. Obama's announcement that we were entering a new chapter of development thus seems to maintain the exploitative characteristics of old structures, similar to all the previous claims of newness. However, this does not mean that the status quo will remain completely unaltered. Climate change will have a dramatic impact. As Klein (2014: 28) notes, climate change is an all-encompassing crisis that will have massive consequences. In an Apartheid-like structure this will probably mean that more people who are not seen as economically necessary will be left to suffer droughts and storms while increasingly ruthless border control systems safeguard the rich in their fortresses.

It is almost impossible to discuss fortifying borders without mentioning Trump, which brings me to the second vision of development. Donald Trump addressed the UNGA on 25 September 2019 and outlined America's plans for the future. While Obama framed America as a leader and "partner in development", Trump stressed that the US "prizes liberty, independence, and self-government above all." Immediately after this point, he informed the UNGA that "the United States, after having spent over two and a half trillion dollars since my election to completely rebuild our great military, is also, by far, the world's most powerful nation" because "Americans know that in a world where others seek conquest and domination, our nation must be strong in wealth, in might, and in spirit. That is why the United States vigorously defends the traditions and customs that have made us who we are" (Trump, 2019). Trump thus promoted a policy of

non-interference and reiterated that "The future belongs to sovereign and independent nations" who "honour the differences that make each country special and unique" (Trump, 2019). It is important to remember that the Apartheid government also defended their policies in the name of sovereignty and presented the Bantustans as a way to honour "African cultures".

Later in his speech, Trump went on to say that "peace-loving nations" such as America were threatened by the "repressive regime in Iran". Apparently, the Iranian regime had a "fanatical quest for nuclear weapons" (Trump, 2019). In contrast, America's stockpile of 6 185 nuclear warheads was seen as completely rational, even though it is the only country in history that has actually used nuclear weapons in warfare (Chenel & Moynihan, 2019). In spite of these glaring contradictions, the Trump administration has imposed severe economic sanctions on Iran. Although this is not a new policy, Trump boasted that he would impose the "highest level of sanctions" on Iran, obviously without taking into account the consequences that this would have for the population.[110] This reveals that the "American values" of independence and sovereignty apply only to America and its allies.[111] Perhaps we can find a historical precedent in the Apartheid government's insistence on its sovereignty while it was waging wars in its neighbouring states, predominantly Angola.

Trump did not mention climate change in his speech. Instead he focused on his pro-growth policies, including "massive tax cuts and regulations cuts" (Trump, 2019). He also bragged about his policies in relation to the fossil fuel industry since they would ensure that the US would remain the world's number one oil and natural gas producer. As would be expected, he did mention immigration as a critical challenge. However, he alleged that the "radical activists" who demanded less border control were undermining the well-being of immigrants. In fact, he stated that these activists were "empowering criminal organizations that prey on innocent men, women, and children" and that their "false sense of virtue" was harming the well-being of innocent people because "when you undermine border security, you are undermining human rights and human dignity." In an interesting twist, Trump did not simply justify border control in the name of American safety or the protection of "American culture" as per usual, but actually claimed that it contributed to the well-being of immigrants. Moreover, he stated that "Mass illegal migration is unfair, unsafe, and unsustainable for everyone involved: the sending countries and the depleted countries. And they become depleted very fast, but their youth is not taken care of and human capital goes to waste." Jim Hoagland (cited in Dubow, 2014: 276) claims that the defining difference between the system of white supremacy in SA and the one in America was that Apartheid was cast as a "mission": "At the height of

[110] If the historical record is any indication, the US's sanction policies are likely to be catastrophic. According to Amnesty International, the UN Children Fund and the World Food Programme, the American sanctions against Iraq between 1991 and 2003 killed on average 45 000 children under the age of five per month or 500 000 children in total. If UN estimates are accurate, this would mean that the sanctions against Iraq caused more deaths than "all so-called weapons of mass destruction throughout history" (Mueller & Mueller, 1999).

[111] In addition to the long history of American intervention, Trump also made it apparent that his regime would continue to interfere in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Apparently, he did not find it acceptable that Cuba was "plundering Venezuela's oil" (Trump, 2019).

apartheid, in the early 1970s, whites were always 'giving' blacks freedom, or material rewards, or whatever". This might be a shrewd observation in relation to America's internal racist system. However, from Trump's claims and from the long history of American intervention abroad, we can see that American regimes often frame their oppressive policies as a "mission", especially a mission of liberation.[112]

According to Trump, America is not only under threat from Iran and "swarms of immigrants", but also from the media and academic institutions that "push flat-out assaults on our histories, traditions, and values" (Trump, 2019). One of these assaults included women's right to abortions: "Global bureaucrats have absolutely no business attacking the sovereignty of nations that wish to protect innocent life. Like many nations here today, we in America believe that every child—born and unborn—is a sacred gift from God." The American government does seem very concerned about innocent life, unless of course children are Iraqi or Iranian or Mexican (and the list goes on).

Here it is important to keep in mind that a large portion of Trump's constituency hold conservative religious views. According to a recent survey, 81% of white evangelists and more than two thirds of white Christians in the US supported Trump and agreed with the statement that he "fights for what I believe in" (Shellnutt, 2020). The same survey found that, while 64% of white Christians agree with Trump on most issues, less than 15% of black Christians hold the same views. It is thus clear that religion and race intersect in the identity formation of Trump supporters. Although Trump's religious supporters did not necessarily agree with his personal life choices, his anti-abortion policy played a large role in winning their favour. Trump positioned himself as a protector of "the faith" against "outsiders" who threaten religious traditions. This was true at the time of Trump's speech, but it was also evident when he posed with a Bible after a more recent speech in which he declared that he would deploy federal troops against Black Lives Matter protestors to "restore security and safety in America" (cited in Olson, 2020).

Throughout his current electoral campaign, Trump asserted that "we're going to win another monumental victory for faith and family, God and country, flag and freedom" (cited in Olson, 2020). In Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry's new book, *Taking America back for God*, they contend that Trump's white Christian supporters see him as a saviour, a protector of traditional religion and a defender of a bygone way of life. A yearning for an imagined past also undoubtedly contributed to the success of Trump's previous campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again". According to Olson (2020), "in that imagined past, white men ruled the roost, families went to church every Sunday and outsiders knew their place". We can thus see how Trump's statements on religion, gender and migration are formulated to appeal to a particular constituency.

It is unsurprising that Trump would use particular discourses or imagery, such as carrying a Bible, to appeal to his supporters. However, it is interesting that Trump's discourses so closely mirror Afrikaner nationalist discourses. I do not provide a discussion of the role that religion played in maintaining

[112] The notion of human capital is similar to the general use of human resources and, as with the Obama speech, indicates a general context of economisation.

(and subverting) Apartheid, though I mention the importance of Afrikaners' perception of themselves as God's chosen people. Nonetheless, religion and particularly the conservative Christianity associated with the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, or NGK, in Afrikaans) was crucial to justifying the Apartheid system. For example, D.F. Malan claimed that "we hold this nationhood as our due for it was given us by the Architect of the universe … Afrikanerdom is not the work of men but the creation of God" (cited in Moodie, 1975 :1). As we shall see, Trump's gendered discourses as well as his attempts to appeal to an idealised past also clearly echo Afrikaner nationalist discourses.

Trump's anti-abortion policies have been widely criticised by feminists in the US. His attitude towards women was also evident in his comments about "grabbing women by the pussy" and the fact that more than two dozen cases of sexual assault and harassment have been filed against him (Mindock, 2019).[113] Yet, in his 2019 address to the UNGA he was quick to emphasise the importance of women's empowerment (Trump, 2019):

> My administration launched the Women's Global Development and Prosperity Initiative. The W-GDP is the first ever government-wide approach to women's economic empowerment, working to ensure that women all over the planet have the legal right to own and inherit property, work in the same industries as men, travel freely, and access credit and institutions.

There are too many contradictions for me to seriously discuss, but I want to draw attention to the fact that empowerment is again defined only in economic terms. Moreover, Trump went on to claim that women should be empowered so that they could contribute to national prosperity: "It is therefore vital not only to a nation's prosperity, but also is vital to its national security, to pursue women's economic development" (Trump, 2019).

Firstly, this strongly echoes Afrikaner nationalist discourses in which women were valued for their contribution to the nation. Secondly, in spite of the many differences between Obama and Trump's discursive strategies, a strong point of convergence was their reasoning around the issue of women's empowerment. Successive American regimes have used very similar gendered discourses to intervene in other parts of the world, as demonstrated during the prelude to the Bush administration's invasion of Afghanistan. Not only did the Bush administration claim that it was invading Afghanistan to "fight for the rights and dignity of women", but after the invasion, George Bush also claimed that he was moving on to loftier goals—spreading respect for women "in the Middle East and beyond!" (Gerstenzang & Getter, 2001; Viner, 2002).[114]

Much more can be said about Trump's gendered discourses. As the sociologist C.J. Pascoe argues, Trumpism epitomises a contest over masculinity and what qualifies as a "real man". It is not only Trump and his supporters who participate in this contest, but also

[113] This is not even to mention the effect that his policies on issues such as healthcare will have on poor women of colour and single mothers.

[114] It is imperative to note that Bush's concern for women's wellbeing was merely rhetorical. Various scholars have demonstrated that his policies had devastating effects on women in Afghanistan and Iraq (Al-Ali & Pratt, 2006, 2008, 2011; Al-Jawaheri, 2014; Banwell, 2015).

those who oppose his administration. According to Pascoe (2017: 119), "the themes deployed by Trumpists and anti-Trumpists alike address a core component of masculinity in the global west—dominance … dominance over women and dominance over other, less masculine, men,". Perhaps this was most strikingly demonstrated by Trump's "my rocket is bigger than yours" Twitter showdown with the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in January 2018. Trump also derogatively referred to Kim Jong Un as a "Little Rocket Man" (cited in Cummings, 2018).

Trumpist representations of masculinity share many resemblances with conservative Afrikaner ideas about masculinity. As early as 1914, when a group of republican Afrikaners rebelled against the Union government's decision to support Britain in the First World War, one of the rebels declared "a boer and his gun and his wife are three things always together" (cited in Swart, 1998: 737). There is a link between this reference to guns as constitutive of masculinity and Trump's gun control policies or lack thereof. The similarities between the two republican discourses did not only include militarism. As the historian Sandra Swart (1998) observes, even at this early stage, republican leaders tried to propagate their cause by drawing on nostalgic ideas of Boer masculinity. The notion that men in the past were "real men" and have become feminised thus seems to have been a cornerstone of discourses about republican masculinity in both the US and SA.[115]

Trump's vision of the future also echoes many Afrikaner nationalist discourses. I have mentioned that the NP used the Cold War divide to gain support from the US. Both the Apartheid government and the US used the notion of the "Rooi Gevaar" (red/communist danger) to justify their policies. I have also mentioned that American statements on the threats of migration and especially Trump's imagery of a "swarm of immigrants" resembles the notion of "die Swart Gevaar" (Black Danger) that was so prevalent in Apartheid SA. In comparison to Obama's developmental vision, Trump's vision is a more conservative form of Apartheid based on securitisation and separate development. Trump asserted that "the true good of a nation can only be pursued by those who love it: by citizens who are rooted in its history, who are nourished by its culture, committed to its values, attached to its people, and who know that its future is theirs to build or theirs to lose" (Trump, 2019). This appeal to nationalism and patriotism unmistakeably resembles Afrikaner nationalism. An ideology built on fear and selfishness is always dangerous, but in the context of climate

[115] Americans and Afrikaners have a shared history of settler colonialism and rebellion against the British Crown. It is probable that their identity formation and notions of masculinity and femininity were shaped by these experiences. The historian Dean Allen (2003) links the Anglo-Boer War/South African War (1899–1902) to Afrikaner nationalism and the important role that rugby has played in Afrikaner identity construction. Rugby has also played a central role in the construction of Afrikaner masculinity and this provides an example of how Afrikaners' rebellion against Britain influenced their sense of identity. During Trump's Fourth of July Speech in 2019, he also evoked American settlers' rebellion against the British to brag about America's military strength. In spite of the many historical blunders he made during his speech (for example claiming that "our Army manned the air" while there was no air travel in eighteenth-century America) he still drew on popular conceptions of the rebellion to claim that the country's future "rests on the shoulders of men and women willing to defend it" and "As long as we stay true to our cause, as long as we remember our great history and as long as we never stop fighting for a better future, then there will be nothing that America cannot do" (Jackson & Hayes, 2019). It could be interesting to look into the similarities between republican American constructions of masculinity and Afrikaner constructions of masculinity, especially in the context of AfriForum's appeal to Trump to intervene in SA to protect Afrikaners and Trump's pledge to investigate the murders of white farmers in SA (Brock, 2018).

change it is likely to be catastrophic. Not only is Trump using it as a justification for investing in industries that will exacerbate climate change even further, but we can certainly imagine a world where the powerful elite can use these ideas to gain access to a decreasing amount of resources. We can imagine it because it is already happening.

The Obama and Trump roads are different in many respects, but neither offers a solution for the vast majority of the people on the planet. Both options will uphold an apartheid-like structure and neither will mitigate climate change. The one option is a conservative version of apartheid, based on nationalism and separatism. The other option is politically correct apartheid where wealthier nations are sometimes charitable toward the countries they are exploiting. Both options are equally brutal, albeit in different ways. The Trump option is brutal for more obvious reasons, but the Obama option is brutal precisely because of its politically correct façade.

The façade creates the illusion that something is being done about climate change while the Obama administration spent more than $34 billion on fossil fuel projects around the world through the US Export-Import Bank. In fact, Obama invested more than triple the amount of money in the fossil fuel industry than the Bush administration had. His policies are also worse because he funded these projects in poorer countries, which means that American corporations ultimately profited from them, but the carbon emissions were accounted to the countries where the plants were built and the communities who live near them are bearing the consequences. For example, in India, villagers who live near one of the plants complained about contaminated water, coal ash blowing into their villages, and respiratory and stomach problems (Prasad, Burke, Michael, Milman, 2016; Shalev, Phillis, Feder & Rust, 2016).

I do not discuss these options to create images of dystopian futures. I discuss them to show that we are already living in a dystopia. Moreover, this dystopia is partly sustained by the utopian vision of sustainable development. The origin of the word "utopia" stretches back to Sir Thomas More's 1516 book Utopia. Utopia was an imaginary island and More wanted to imply that it could never exist. The word is a combination of the Greek words ou (meaning "no" or "not") and topos (meaning "place"). On the one hand, a utopia is thus by definition a place that we can never reach (Merriam Webster, 2020). On the other hand, a dystopia is an imagined society where people live fearful, wretched and dehumanised lives. We do not have to imagine this. The other side of the sustainable development utopia is the dystopias in which millions of people around the world live. Climate change will bring many challenges and if the policies that are supposed to address these challenges follow either of the roads discussed above, it is likely that millions of people will suffer to support the profits of a few. Interestingly, Dubow (2014: 292) observes that "Verwoerd's talent for social engineering, coupled with his ideological dogmatism, offered the possibility of translating a utopian vision into reality". Many Afrikaners had utopian visions of Apartheid while the country's black majority was forced into squalor. Perhaps this observation from SA could serve as a lesson to us all.

Conclusion

Throughout each stage of Apartheid, black South Africans resisted using different strategies. Many refused to comply with removals, border controls and the pass system. Africans moved into and through white spaces, established squatter communities and challenged the constraints on their mobility and civil rights more generally (Besteman, 2019: 29). Black South Africans also adapted. They used the limited resources available to them to manoeuvre and manipulate the restrictions imposed on them. As Posel (1991: 22) notes, "the state's subjects are not simply passive victims; state power is contested in organised and unorganised ways, which play havoc with the states' capacity to control its destiny". Similarly, today people are not merely victims of Global Apartheid. They resist and adapt, cooperate and dissent. However, the adaptability of people cannot be used to justify Global Apartheid. Surely the fact that people have agency does not legitimate their exploitation.

Accordingly, this chapter has discussed elements of Global Apartheid as well as different smaller Apartheid systems. This reveals that Apartheid systems can take multiple forms and they can be accompanied by multiple discourses. Like the Apartheid system in SA, the strategies and discourses used by the elite to maintain the status quo can vary over time. However, there are also similarities between these different systems that enable us to identify them as "apartheid". This usually entails a system that favours the already wealthy and is characterised by gross inequality, discrimination against the "other" and militarised border regimes.[116]

The discourses and ideologies that sustain these systems usually depend on selective collective memories. This entails "retaining ideas and assumptions for interpreting experience, answering fundamental questions, formulating aspirations and informing decisions" (Alexander, 1996: 230). Discourses are recreated in everyday institutions and, although they are not necessarily the most widespread, they are the ideas that hold the greatest power over people's lives. As we have seen, discourse is instrumental, and it defines how things should be seen and treated. Consequently, if sustainable development remains the dominant discourse, the most powerful institutions will continue to misrepresent problems and prescribe policies that are likely to worsen many of the challenges we are facing today, including those related to climate change.

[116] This can perhaps be related to the argument that Apartheid in SA was "colonialism of a special type" (South African Communist Party (SACP), 1962) and was an iteration of a type of society that capitalism had created elsewhere. This would only reinforce the argument that capitalism is an inherently unequal and discriminatory system. However, I also want to emphasise that Apartheid cannot be reduced to capitalism and that race and identity were/are intimately connected to economic considerations.

Conclusion

This monograph has ultimately been about stories. It has been about the way stories have been told at the international level and the stories that have remained dominant in spite of critique. Summarily, it has been about whose stories are heard and how this has framed the solutions proposed for global problems. The story of development has gained prominence and framed the solutions proposed in relation to climate change. This does not mean that development has been uncontested, but that it has remained an authoritative narrative in international relations for more than a century in spite of the many critiques that have been levelled against it.

Many scholars have claimed that we live in a post-ideological or post-hegemonic world. Although the first traces of this can perhaps be found in Daniel Bell's (1960) *The end of ideology,* the notion gained more prominence after the end of the Cold War in 1989. As the political theorist Carlos Pessoa (2003: 485) notes, in the post-Cold War period, ideology has often been seen as unimportant or has been "demonised for the way in which it acts as obstacle to tackling 'concrete issues'". In contrast to this view, which sees ideology as a distortion of reality, Žižek draws attention to the important ways in which ideology is active in the construction of reality. Žižek (cited in Pessoa, 2003: 486) argues that, if we see reality as untainted by ideological input, we "fall right back into the terrain of ideology". Instead of signalling a decline in the power of ideology, the notion that we are living in a post-ideological world might have bolstered the efficiency of ideology in constructing social reality.

Many of Žižek's reflections on ideology can be applied to development. For example, development is generally not seen as an ideology, but is taken to be a social reality. An apt example of this was the mandate of the Brundtland Commission. As discussed in chapter three, the commission had to suggest ways in which the environment could be protected while economic growth continued. Within this ideological framework, there was no option to challenge economic growth or capitalism more broadly. None of the reports concerning climate change have acknowledged that they have an ideological orientation, yet all of them espoused pro-capitalist views. It can thus be argued that this disregard for ideology and the supposedly neutral language of "environmental management" and "investment in human resources" augmented the power of ideology in constructing social reality.

Although these reflections on ideology could be applied to development, I argue that it might be more useful to conceptualise development as a narrative. I note in the introduction that a narrative is a particular way of explaining and understanding events. Throughout

the monograph I have attempted to demonstrate how the narrative of development has informed dominant perceptions in international relations. This was exemplified by how problems in the Global South were/are explained. The narrative of development sees the Global South as lacking in comparison to the Global North and leads to policy prescriptions aimed at "uplifting" the South. By defining the problem in this way, it overlooks the complex relations between the North and the South. It thus focuses our attention on problems of lack, for example poverty, without questioning the other side of the relationship, namely extreme wealth.

By conceptualising development as a narrative, I also hope to draw attention to its characters, morality, coherence and outcomes (Crush, 1995 :13). The characters have changed over time, from British imperial officers to Apartheid officials to international organisations and "development experts". There was not necessarily a chronological succession from one set of characters to the next. As demonstrated by the fact that the Apartheid government mimicked the British Empire's post-Second World War colonial strategies, the different characters in the plot of development interacted with and influenced each other. As noted in the introduction, the narrative of development has not always been coherent. It has been appropriated by various characters to support various objectives. For example, African leaders also used the narrative of development to demand better circumstances in colonies.

Nonetheless, I have attempted to demonstrate that elements of the development narrative that might seem incoherent or contradictory can actually work to reinforce the broader narrative. This was apparent in the concept of "native development", which allowed imperial powers and the Apartheid government to intervene in "African areas" while simultaneously blaming the problems in these areas on "African culture". Similarly, I have argued that the contradictions within the discourse of sustainable development have ultimately worked to perpetuate unsustainable development.

While some scholars such as Van Houtum (2010) argue that there is a contradiction between Europe's humanitarian assistance and avowed dedication to human rights and its ruthless border control policies, I have argued that these two elements are actually mutually constitutive. This was already evident in the limited development projects European colonial powers launched in order to quell African resistance and prolong colonialism. Contemporary American and European corporations follow a similar strategy, as demonstrated by Nestlé's projects in Nigeria and NKG's land grabs in Uganda. Consequently, the lauded progressive policies of corporations who claim to support sustainability and community development are more problematic than explicit corporate exploitation precisely because the benevolent gloss sometimes conceals unjust practices and thus helps to maintain them.

Likewise, imperial Britain, the Apartheid government, and international organisations have repeatedly claimed that new eras have arrived while reproducing older policies. Again, there was not simply a contradiction between claims of newness and the reproduction of older exploitative systems but claims of newness were actually used to

maintain these systems. A "thinking with history" approach has been particularly informative in this regard since it revealed the broader temporal flows out of which the present was formed. It could thus enable us to situate the contemporary discourse of sustainable development in the broader narrative of development while exposing factors that are unique to the present, such as the rise of neoliberal ideology.

The first chapter provides the basis of the "thinking with history" approach by discussing the ways in which colonial powers, particularly Britain, used the narrative of development in order to justify and even reinvigorate their colonial policies. As Hodge (2016: 159) observes, instead of searching for the illusive origin of development, it might be more meaningful to examine the "exchanges of ideas, models, and practices, and the interactions of people and institutions, that moved across the 'webs of significance' surrounding specific projects or programs". I therefore do not aim to identify the definitive origin of development, but rather to show how the narrative has been used in specific instances throughout the twentieth century. I follow this approach in order to show the correlations between colonial development policies and sustainable development policies today. It is important to highlight these correlations to support the argument that, just as colonial powers used the narrative to maintain colonial powers structures, the narrative still functions to maintain a broader exploitative system today.

Similar to colonial powers, the Apartheid government in SA used the narrative of separate development to justify its homelands policy. As discussed in the first chapter, colonial powers launched a new era of development after the Second World War and used the rhetoric of development in order to retain colonial power relations in the face of increasing resistance. The NP mimicked this rhetoric in many ways and when Dr Hendrik Verwoerd became Prime Minister of SA in 1958, he attempted to preserve the Apartheid system by introducing a system of "separate development". The second chapter discusses some of the NP's development rhetoric and the policies it implemented in the Bantustans in order to emphasise the similarities they shared with contemporary sustainable development rhetoric and policies. These parallels further support the argument that the narrative of development and, particularly, the discourse of sustainable development helps to sustain a broader exploitative system.

After sketching the historical context in the first two chapters, I discuss in the third chapter the ways in which the discourse of sustainable development has informed contemporary climate change policies and some of the problematic policies this has produced. One of the primary flaws of the discourse is that it presents the "lack of development" in the Global South as the problem and then prescribes policies to "uplift" or "develop" the countries that are identified as lacking. This framework has ironically allowed the industrialised countries of the North who are largely responsible for anthropogenic climate change to present themselves as saviours and leaders in sustainable development. It has been more than thirty years since the discourse of sustainable development began to frame international organisations' approach to climate change and the

causes of anthropogenic climate change have not been dealt with. Although profit motives and vested interests have surely provided important incentives for sustaining the status quo (Klein, 2014), this monograph has argued that the discourse of sustainable development has also been an impediment to deeper structural change.

Subsequently, I argue that the status quo functions as a system of Global Apartheid. The narrative of development positions the Global North and South as two points in a linear history. The North is thus positioned as the mirror of the future while the "underdeveloped" countries of the South are encouraged to "catch up" with the North. By framing international relations as an Apartheid system, I attempt to tell a different version of the story. This new way of telling the story enables us to see, firstly, that the development of the North depended (and depends) on its exploitative relationship with the South. Moreover, the South has not been "outside" of development or "behind" the North but has been playing an integral part in the story of development. This implies that the South cannot develop along the lines of the North. Climate change has clearly demonstrated that the earth does not have the capacity to handle more development. Instead of promoting the development of the South, we should focus on redistribution. This is not a matter of charity, but of justice since, as we have seen, massive redistribution has already taken place from the South to the North.

Throughout the monograph we have seen that development projects have been gendered in multiple ways. Firstly, a strong continuity in the narrative of development has been the ways in which women from the Global North and South have been represented. In both colonial development projects and contemporary sustainable development projects, women from the North were presented as empowered and liberated, while women from the South were presented as "beasts of burden" stuck in archaic patriarchal relations. The policies that have followed from this paradigm have focused on instructing women in the South on how they can also become empowered and liberated like the women in the North. This is representative of the broader colonial narrative that sees the South as "stuck in the past".

Applying a "thinking with history" approach to the representation of women in development policies also reveals that the notion of what constitutes an empowered woman has changed over time. In colonial development projects, women from the North were sent to colonies to educate the women there on domesticity and maternity. Today, projects are much more focused on economic empowerment and "investing in human resources". Empowered women are thus no longer defined in terms of their domestic skills, but as women who participate in the labour force and have access to finance. However, there is still a strong continuity in the fact that investments in women are seen as investments in their communities. If women are framed as investments, the implicit assumption also remains that the investors are masculine. This perhaps further reinforces the notion that women must be helped or empowered by men, just as the Global South ostensibly has to be empowered by the North. Women in the Global South have thus consistently

been presented as tools to advance development. This monograph has not attempted to contest policies such as improved healthcare and education for women. Instead, I want to raise questions about how empowerment is defined and who gets to decide on the definition.

Gender has also been an important link between the Apartheid system in SA and Global Apartheid. Just as black female domestic workers had to migrate from their "homelands" in order to perform the domestic tasks of white women in Apartheid SA, women from the Global South today migrate to the North to work as domestic workers. This is one of the clearest examples of how positionality in the Global Apartheid system has been structured along intersectional axes such as gender, class, race and geography. This is also a link to some of the "regional" forms of apartheid discussed in chapter three, particular the migrant labour system in the Gulf States. The Gulf States example further demonstrates how migrant labour systems are shaped by gender and ethnicity. As with Apartheid in SA, we could see that economic dimensions shaped exploitation, but that racial/ethnic and gender factors cannot be mechanically reduced to economics.

Furthermore, gendered discourses present the strongest point of convergence between the two primary types of Global Apartheid we are facing today, namely the Obama option and the Trump option. There were differences in the types of masculinity that Obama and Trump represented. Although I do not provide an in-depth analysis of this topic, the brief discussion of Trump's masculine discourses demonstrates that his form of masculinity is defined by domination, militarism and competition. In concurrence with Obama's more polished version of Apartheid, his masculinity comes across as more gentlemanly[117]. However, both Trump and Obama perpetuate the colonial notion that the treatment of women is a barometer of civilisation. Trump's conduct has clearly contradicted his proclaimed dedication to women's empowerment. This is perhaps reminiscent of the ways in which British colonial patriarchs claimed to be dedicated to the upliftment of women in colonies while they were augmenting the power of African patriarchs and opposing an increasingly vocal feminist movement in Britain (Tétreault, 2006: 37).

In addition to the similarities between Trump and Obama's presentation of women, as discussed in chapter four, I have argued that they uphold different versions of the same system. Trump's version of Global Apartheid is a system of separate development that depends on hyper-securitisation and fear of the "other". Trump's discursive strategies clearly echoed Apartheid notions of "die swart gevaar" (black danger) and an "influx" of migrants. Obama largely upheld the same system, as demonstrated by his brutal border control policies. However, he discursively emphasised the need to help the Global South develop and adapt to climate change. This discourse is more reminiscent of notions of tutelage that were associated with a more liberal version of Apartheid.

[117] There are multiple other sources that discuss Obama's masculinity and, especially, claim that he was not "man enough". For example, Frank Rudy Cooper discusses attacks on Obama's masculinity in relation to his positionality as a black man. In the lead-up to the 2008 election, one columnist even referred to Obama as America's first female president (Cooper, 2009:633).

Although Trump's version of Global Apartheid is despicable, Obama's version is more dangerous in some ways. This is because Trump's version is more explicitly brutal and easier to criticise. On the other hand, Obama's version is couched in the glossy language of assistance and humanitarianism while his policies towards the Global South were not significantly less brutal.

Neither one of the two options discussed above will enable the majority of humanity to deal with the challenges associated with climate change, much less actually address the causes of anthropogenic climate change. Although profit and power have clearly played a significant role in maintaining the status quo,[118] I have argued that the stories that have accompanied these power structures have been extremely significant. Stories influence the ways in which people see humanity's past and future. As demonstrated by the discussion of the discourse of sustainable development, stories frame the ways in which problems are defined and thus people's conceptions of what should be done and what is possible.

I have noted throughout that the narrative of development has been contested, not least by many of the scholars cited in this monograph. I also mention the ways in which activist groups such as indigenous peoples' organisations have opened up spaces for new stories to be told. It is discouraging that the narrative of development has survived amidst so many critiques. However, the fact that a story can hold so much sway should perhaps embolden thinkers, artists and activists around the world to keep telling different and new stories. In relation to Apartheid in SA, Norman Etherington (cited in Dubow, 2014: 288) argues that history was "the master tool of intellectual resistance to apartheid". The fundamental aim of this monograph has thus been to contribute to calls for global justice through telling the (his) story of development differently.

[118] For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, please consult Klein's (2014) *This changes everything.*

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

Mfecane, S. 2018. (Un)knowing MEN: Africanising gender justice programmes for men in South Africa.

In (Un)knowing Men Sakhumzi Mfecane shares his critical reflections on research on men and masculinities in South Africa. In South Africa, he argues, there seems to be an impasse in scholarly accounts of men and masculinities. Old theories do not provide new answers; violence against women, homicide, rape of women and children, and homophobia persist despite heavy financial investments by the government and international NGOs in research, education and activism that seek to end all forms of gender inequality in South Africa. Research and interventions, Mfecane points out, centre on the same goal of subverting patriarchy without putting patriarchy in proper social and historical context.

Wielenga, C., Bae, B. B., Dahlmanns, E., Matshaka, C., Matsimbe, Z. & Murambadoro, R. 2018. Women in the Context of Justice: Continuities and Discontinuities in Southern Africa.

This Handbook builds on the work of a longer term project on justice and governance practices at community level during periods of transition. This project is particularly interested in the burgeoning endeavour to incorporate community justice practices into transitional justice interventions after mass violence. One of the issues identified is that there seems to be a knee-jerk reaction to community justice practices, including the response that such practices are 'patriarchal' and 'gender-biased', and thus that they need to be abolished.



Mawere, Tinashe. 2019. Gendered and Sexual Imagi(nations), the 2018 Zimbabwean E(r)ections and the Aftermath.

Gendered and Sexual Imagi(nations) attempts to answer questions that have been central to scholarship within the humanities. Drawing on the concepts which Schneider refers to as the basic building blocks of society, i.e. "the quartet of kinship, economics, politics, and religion", Mawere explores, on the one hand, the historiography of the Zimbabwean state, specifically the Mugabe era, and the particular ways in which it has been underpinned by a deeply rooted system of patriarchal values. On the other hand, this text asks questions which most authors have shied away from asking. Rather than constructing a perspective which imagines leaders of ZANU-PF and the MDC in natural opposition and fundamentally different because of divergent political visions, Gendered and Sexual Imagi(nations) asks its readers to take note of the commonalities shared by male leaders of these parties, and, in fact, held by most male politicians.



Nduna, Mzikazi. 2020. A magnifying glass and a fine-tooth comb: understanding girls' and young women's sexual vulnerability.

Research with regard to the sexuality of adolescent girls and young women continues to suggest new approaches for understanding the sexual risks experienced by girls and young women in Southern Africa. Whilst this knowledge base reveals that young women's life conditions and experiences are sub-optimal, some sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) interventions are designed and delivered with unchecked assumptions. This monograph addresses some of the assumptions underpinning adolescent girls' and young women's vulnerability that could be considered when designing and delivering SRHR interventions.

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Limited free hardcopies are available from the CSA&G offices on request.

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About the Author

Elize Soer is a doctoral student at the *Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies*. She previously worked as a part-time researcher at the *Centre for Sexualities, AIDS and Gender (CSA&G)* on the Gender Justice project. Elize obtained her degree in International Relations and Political Science as well as a joint honours degree in History and International Political Economy from the *University of Pretoria (UP).* She also completed her master's degree in History in 2019. During her postgraduate studies, she worked as a part-time lecturer at the *Department of Historical and Heritage Studies* at *UP*. Currently, her research is focused on the role of imagined futures and fictional expectations in transition periods and in capitalist dynamics more broadly. She is generally interested in narratives and ideologies related to temporarily and the relationship between notions of the past, present and future.

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